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OF THE

HOLY SCRIPTURES.

SECOND SERIES.

BY ELEAZAR LORD.

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PREFACE.

THE present fulfills an intimation expressed at the close of the former Volume under the same title.

The most striking feature of the very numerous, learned, philosophical, and theological treatises of modern times, on the subject of Inspiration, is that of their various and inconsistent definitions, theories, and speculations. It is remarkable that, at a period characterized as preëminently the age of Bibles, when the Protestant world, aware of the Divine purposes to be fulfilled by the universal diffusion of the Sacred Oracles, is engaged in the publication of them in the languages of all the nations of the earth, their inspiration, the basis of their claim to infallibility and Divine authority, should, by one class of writers, be asserted on erroneous and fallacious principles; and by other classes, be openly assailed, impugned, or denied, upon various contradictory and hostile theories and assumptions; that learned and orthodox men of the one class, who hold the Scriptures to be the infallible word of God, should assume that infallible guidance of the sacred writers, instead of a conveyance to their minds of the infallible thoughts and words which they were to record, was the object and end of Inspiration; and that men of the other class should treat the subject as involving no specific element of infallibility whatever. On the one hand, a state of things, in all respects unprecedented, exists in regard to the means and facilities of diffusing the Oracles of God among all nations; on the other, the plenary inspiration and Divine authority of those Oracles is called in question in new and imposing forms of theory and speculation.

The organizations, efforts, and agencies of Protestant Christendom for the dissemination of the Scriptures, proceed upon the avowed principle and belief that they are the infallible Word of God. This it is that demands, encourages, and justifies those efforts, and the vast array of preparations which have been made for their enlargement; and, at the same time, is the sure ground of confidence that they will be persevered in and extended, till the earth is filled with the knowledge of Jehovah, when men shall see eye to eye, shall be of one mind as to what the Scriptures teach, and there shall be one Lord, and His *Name* one—the manifestation of His perfections, acts, and purposes being made and declared alike to all. On the other hand, the great adversary of those oracles seeks, through such instrumentalities as he can influence, to impeach their Divine authority, deny their inspiration, and destroy all confidence in their infallibility. Hence, as the conflict is evidently tending to a single point—that of the nature of Inspiration, or the nature, extent, and effects of that Inspiration which is affirmed of the Holy Scriptures—we may reasonably expect, that, as those Divinely appointed means of reformation and salvation shall be more and more widely diffused among the families of the earth, the opposing efforts will be more and more exerted against this cardinal point. The earlier grounds and methods of opposition to the claims of the Sacred Oracles have failed. The Church still exists, and with more energy, confidence, and hope than ever, is erecting her standard in every land; and the characteristics of those whose faith rests solely on the Scriptures as the inspired and infallible Word of God, remain unchanged.

Externally, Christianity and the Bible have been assailed at every point. Philosophical and speculative theories of man, and of nature, have assumed all the forms and hues, it may be presumed, of which they are capable. Criticism is exhausted, and dying of atrophy. The mystic echoes of senseless matter, of mummies, of lavas, of fossil bones, and nether rocks, have been evoked to little purpose. Psychology, physiology, and a score of other *ologies*, have been explored in search of arguments against the supernatural and the historical claims of the sacred

volume. Under one leadership or another, of professed friends, or open enemies, all the phenomena of nature have been arrayed against the written words of the Self-Existent Author of nature. But these appliances have resulted in no tangible evidence, no rational conviction, no stable conclusion, nothing satisfactory. The nature of evidence has been discussed, as if those whose faith in the Divine inspiration, authority, and infallibility of the Holy Scriptures, is so unwavering and effective as to work a change of their hearts, reform their lives, deliver them from fear, and make them triumphant even in death, needed to be informed why they believed, or on what kind of evidence a real faith must necessarily rest. Logic, as the science of evidence, is set up, as a scaling-ladder in a siege, with its steps and rounds of intuition and induction, and planted on that ground of intuition in the mind itself which excludes all external testimony, and all supernatural works and revelations; and is made to pronounce self-evidence to be no evidence. The apostles of idealism, pantheism, and rationalism, on the continent, assert and argue that there is nothing supernatural and divine in Inspiration, nothing that is not common to all mankind, nothing peculiar to any, except in degree. Recent publications of ministers, theological teachers, philosophical speculators, and critics, in England, exhibit equally degenerate views. In a labored treatise by the Rev. John Macnaught, a clergyman of the Established Church, Inspiration is thus defined: "The term signifies that action of the Divine Spirit by which, apart from any idea of infallibility, all that is good in man, beast, or matter, is originated and sustained," (p. 163;) and Rev. Mr. Maurice, professor of Divinity in Kings College, London, teaches that there is no difference between the inspiring influences of the Spirit, and those influences which are common to all Christians.

It is especially since the outburst of new and extraordinary agencies in translating, printing, and disseminating the Word of God throughout the earth, that the rationalistic and pantheistic theories in opposition to the plenary inspiration, Divine authority, and infallibility of the Holy Scriptures, have been put forth. The adverse demonstrations

have kept pace with the progress of natural science and speculative philosophy, and with the provocatives of the depraved heart to infidelity and atheism which are derived from the successful progress of Christian efforts in the diffusion of the Scriptures. Meantime, while the resources of naturalism and rationalism have been plied, and have been aided by the arts of dissimulation, of indirect assault, of affected proffers of reconciliation, of conceding as to its essence what is claimed to be revelation, while rejecting the words which express it, and of scrupulosity, or of hypocrisy, in deeming what science is said to teach to be a safer ground of inference than the text of Scripture; the Christian party have gained much—much in confidence, in concentration of effort, in the facilities of translating, of printing, and of disseminating copies of the inspired word, in the removal of obstacles to their action, which, in respect to large portions of the human race, were formerly insurmountable, in the countenance and sanction of civil governments, and in the public opinion both of civilized and uncivilized nations.

Regarding the subject in this light, and considering the source and nature of the hostile efforts, it is natural to conclude that the controversy will be narrowed down to the question of plenary divine inspiration—at least to a degree hitherto unknown. For on the belief of that doctrine all the efforts for the publication and diffusion of the Holy Scriptures in the various languages of the earth are, avowedly, based, and unless that doctrine can be subverted there is no resource of opposition left, in a way of argument, that can promise to be of any avail. And unless that doctrine can be subverted, and the infallibility of reason, or that of the papal Hierarchy, be sustained, physical means of coërcion will naturally be resorted to.

There is, moreover, in the present aspect of the whole subject, reason to conclude, that the sacred volume will increasingly more and more, be employed, honored and vindicated by its Divine Author as the instrument of accomplishing the purposes which He has therein disclosed concerning the overthrow of all false systems and the illumination and conversion of mankind. Apparently what has hitherto been

done, is but preliminary. The Divine Wisdom has seen fit, in the great drama of Providence and the trial of fallen human nature before the face of the universe, to permit the abettors of infidelity and error in all their forms, fully to manifest themselves. A change of scene is, seemingly, at hand. The "last days," the period when the Gospel is to be communicated to all nations, when by means of the Holy Scriptures the earth is to be filled with the knowledge of Jehovah, as the waters fill the places of the deep, are drawing nigh. Translations into all the principal languages have been accomplished; facilities of printing and publication have been multiplied; the difficulties of access to the most populous nations, have passed, or are passing away: and it is becoming evident to Bible Societies and their agents, that the Divine Word, which they disseminate, is to be more and more conspicuously, the direct means of subverting error and changing the sentiments and hearts of men. By that means multitudes, whole tribes, whole nations, may, as easily as here and there an individual, be taught of God, and turned from darkness to light. The deficiency of converted men to be educated and fitted to be preachers, qualified and furnished to encounter all the heresies and errors of the Christian and the Anti-Christian world, may cease to be an obstacle to the universal propagation and triumph of the Gospel. The word of God and the testimony of witnessing converts, evangelists, colporteurs, raised up for the purpose, both in regions partially occupied by ordained ministers of the Gospel, and in regions inaccessible to them—may by the Spirit, poured out from on high, be rendered effectual to the pulling down of strongholds, and overcoming the armies of the aliens.

The various forms of antagonism to the Bible, as exhibited hitherto, have failed of any decisive and permanent success, and are no longer likely to attract supporters; which, in connection with the growing influence and onward progress of the Bible itself in its proper mission, strongly indicates that the opposing forces will be driven to concentrate their attacks on the Divine Inspiration and authority of the Scriptures themselves, instead of trusting to a predatory warfare on their outposts.

But if the course of events suggests this, the principles on which the opposing parties depend, and to which they seem to be irretrievably reduced, still more distinctly indicate the same result. The foundation principle of the philosophical theories now in the ascendant, is, *that there is no absolute and immutable Truth*—that whatever any system may pretend to as truth, is only relative, and is no further the same to one mind as to another, than the knowledge and observation of physical and mental phenomena of one corresponds to that of the other. That which assumes the aspect of truth, at one time, in relation to those phenomena as then observed, may cease to have that aspect at another time, or as the things observed are different, or are regarded in a different light. In short, what are called truths being not absolutely, but only relatively such, may be opposed to each other; and therefore all opinions, religions, and creeds may be equally true as held at different periods, by different peoples, or as held together.

But if the Scriptures are divinely inspired, if they are the Word of God, then they are infallible and immutable truth, and as such are the direct point of attack and denial, to the dogmas of philosophy.

Again the Romish Hierarchy while professing to receive the Scriptures as of Divine inspiration, are opposed to the dissemination of them among the people. But they do not in fact receive them as infallible, immutable, and conclusive. On the contrary, they hold that the supreme ecclesiastical authority of the Church of Rome is invested with infallibility to decide what shall be received as truth. Their system rests on this dogma; and to maintain it, they must deny the inspiration and infallibility of the Scriptures. For the Divine inspiration of the Scriptures is the ground of their infallibility, and to assert another infallibility, which may add to or diminish aught from them, is to deny their inspiration; it is to deny that they are the words of God, to assert an authority superior to theirs, and to claim plenary authority and discretion to suppress and annul them, and to add apocryphal books to the original canon, and new articles of faith and practice.

It is admitted on both sides that infallibility in respect to what must be believed in order to salvation, is absolutely necessary. The Holy

Scriptures claim to be infallible on the ground that they are the words of God, given, imparted, expressed, to the sacred writers by inspiration of God. If He is infallible and immutable, then what He said, what He spake by the Prophets and Apostles, and inspired into their minds and moved them to write, is infallible and immutable. This is the argument of Protestants. They believe in the absolute infallibility of God; they believe the Scriptures to be His word, and as such believe them to be infallible; they believe their articles of faith solely on the authority of God, because those articles are expressly taught and affirmed in His Word; their faith rests solely on the authority of God, as expressed in His own word; they receive and believe no article of faith on the authority or testimony of "any man or church."

True, they must be satisfied by examination, reason, argument, that the Scriptures are the Word of God, given by His inspiration. But so on the other hand must the Romanist, whose faith rests on the authority and alleged inspiration of the sovereign pontiff, ascertain by the exercise of his reason, the nature and ground of the pontiff's claims, and what his decisions and prescriptions are, and what articles of faith and rules of life, he promulgates and enjoins on them. In the nature of things, the meaning of his dogmas, rescripts, and decrees, must be determined by his words in the same way that the meaning of the words of God as written in the Scripture must be determined. A Romanist who believes the Pope to be inspired and infallible, can not be any more certain that he rightly understands what the Pope says, than a Protestant can be certain that he understands what God says in His word; and in adopting the articles of faith of the papal system, the papist exercises his private judgment, as really as the Protestant in adopting the Scriptures as the infallible rule of faith and life. An inspiration of the Pope, were it real, could no more make his words intelligible and infallible, than the inspiration of the Scriptures makes them intelligible and infallible. The difference beween the two cases is, that the Protestant's faith rests directly on the authority of God, while the papist's faith rests on the alleged authority of man in the person of the Pope under his claim of inspiration. To give the papist

any advantage in respect to the use of reason, private judgment, and infallible certainty, he should himself be inspired as well as the sovereign Pontiff.

What is plainly of the first necessity to those who hold, teach, and disseminate the Scriptures as the infallible word of God, is a clear, intelligible, Scriptural definition of inspiration as the act of God. Next, the application of the doctrine founded on such definition, to the phenomena of the sacred text, and the clearing of the subject in all its relations from the blur and taint of human speculation, philosophy, folly, and corruption.

There is, at present, as manifested to the public eye and ear, in all quarters, the utmost confusion of theories and definitions. An inspection of the numerous publications which have issued from the British press since the philosophical treatise of Mr. Morell, can hardly fail to result in a strong conviction that the purely speculative, idealistic, and pantheistic views of that author had, in some instances, wholly, and in others partially, modified the theories, definitions, illustrations, distinctions, use of terms, and conclusions of nearly every writer who has succeeded him. And while the adorable Head of the Church, "whose word that goeth forth out of His mouth, shall not return unto Him void, but shall accomplish that which He pleases, and shall prosper in the thing whereto He sends it," is directing the agencies of His Providence to the universal diffusion of that word among the nations, it is not unlikely that He may yet subject His professing people in the communities where the Scriptures have long been a common inheritance, to a conflict with His enemies, concerning the inspiration, infallibility, and authority of those sacred oracles which will demand an exhibition of the faith of martyrs.

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CHAPTER I.

RECAPITULATION.

In the preceding volume, bearing the same title as the present, the following facts and principles were insisted on:

That a revelation from God was originally and indispensably necessary to man.

That a divine revelation, to fulfill its purpose, must be made in the ordinary language, styles, and idioms, of its recipients.

That it is according to man's constitution, a law of his mind, exemplified in his experience and consciousness, that he thinks in words; that he conceives, receives from others, is conscious of, remembers, and expresses, thoughts, only in words and signs equivalent to vocal articulations; that words and intelligible signs are the sole medium and instrument of thought; that thoughts are conveyed from one human mind to another only in words and signs; and accordingly, that, in conformity to man's nature, the divine thoughts were conveyed into the minds of the sacred writers, in words, by inspiration.

That inspiration was a Divine act, exerted, not on the faculties of the sacred penmen, but exerted in conveying to their minds the thoughts which they were to express in writing.

That the inspiration of thoughts in the words which were to be written, enabled the writers intelligently and infallibly to record them in writing; so that the words which they wrote, being the very words by which they became, by inspiration, conscious of the thoughts, were in fact, as the Scriptures declare them to be, the words of God.

That what the sacred penmen wrote was inspired into their minds in the language, style, and idiom, of the respective writers—because they understood, and were qualified by their education to write that language in the style to which they were respectively accustomed; because their readers also were qualified to understand what they so wrote; and because when translated into the like phraseology of different nations, what they wrote would be level to the capacity of the common people whose thoughts and style of expression, are, for the most part, essentially alike.

That as we conceive and are conscious of thoughts only in words, so our words necessarily and perfectly signify and express the thoughts which we conceive in them; since all that we are conscious of in thinking we are conscious of in the words in which we think.

That in thinking the mind selects and collocates the words in which we are conscious of our thoughts, and which we speak or write when we express our thoughts to others: since we are no otherwise conscious of thoughts than of the words in that succession in which

we write or vocally express them; and since the thought conveyed in a perfect sentence is precisely that thought only as it is defined and qualified by the particular words employed and collocated as they are when the sentence is written; so that to conceive a thought in words is, of necessity, to conceive it in words collocated as when written, so as perfectly to express it.

That, accordingly, the *usus loquendi*, the exact signification, or sense in which words are used in the connections, grammatical forms and collocations assigned to them in sentences, is fixed by the action of the mind in thinking, so that the rule of usage is predetermined by the intellectual cogitative act.

That language is not a product of human ingenuity, but a primeval gift of God, essential to man's exercise of the power of thought, and necessary at the very dawn of his existence.

That words are the matrix, vehicle, instrument of thought, and as articulated and written, are representatives, not of *things*, but only of *thoughts*.

That words are as perfect a medium of thought as light is of visual, or air of auricular perception; and to those who understand and use them alike, they perfectly convey the thoughts conceived in them from one mind to another.

That inspired thoughts as expressed in the words of the original text of Scripture, being clearly conceived in those words by a translator, and as clearly conceived in the words of another language, may be as clearly expressed in such other words as they are in the original; and the inspired thoughts may be conveyed to

the reader of the translation, as perfectly as they were conveyed by inspiration to the sacred writers, and as they were conveyed to the readers of the original text: since in both instances equally, the words perfectly express and are the correlates, vehicles, and representatives of the thoughts conceived in them; and since it is impossible that particular thoughts should be perfectly conceived, except in words which perfectly represent and express them.

That the words of the original text of Scripture, being the words in which the Divine thoughts were inspired into the minds of the sacred writers, infallibly represent those thoughts, and are as infallible as the thoughts are.

That the words of Scripture are the words of God, because He inspired them into the minds of those whom He appointed to write them; they are the infallible rule of faith, because they express the thoughts which He inspired in them; and they are immutable because His thoughts change not.

That while all the words of Scripture, whether relating to original revelations or to matters of human experience and history, were inspired into the minds of the sacred writers, the doctrine of plenary Divine Inspiration does not imply that the words recorded as having been spoken by wicked men and evil spirits were divinely inspired into the minds of those speakers, but only that, in order to the words of those speakers being infallibly recorded, they were conveyed to the minds of the sacred writers by inspiration. Job's friends did not speak by inspiration; but what they said, the very words which they uttered, were inspired

into the mind of the writer of the book of Job. Satan did not speak to Eve by inspiration; but what he said to her was conveyed to Moses by inspiration, to be by him recorded with infallible accuracy.

In our view of the inspiration of the Divine thoughts in the words of the sacred text, the Scriptures are, collectively, the Word of God; and as such, are infallible and endure forever. Every doctrinal truth which they reveal, every inspired sentiment which they utter, and every historical fact which they certify, will forever remain immutable as originally inspired and expressed —the Word of God—the Testimony of Jesus Christ.

The Word of God, as recorded in the Bible, thus stands out as the verbal expression of His thoughts, His will, His purposes, and His acts; and as the vehicle of His power in the works of creation, providence, and grace, and the intermediate instrument of intellectual and spiritual intercourse and influence, between Him and men: in a manner, analogous, in respect to its externality, its mediate instrumentality, and its enduring existence, to the Divine Logos; the personal Word incarnate, the visible Mediator; a chief end of all whose works is to fulfill what the written word testifies of Him: "For of Him, and to Him, and through Him, are all things; to whom be glory forever, amen." The created intelligences of all worlds are to see and be conscious that every word of Scripture is verified, vindicated, and fulfilled in and through Him. By Him were all things created, that unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known, by His administration of all things relatively to the Church, the manifold wisdom of God, accord-

ing to His eternal purpose which He purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord; which, as a mystery, was revealed to Paul and written by him. (Eph. 3.) "To Him every knee shall bow; of those in heaven, and those on earth, and those under the earth; and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." (Philippians 2.)

In carrying out His comprehensive scheme of agency and manifestation, with reference to present results, and to the intelligence and homage of creatures in all future time; and in administering all things under the ancient economy in relation to His redemptive work, and in literal conformity to his inspired word, He assumed a theocratic relation to His covenant people; and exercised His peculiar offices and prerogatives as Mediatorial Prophet, Priest, and King. Of the government which He instituted over the children of Israel, He was the Lawgiver and the Head—the chief Magistrate—the King. His throne was the mercy seat—the ark of His covenant—in the inner and secluded precinct of His tabernacle. But being invisibly, though personally present, He signified and made known His presence by His vocal utterance of words—words articulated, heard, understood, and often responded to in the same sense and manner as the words addressed by one human person to another. In that ordinary and accustomed sense His words were received, believed, and relied on as infallibly conveying His meaning, His thoughts, promises, testimonies.

That *faith,* accordingly, which, as the instrument in justification, connects the soul with Christ, is belief of the testimony which the Scriptures express concerning

Him. It is realized to man's consciousness in the words of Scripture. It is believing the testimony which God has given in the words inspired by Him; believing it on His authority, and because He has spoken it. Words are the vehicle of that testimony. The act is like that of seeing, of which light is the medium.

Among the things which specially characterize this testimony, both under the ancient and the present dispensation, are those which relate to His person, as constituted by the union of the human with His Divine nature; and those which relate to His mediatorial offices and works as Prophet, Priest, and King. These things are sometimes expressed separately; often in connection with each other; and all of them are more or less distinctly implied in those testimonies which relate expressly to the shedding of His blood—the sacrifice of His life—as a substitute for actual transgressors, and instead of directly inflicting on them the penalty of the Law.

These things are testified throughout the Old Testament Scriptures. They are as truly the basis and essence of the Patriarchal and Levitical economies, as of the Christian. The faith through which the patriarchs were justified, was faith in them, however summarily and briefly they may be expressed in the written word; and to whatever extent they may be conveyed in the forms of promise, and through the instrumentality of types and ritual observances. Every statement, promise, representation, implies—as well as those which directly express them—that those who are said to believe the verbal statements, had knowledge of the things referred to.

Thus the faith through which Abraham was justified, is every where represented as an implicit unwavering belief of verbal promises of God, which in every instance, expressed, or implied and involved, those testimonies concerning Christ as Redeemer and Saviour, which constitute the substance of the Gospel. On the promise being announced to him that, contrary to all human probability, he should have a son, and a numerous posterity, he believed Jehovah, and He counted it to him for righteousness; for that belief included faith in Christ, who in respect to His human nature, was to be one of his descendants, and preëminently the Seed in whom all the covenants and promises centred. By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac, the son who had been promised, and through whom the other promises were to be fulfilled; accounting that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead. He believed God, who quickeneth the dead; believed what he spoke to him, solely because He spoke it; believed it as His word, involving His infinite authority and prescience, whether command or promise, and whether more or less comprehensive and expressive of His covenant and purpose of redemption through the mediation and sacrifice of Christ. By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous, or justified; which implies that he believed the Divine testimonies concerning the substitution and death of Christ for the redemption of sinners.

Paul writes to Timothy: "Continue thou in the things which thou hast learned, and hast been assured of; knowing of whom thou hast learned them, and that

from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." All Scripture is *theopneustos*, God-inbreathed—inbreathed, inspired, of God. Timothy had learned of God by His inspired words in Scripture, on which his faith was founded.

That which the prophets and apostles spoke and wrote in their official character was regarded by their contemporaries, as being not theirs, in thought or language, but as being, on the contrary, the words of God. The distinction between true and false prophets, was that the *false* uttered only their own thoughts and words, and the *true* only the thoughts and words of God. They called upon their auditors to hear from them the words of God. "He spake by the mouth of all His holy prophets since the world began." The apostles "spake the word of God with boldness;" multitudes came together to "hear the word of the Lord from them." (Acts 4.) Peter refers to all the epistles of Paul as Scriptures, which "the unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction."

Such faith rests on the words of Scripture as used in their grammatical sense and connection in sentences. The reason why the rules of grammar are the true and fitting rules of construing and interpreting sentences, is not that they are rules devised by grammarians for that purpose, but that they are inherent in language itself—being founded in the conception of thoughts in words. Words jointly with the thoughts which they express, are conceived in their due grammatical forms

and relations. The parts of speech necessary to the perfect consciousness and expression of our thoughts are conceived in the forms which underlie and imply the rules of grammar. This occurs spontaneously. No one in consciously conceiving thoughts in words has any conscious reference to the rules of grammar, any more than a skillful performer while rapidly touching the right keys of his instrument, so as to perform correctly the tune which he wills to play, has a conscious reference to the rules of musical composition. Of the action of the soul in thinking—complex, effective, and inconceivably rapid as it may be—we are not conscious. We are conscious only of the effects, in our conceptions of thoughts in words. We infer the action from the effects. And as we are alike conscious of the words and thoughts, which indeed are to our consciousness identical, we as justly ascribe to that action the production of the words in the requisite forms and collocations, as the thoughts which are their correlates. Those words in those forms and relations, perfectly echo, represent, and express the thoughts conceived in them, which is the same as to say that they grammatically express those thoughts.

If we did not think grammatically, by a necessity like that by which we see and distinguish the same objects with unerring certainty at different times, and hear and distinguish the same sounds at successive periods under like conditions, then no formal rules of grammar could possibly enable us to adjust our words so as perfectly to express our thoughts. If our thoughts as we originally and naturally conceive them, were not, in respect to their arrangement and relations, conform-

able to the true rules of grammar, then it would be impossible to adjust our words to them by the artificial verbal rules of grammar. Words are the servants, instruments, vehicles, echoes, expressions of thoughts. In the order of nature, thoughts have the precedence. If the thoughts are not necessarily grammatical—if the words are subject to grammatical rules independently of the thoughts—then there is no necessary or immutable relation between them, and no ground of certainty that a grammatical arrangement of the words of a sentence will perfectly express the thoughts as they were conceived and are intended to be conveyed. But if we think grammatically, and think in words, then the rules of grammar are founded in the action of the soul in thinking.

It is apparent, therefore, that to expound the language of a sentence, so as to exhibit the thoughts intended to be expressed by it, is to exhibit the thoughts of the author as he conceived and arranged them in his words, that is, in conformity to the true rules of grammar. The expositor, therefore, must understand the words as the author did, and must conceive the thoughts in those words as the author conceived them. When he so conceives the thoughts, the grammatical rules may, if correct, assist, and can not mislead or embarrass him.

This grammatical conception of thoughts in words, is, in like manner, the prerequisite and basis of the *usus loquendi*—the ground of legitimate and authoritive usage. Those who conceive the same thoughts, equally conceive, and when not misled by education, or biased by vicious example, express them conformably to the rules of grammar. The particular words to be used,

and in the forms in which they are to be used, are necessitated and determined in the conception of the simple, modified, or complex thoughts to be expressed. The mind in willing to think or to conceive particular thoughts, has, in its primary action, equal scope and freedom, in respect to the thoughts and words, the thoughts and words being conceived together.

But after conceiving particular thoughts in fitting and answerable words, the mind may, by reflection, review its thoughts, and revise the words in which they were originally conceived, and may conceive the same thoughts in other words, doing in effect what a translator from one language into another does. This process opens the door of influence from the imagination, and the feelings, emotions, and passions; and is modified by rhetorical rules, literary tastes, and a thousand extraneous causes by which the power of conception is baffled and enervated, the intellect is rendered feeble, indecisive, and confused, and the thoughts dressed in an artificial garb, are lost, or rendered pointless. No man should speak or write without such knowledge of what he intends to say, as to enable him to conceive his thoughts at first in the words in which he ought once for all to express them.

The foregoing observations respecting the grammatical conception of thoughts, pre-suppose that the exercise of the power of thought is acquired by education, example, vocal and literary instruction, hearing and reading the words of those who speak and write grammatically, so that the natural capacity and tendency of the mind to conceive thoughts in their due orderly succession, shall not be thwarted and perverted

by the force of erroneous teaching and example. At the same time these observations may serve to confirm and illustrate the fact that the natural or constitutional laws of intellectual action, the laws of thought, were not infringed or deviated from, by the inspiration of the divine thoughts and words into the minds of the sacred writers, but were strictly conformed to, the thoughts being inspired in the words and idioms in which the writers would naturally conceive them.

The primary error which pervades the treatises of those who believe in any Divine Inspiration, is that of regarding the inspiration *as an influence on the mental faculties of the sacred writers;* some regarding it as enlightening, exciting, assisting, and guiding; others as *guiding* them in the exercise of their faculties, but not otherwise affecting them—as rendering them infallible in what they spoke or wrote, but not rendering them omniscient; preserving them from asserting error, but not enabling them either to know or to remember all things. The fact of such a *guidance* is, we apprehend no where taught in Scripture as a constituent of inspiration; the mode of it is, we think, inconceivable. Inspiration, according to the Scriptures, imports no more nor less than inbreathing, imparting, conveying, into the minds of the writers, exactly, in thought and language, what they were to write. What they wrote, therefore, was infallible, solely because it was just what was given them by inspiration. It was no more necessary that the *men* should be rendered infallible or omniscient, in order to their receiving what was conveyed to them by inspiration, than in order to their receiving and uttering correctly what was expressed to them by

their fellow-men. Undoubtedly they were *moved* by the Holy Ghost to speak and write correctly, and without defect or mistake, just what they received by inspiration. But that *moving* of them was not of the nature of inspiration. They were not moved to receive, discover, or remember what they were to write, but to write what they had received and were conscious of by inspiration.

The difficulties, accordingly, which are sought to be obviated by a notion of guidance, or an influence on their faculties, are founded in a misconception of the nature and effect of inspiration. If they actually received from God just what they were to write, and actually wrote just what they received, then the difficulties in question are merely imaginary. That they did so receive and write just what was given them by inspiration of God, the Scriptures themselves clearly testify, and also that they were *moved* to utter just what they received; and on this ground it is that their writings claim to be the infallible word of God.

But on supposition that they did not *receive* from God by inspiration the thoughts and words which they were to utter by writing, or did not utter just the thoughts and words which they received, then, though a man may believe that the Scriptures are the infallible word of God, he can give to other men no scriptural or other conclusive evidence that they are infallibly His Word. He may say that the writers were rendered infallible in what they wrote; that they were rendered infallible in discerning the thoughts to be expressed, and in selecting the proper words; that they were infallibly guided, preserved from error, and the like; and he may

confidently and sincerely think so: such is his opinion, derived, it may be, as a necessary inference, from the doctrines which he believes the Scriptures to contain, or from his belief of the Divine authority and infallible truth of those doctrines; but such belief and opinion constitute no evidence either to him or to other men, that it was inspiration, or any thing which Scripture or philology define as inspiration, that so *guided* the sacred writers, and rendered them infallible. If there are certain truths of Scripture which man could not discover, but the belief of which, on the authority of God, is absolutely necessary to salvation, doubtless he that believes them and is conscious of that which constitutes salvation, may infer with undoubting confidence that the Scripture which records them is the infallible Word of God. But how shall that serve to convince those who have not so believed, those who are ignorant, those who have been erroneously instructed, those who have been deceived, bewildered, and misled? If they are to be convinced it must be by other means than the opinions, experience, or testimony of men. They may be convinced by their own examination, and by testimony that the Scriptures exhibit many truths which no man can possibly discover of himself; but that may be far from satisfying them that those truths as expressed in Scripture are the infallible, immutable word of God, and that every thing in Scripture alike involves His authority, and is part and parcel of the unalterable rule of faith and life on which his everlasting destiny depends. He may be staggered and confounded by the objections, criticisms, and arguments, addressed to his reason, by skeptical

philosophers and theorists. And if any thing is addressed to his reason to rectify his convictions, it must be of a nature to obviate those objections.

No man who pretends to believe any thing upon any kind of evidence, has any difficulty in admitting that those truths of Scripture which it was impossible for man to discover, were attained by some kind of inspiration. The great question is: What was the nature of that inspiration? If it was the act of God, conveying His thoughts in words into the minds of the sacred writers, then there is no room for doubt but that the words of Scripture are the infallible words of God. If He inspired those words into their minds, then they are His words. If it is the nature of inspiration to communicate thoughts, then it is its nature to communicate words, for thoughts are conveyed from without to the human mind in its intelligently conscious state, only in words and signs of equivalent significance.

This, which we take to be the only Divine inspiration, the only inspiration claimed and asserted by the Holy Scriptures, is the act of God; and is not less distinct from any act or agency of man, than is the act of creation, or the act of breathing into man the breath of life. But if those who discuss the origin of the Scriptures, the source of their language, their infallibility, their peculiarity of styles, may, in place of this inspiration, substitute something else; something, any thing, to suit their particular theory; an impersonal, indefinable, incomprehensible influence on man's faculties; a power of spiritual intuition; a *guidance* which wholly supersedes discretion and volition, and is equivalent to a gift of omniscience; a combination and

amalgamation of Divine and human agency in the same acts: in a word, if the theories and speculations of rationalists, idealists, and pantheists, may be taken as guides, we may justly expect a continued harvest of corresponding fruits. On the one system, the difficulties referred to, which relate to the Divine authority and infallibility of all the words and sentences of Scripture, are wholly superseded. On the other, they are confirmed, aggravated, and multiplied. If God alone determined what should be written on His authority, as His word, and as the infallible rule of faith and life, and if He inspired into the minds of the sacred penmen what He required to be written, and moved them to write it; if this is clearly taught in the Scriptures themselves, and is clearly consonant to man's exigencies, capacities, manner of receiving intelligence from without, and mode of intellectual action, thought, and consciousness, then we are warranted and bound to receive the Scriptures entire as the inspired, expressed, infallible word of God; and it behooves all men, one as much as another, the learned as much as the ignorant, to impute, whatever in them he does not comprehend or see the reason of, to his own ignorance, blindness, and incompetency. On this view, no man can, with any more consistency, reason, or conviction, refuse so to receive and believe the Scriptures, than he can refuse to believe his own existence, or the phenomena of his senses, until he fully comprehends all that they involve and imply. We have in fact no higher evidence on which to believe that God created and governs the world, than we have to believe that He appointed a succession of holy men to receive by in-

spiration from Him, and commit to writing in His name, and on His authority, the successive portions of the sacred Scriptures.

Now if God alone determined what should be written on His authority as Holy Scripture, and inspired into the minds of the sacred penmen the thoughts in the words which He intended they should write, then the actual existence of any one of the sentences of Scripture is as much and for the same reason, as that of any other, to be referred to this determination and inspiration; and there is no more ground of stumbling at the occurrence of one passage, than at the occurrence of any other. If His object and purpose, in giving the Scriptures by His inspiration, was such as to require all that variety of matter which the Scriptures actually contain—revelations, which it was impossible for man to discover, concerning Himself; His acts as Creator, Ruler, and Redeemer; His purposes, counsels, and covenants; His perfections and relations; His laws and providence; His vocal utterances; and His conveyance of thoughts by inspiration: and on the other hand, all that they contain concerning man: his nature, relations, and responsibilities; his conduct, his apostasy, his repentance and salvation, or the contrary; his experience, socially and as an individual; the biography, life, character, conduct, sentiments, beliefs, thoughts, purposes, motives, experience, death, and destiny, of individuals; the rise, history, decline and extinction of families, tribes, nations, dynasties; and if it was necessary that this variety of matter, for chronological, moral, or any other reasons, should be intimately and homogeneously connected and inter-

mingled, then there can be nothing more incongruous or improbable in the inspiration and committing to writing of any one portion than of any other. If the Divine wisdom determined that the very words uttered by Satan, through the serpent, to Eve, should be recorded, so that the manner of the temptation and fall of man, might be infallibly known to the whole race upon whom the consequences fall; then it is plain that He may, and if the narrative is true, must have conveyed the identical words of the Hebrew text to Moses by inspiration—inbreathing them into his mind. For in no other way is it possible to conceive that Moses could have infallibly known what words were uttered by Satan, or by either of the other speakers in that scene. If what was uttered by Joseph's brethren, in their conspiracy against him, should be recorded in Scripture in connection with the other facts of his history; that the conversation between Ahab and Jezebel concerning Naboth's vineyard, and a copy of the letters which she wrote in his name, should be recorded verbatim, as connected with the sequel of his history; that the private actions, opinions, expressions, designs, wishes, disappointments, sins, negligences, ignorance, of rulers and subjects, of prophets, and of sacred writers themselves, should in like manner be recorded; these and scores of similar instances, afford no more ground of objection to the words of the record having been expressly inspired into their minds to be written in the Sacred Scriptures, than direct revelations, predictions, or any other passages afford. The question is not as to the matter of the record. That was divinely predetermined. The question is as to how that record

came to be written by the authority and as the words of God; and if any of the words of Scripture were given to the prophets by inspiration of God, in order to their being recorded in His name and on His infallible authority, it must have been for reasons and from a necessity, equally applicable to them all; and accordingly the Scriptures themselves make no exception, but declare that all that was written as His word, was given by inspiration of God.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT WAS NOT, AND WHAT WAS, EFFECTED BY THE DIVINE ACT OF INSPIRATION.

FROM our view of the nature of inspiration the effects produced by it are rendered obvious, and may be explicitly stated; and, on the other hand, effects which those who deny the doctrine of plenary inspiration imagine to be necessary consequences of that doctrine, may be specified as not pertaining to it. This imputed class of effects behooves to be first noticed.

1. The Divine act of inspiration did not change, or in any way affect the moral character of the prophets, apostles, or other subjects of it. Holy men were not made such by that act. Unholy men, as Balaam and Caiaphas, who uttered what was conveyed into their minds by Divine inspiration, were not thereby rendered holy.

2. It did not add to, or affect their intelligence, knowledge, judgment, or consciousness, concerning matters of ordinary experience, scientific truths, or any thing, except the thoughts and words which were divinely inspired into their minds to be spoken or written by them. It did not remove their ignorance, or rectify their erroneous opinions concerning astrono-

my, geography, history, or any other branch of secular knowledge. Beyond what was conveyed to them by inspiration, they remained, as men, in every respect as ignorant and as liable to err, as they were before.

3. It did not render them infallible in respect to any thing, except in receiving and delivering what was inspired—inbreathed—into their minds. They spake and wrote what they were moved, and as they were moved, by the Holy Ghost, to speak and write. The Spirit spake in them and by them. They received by inspiration, and officially spoke and wrote only the infallible word of God. Apart from their reception and expression of what was so inspired, they remained as fallible as other men.

4. It did not affect their individual peculiarities, as thinkers, reasoners, and writers, or in respect to the language, style, and idioms, to which, by education and habit, they were accustomed. As the Divine thoughts were conveyed into their minds in words, they were of necessity conveyed in words and idioms with which they were familiar, of which they understood the usage and signification, and which they were qualified by education to speak and write, just as when Jehovah spoke audibly to the children of Israel, and to the prophets, He spoke in words, styles, and idioms, which they understood, and with which they were familiar.

5. It did not suspend or counteract any law, faculty, or function of their minds, nor impair their intelligent and conscious self-control. It did not contravene, disturb, or interfere with, the exercise of any of their faculties. Their reception of the thoughts conveyed

by Divine inspiration, affected their understandings in no degree differently from their reception of thoughts vocally expressed to them by their fellow-men. They were not subjected to a state of ecstasy on the one hand, nor to a state of unconsciousness on the other. They spoke and wrote what was conveyed to them by inspiration, just as they and their contemporaries and all men, acting rationally and freely, speak and write what they receive from each other. The only peculiarity discoverable in their case relates to the source of what was conveyed into their minds, and the mode in which it was conveyed.

6. It was not clairvoyance, spiritual intuition, plenary knowledge, or elevation of religious consciousness. It was not a mode of exercise of the human faculties. It was not a Divine influence on any of the faculties of man; but a Divine act conveying thoughts to the minds of the sacred writers, and through them, as the organs of communication, publishing them to their hearers and readers.

7. It was not a proper miracle. It was supernatural, but not contra-natural. It neither suspended nor counteracted any of their mental faculties, but was in conformity with the natural laws and ordinary operations of their minds.

On the other hand:

1. The Divine act of inspiration conveyed the thoughts, which the Scriptures express, to the minds of the sacred writers—to their understandings—to their intelligent consciousness.

2. It conveyed those thoughts in words—in the words which they were at the same time moved to

speak and write. The Spirit spake by them. His word was on their tongue. The Word of the Lord came unto them—was inspired into their minds—came audibly or in a manner equivalent to distinct vocal utterance—came *saying*, Thus saith the Lord, hear the word of the Lord—came either with an express command, or from their official relation, an implied command, to them to proclaim or write it.

It was a rule binding on the prophets, to speak the very words of God that were inspired into their minds. "The prophet that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully." (Jer. 23.) To speak any other than the words of God, was the mark of a false pretender to the prophetic office. Hence it is said of the false prophets: "They speak a vision of their own hearts, and not out of the mouth of the Lord." . . . Again: "I have not sent these prophets, yet they ran; I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied. . . . . I have heard what the prophets said, that prophesy lies in my name, saying, I have dreamed, I have dreamed . . . . they are prophets of the deceit of their own heart." (Jer. 23.) Moses told the people "all *the words* of the Lord, and wrote all *the words* of the Lord." (Ex. 24.) "Samuel told all *the words* of the Lord unto the people that asked of him a king." (1 Sam. 8.) "This word came from the Lord to Jeremiah, saying: Thus saith the Lord: stand in the court of the Lord's house and speak . . . all *the words* that I command thee to speak; diminish not *a word*." (Chap. 26.) "The word that came to Jeremiah from the Lord, saying: Thus speaketh the Lord God of Israel, saying, Write thee *all the words* that I have spoken unto thee in a book."

. . . Again: "These are *the words* that the Lord spake concerning Israel and concerning Judah." (Chap. 30.) "This word came unto Jeremiah from the Lord, saying: Take thee a roll of a book, and write therein all *the words* that I have spoken unto thee against Israel and against all the nations. . . . . Then Jeremiah called Baruch, the Scribe, and Baruch wrote from the mouth of Jeremiah all *the words* of the Lord, which he had spoken unto him, upon a roll of a book. And Jeremiah, being confined in prison, commanded Baruch, saying: Go thou and read in the roll, which thou hast written from my mouth, *the words of the Lord* in the ears of the people in the Lord's house. And Baruch . . . did according to all that Jeremiah the prophet commanded him, reading in the book *the words* of the Lord, in the Lord's house. The princes . . asked Baruch, saying, Tell us now, how didst thou write all these words at his mouth? Then Baruch answered them, He pronounced *all these words* unto me with his mouth, and I wrote them with ink in the book." (Jer. 36.) The controversy between the apostate Jews and Jeremiah, turned on the question, Whether *the words* which he spoke and wrote in his official character as prophet, were the words of Jehovah, or his own words?

Jehovah said to Isaiah: "I have put my words in thy mouth." (Chap. 51.) To Jeremiah: "I have put my words in thy mouth." (Chap. 1.) To Ezekiel: "Thou shalt speak *my words* unto them." (Chap. 2.) Again: "All my words that I shall speak unto thee receive in thine heart, and hear with thine ears." (Chap. 3.) Not only is that which was conveyed to the sacred writers from God, by inspiration, characterized

in the foregoing, and many similar passages throughout the Scriptures, as the veritable words of God—His thoughts in His words—but it is evident that His thoughts could not be conveyed to them apart from words, consistently with their retaining the ordinary exercise of their faculties, so as intelligently to understand, and express them vocally and in writing. For in the natural state and exercise of his faculties, man thinks in words, and receives thoughts from external sources, intellectually conceives thoughts, is conscious of, remembers, and expresses them, only in words and signs equivalent to vocal articulations. To suppose thoughts to be inspired into his mind without words, therefore, would be to suppose that, in receiving them, he did not retain the ordinary use of his faculties; whereas the sacred writers, when receiving inspirations, undoubtedly did retain the natural and accustomed use of their mental faculties as perfectly as when receiving communications from their fellow-men, or when conceiving and expressing thoughts conceived in their own minds.

Moreover, if thoughts were inspired into the minds of the sacred writers, they must have been inspired in words, because it is impossible for man to determine or understand what a particular thought is, unless he knows and understands the words which are employed to express it. He can not be conscious of the thought, without the words; and if he is not conscious of the thought, he can not select words to express it, any more than he can select musical notes to constitute a particular tune of which he has no conscious knowledge, or arithmetical figures to solve a problem of

which he knows only the name. A thought requires certain words, in a certain orderly succession, perfectly to express it. Those words in that succession define, limit, qualify the thought. Other words, or a different succession, will not perfectly express it. A perfect reception or conception of the thought, therefore, can not take place in the human mind without the words by which it is expressed. To conceive a thought is to conceive it precisely as it is to the consciousness when expressed in words, which can not be distinguished from conceiving it in words.

3. The Divine act of inspiration, rendered the sacred writers infallible in respect to what they received, and wrote in their official character. What they received they wrote. What they received was the infallible word of God. What they wrote, therefore, was His infallible word. They had no discretion in the case. Though intelligent and voluntary in speaking and writing, they were but the Spirit's organ of communication. The Spirit spake by them. What they were to write was by inspiration conveyed into their minds in words as it was to be written, and they wrote it as being the infallible word of God, which liveth and abideth forever.

The sacred writers were persons specially selected to be the organs through whom what was inspired into their minds was to be communicated and written, and thereby to constitute the Holy Scriptures. Such were the prophets and apostles whose office in relation to this subject, it was to speak and write the words of God conveyed to them by inspiration. So far as they acted in this official capacity, they spoke and wrote only what was so conveyed to them. The high priests

under the Levitical system, were, in virtue of their sacerdotal office, sometimes made the organs of communication, Divine announcements being inspired into their minds, and vocally expressed by them. And, at least in one instance—that of Balaam—a false pretender to the prophetic office, was made the organ of communicating Divine messages; but he was effectually restrained from uttering any other than the very words which were spoken to him by Jehovah. (Numbers 22 : 23, etc.)

That which we take to be the scriptural doctrine of Inspiration is, that the thoughts which were expressed in the original texts were inspired into the minds of the sacred writers by the Holy Spirit, in the words which they wrote, and in the order in which they wrote them. This doctrine we hold to be consistent alike with the object, the authority, and the infallibility of the sacred oracles, and with the constitution and laws of the human mind.

The objectors to this doctrine proceed upon the assumption that the agency or influence of the Spirit in what they denominate inspiration, was exerted on the faculties of the prophets, exciting and guiding them; and their objections are of no force whatever, except on this assumption. The moment they admit, as they often tacitly and inconsistently do, that by the act, or in the process, of inspiration, thoughts were conveyed to the minds of the prophets, their objections are as conclusive against their own theory as they are designed to be against the doctrine which they oppose. Hence Professor Lee's distinction between Revelation and Inspiration, and his ascription of revelation, not

to the agency of the Spirit, but exclusively to that of the Logos.

Moreover, the objections of all those, who like the author just mentioned, believe the *truths* as they are expressed in the *words* of Scripture, to be infallible, are in fact as valid objections to their theories as to the doctrine which they oppose.

We understand by inspiration the inbreathing, conveying, transferring, of thoughts, from the Divine mind into the mind of man. We mean nothing but that Divine act, and conceive it to be as properly affirmed of every portion of the Holy Scriptures, as of any portion of those sacred writings. That, we apprehend, is what the Scriptures themselves teach. All Scripture was *given* by inspiration of God: given, imparted, transferred. When we speak of the *nature* of that Divine act, we mean simply that it is the *nature of inspiration* to impart, convey, transfer thoughts to the mind, the intelligent consciousness, of the recipient; as it is the nature of an act of creation to give existence, being, life, to creatures, or as it is the nature of articulate vocal utterance of words, to convey thoughts from one intelligent person to another. In the Divine act of inspiration, consequently, the agency of the recipient can in no wise have any participation whatever, any more than in a Divine act of creation, or in the act of one person in speaking to another.

A chief difficulty, at which the critics and theorists stumble, is, that any Divine inspiration, or any inspiration by which thoughts were conveyed from the Divine to the human mind, should be asserted of those passages in the writings of the apostles and prophets, in which

they express their personal sentiments, experiences, feelings, emotions, desires, purposes, and the like, or any of the facts of their private history. To one who believes the Scriptures throughout to be of Divine authority, this objection can have no weight; for if, including the passages in question, they possess that authority, their being invested with it by a verbal inspiration, can, in no respect, be more reasonably objected to, than their being invested with such authority in any other way. If, as being part of the Scripture, they are of Divine authority, then, it must be admitted, that He whose authority they bear, intended that they should be included, just as they are, in the sacred writings. The thoughts which they convey, could not be exactly and perfectly conveyed in other words, or in the same words differently arranged. And if the omniscient Revealer intended that the thoughts should be expressed in the Holy Scriptures, then an objection to their being inspired in the words which were written could have no more force or propriety than an objection to a selection of the thoughts and words by the writers under His infallible guidance. The fact of their being there by His volition, is the same in the one case as in the other.

Those, therefore, who believe in the Divine authority of every part of Scripture, can no more object to the passages in question, on the ground of their being divinely inspired, than on the ground of their having been infallibly determined by Divine guidance. Admit that such passages express the personal sentiments and affections of the writers, and express them in their ordinary phrase and diction, and it is, at least, as consistent with their Divine authority and their infalli-

bility to regard them as having been expressly inspired into the minds of the sacred writers to be written as part of Holy Scripture, as it is to regard them as having been written under absolute and infallible guidance. Whoever considers the purposes and objects for which the Holy Scriptures were committed to writing, and believes that their other contents were given by Divine inspiration, and are of Divine authority and infallible, must believe that the passages referred to were indispensable to those purposes and objects, and in general, were absolutely necessary to the intelligibility and effect of the didactic and historical passages with which they are interwoven and inseparably connected; insomuch that the other portions could not be what they are without these, nor these what they are without the others. To whatever extent it was the purpose or object of the Scriptures to instruct, and enlighten men in respect to the inward experience and the outward conduct, of the righteous or the wicked, for example, an infallible record of their feelings, affections, and actions, was manifestly necessary.

CHAPTER III.

OF MEDIATE INSTRUMENTALITY OF INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE CREATOR AND INTELLIGENT CREATURES.

It is obvious from the difference between the nature, mode of existence, and mode of action, of the Creator, and those of His rational creatures, that there must needs be some mediate instrumentality of intelligible communication between them. Between the Infinite and finite minds a constituted medium, vehicle, of intelligence and reciprocal communication, is manifestly necessary. It is not conceivable that any interchange of thoughts, any mutual intercourse, could take place without such instrumentality. To suppose the contrary would be to suppose that the creature could comprehend the mind of the Creator, so as to know the Divine thoughts without any expression or manifestation of them in any way.

It is no less apparent that the medium of intellectual and spiritual intercourse must be in harmony with the nature and within the capacity of man, so as to be available to him in the ordinary exercise of his faculties under all circumstances; and so as to involve and be the vehicle of his intuitions and primary beliefs,

and of his consciousness. It must needs be to him a perfect vehicle and instrument of his knowledge of the Divine Will as the rule of his faith and life. In the nature of the case, it must be a medium provided and appointed by the Creator and Lawgiver of man.

Such a medium, vehicle, instrument, is language, speech, words, articulate voices, significant and intelligible signs. By this instrumentality the Divine thoughts are expressed to man, and received and understood by him. It is interposed between the speaker and the hearer. It is the vehicle by which thoughts are transferred from one mind to another. Without it no intelligence is conveyed. Without words or equivalent signs man neither conceives nor is conscious of thought. Thought is not an object of the senses. Independently of words it can not be manifested or perceived. Man can know his own thoughts only as he conceives and is conscious of them in words. One man can know the thoughts of another only as they are expressed and conveyed in words. So no man can know the thoughts of God except as He expresses and conveys them in words. Language, in the comprehensive sense, in which that term is used in this discussion is interposed; it stands between mind and mind, as a condition, adjunct, instrument, vehicle, of thought.

Hence the name of this instrument as the appointed medium of conveyance of the Divine thoughts to man, is transferred and appropriated in Scripture to the Personal Logos, the Revealer of the Divine thoughts, the medium of relations and intercourse between God and man, the Mediator, the Personal agent and administrator in all the Divine works of creation, providence,

and grace. His office, as an intermediate personal agent in all the relations of God to the world, is analogous to the intermediate office of words in the communication of thought. Accordingly the terms, Dabar, (Heb.) Memra, (Chal.) Logos, (Greek,) and Word, (Eng.) signifying, word, speech, thought, discourse, are applied as personal designations of the Divine Mediator, Revealer and Teacher.

There is uniformly a difference between the meaning and use of the Hebrew term *Dabar*, translated *word*, that which is vocally expressed, and *Amar*—translated, *say, saying, said.* The latter term signifies merely the action of the speaker in uttering words, and is accordingly followed by the words uttered. Hence the relations in which the two words occur: as in Gen. 15, where *Dabar* seems, indeed, to designate the Personal Word. "*Dabar Jehovah*"—the Word of the Lord, came to Abram in a vision, (*Amar*,) saying, Fear not, Abram, I am thy Shield. And Abram (*Amar*,) said, Lord God, what wilt thou give me? . . . . And Abram (*Amar*,) said, Behold to me thou hast given no seed. . . . And behold "*Dabar Jehovah*," the Word of the Lord came unto Him, (*Amar*,) saying, this shall not be thine heir. . . . . And *He* brought him forth abroad and (*Amar*) said, Look now towards heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to number them: and *He*, (*Amar*) said unto him, So shall thy seed be. And he believed in Jehovah.

There is a like difference in the New Testament, between "*Logos*," translated word, that which is spoken, declared, manifested; also the term "*Reema*," similarly applied, and the term "*Lego*," translated, say, saying,

said. By the word (Logos) of God were the heavens made.—The word (Logos) was made flesh.—His Word (Logos) was with power.—The Word (reema) of God came unto John.—The word (reema) is nigh thee.—The word (reema) of faith.—The angel of the Lord appeared to Joseph in a dream, saying, (Lego,) Arise and take the young child.—Then saith (Lego) Jesus unto him, Get thee hence.—Verily I say (lego) unto you, Till heaven and earth pass.

This discriminated use of the terms in question strikingly corroborates our view of the office and instrumentality of language; while the Personal appropriation of the chief of those terms, demonstrates the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. An Invisible Divine Person—as invisible and intangible as thought is—becomes manifest by assuming and incorporating a visible nature with His Person. Prior to His incarnation the presence and agency of that Divine Mediatorial Administrator and Revealer, was signified by His vocal utterance of words. His audible voice, His word, being the signal of the exertion of His power, and His instrument in the expression of His thoughts, and being especially that by which His presence and agency were known when He was not personally visible, He was naturally and appropriately denominated by the names of that instrument of manifestation, as signifying the presence of Him who represented and manifested the invisible God, as our words represent and manifest our minds and thoughts.

Thus how often were the Patriarchs and Prophets unexpectedly and unmistakably notified of His Personal presence by the vocal utterance of His words.

How often do we read that *Dabar* Jehovah came, saying—to Abraham, Fear not—to Samuel, It repenteth me that I have set up Saul to be King—to Gad, Go and say unto David, Thus saith Jehovah, I offer thee three things—to Solomon, If thou wilt walk in my statutes—to Jehu, Forasmuch as I called thee out of the dust—to Elijah, Get thee hence—Go show thyself to Ahab; and so to others. His word was also the vehicle of His power in the production of physical, as well as of moral effects, as is signified in every part of Scripture. "He sent His word (Dabar) and healed them and delivered them from their destructions." Or as expressed in the critical version of Alexander: "He sends His word and heals them, and makes them escape from their destruction. He sends His word, He issues His command, exerts His sovereign power and authority." (Ps. 107 : 20.) "By the word (dabar) of Jehovah were the heavens made. . . . For He spake, (amar) and it was done. He commanded, and it stood fast. For (it was) He (that) said, (Be) and it was: (it was) He (that) commanded, and it stood—stood, appeared, came into existence." (Alexander, Ps. 33.)

In most instances some special announcement, message, or direction is given, the occasions being such as to require the personal interference of the speaker. In 1 Kings 18 : 31, there is an incidental statement which illustrates the personal reference of the term Dabar, in such connections. . . . . "Jacob, unto whom Dabar Jehovah came, saying, Israel shall be thy name." The reference is to Gen. 32, where it is recorded that "there wrestled a *Man* with Jacob . . . and He [the man] said, Thy name shall be called no more Jacob,

but Israel; for as a prince hast thou power with God . . . and hast prevailed. . . . And Jacob said, I have seen God face to face." In Hosea 12, it is said of Jacob, with reference to the same occasion, that . . . "by his strength he had power with God: yea he had power over the angel"—Malach, the Messenger, the delegated Mediatorial Person—"and prevailed: he wept and made supplication unto *Him;* he found *Him* in Bethel; even Jehovah, Elohim of Hosts; Jehovah is His memorial." Here the delegated personal Word appearing in the form of Man, is identified with Jehovah, Elohim, and the Messenger of the covenant. (See Malachi 3, where the Lord and the Messenger are identified as the same.)

In various other passages, as in those first above quoted, special messages are given to individuals on occasions of emergency. Dabar Jehovah—came to Isaiah—with a message to Hezekiah, (2 Kings 20,) and the same (Isaiah 38) Dabar Elohim came to Nathan, with a message to David. (1 Chron. 17.) Dabar Jehovah came to David, saying, Thou hast shed blood . . . . thou shalt not build a house unto my name. (1 Chron. 22.) Dabar Jehovah came to Shemaiah with a message to Rehoboam. (2 Chron. 11.) Again, (12 : 7,) Dabar *the* Elohim came to Shemaiah . . . saying, Speak unto Rehoboam, saying, Thus saith Jehovah. (1 Kings 12.) To Jeremiah came Dabar Jehovah, in the days of Josiah . . . also in the days of Jehoiakin . . . Dabar Jehovah came, saying: Before I formed thee. (Jer. 1, again 2 : 14; 29 : 30.)

On the other hand it is through the instrumentality of words as the vehicle of communication between God

and man, that our apprehensions of the Divine Being, and of the Person, attributes, offices, and works of the Logos arise, and are realized to our consciousness in the exercise of faith. The words of God, the inspired verbal testimonies recorded in the Scriptures, are the instrument and medium of faith. Our associated verbal conceptions of what is testified of Christ, constitute in our minds an image, so to speak, a portraiture, a description, of His Person, His perfections, and His works. We see Him, mentally, by faith, as the inspired words describe Him. We see Him through the words, as through an interposed medium—obscurely, indeed, as compared with seeing Him directly face to face—yet in a manner which faith renders efficacious. "We see as through a mirror: the optical impression is, that the object is behind the mirror, and the spectator seems to look through it. . . . We do not see the things themselves, but those things as set forth in *symbols and words*, which imperfectly express them. . . . The clearest revelation of the things of God in words is an enigma, when compared to sight. . . . The Gospel itself is obscure, compared to the lucid medium through which we shall see hereafter. . . . The *word* of God is a mirror wherein even now we behold the glory of the Lord; but what is that to seeing Him face to face?" (*Dr. Hodge on* 1 *Cor.* 13 : 12.) Still, though obscure compared to direct vision, words are the medium, vehicle, representative, of all that we discern—all the knowledge, all the thoughts, all the faith that we are conscious of. They are the mirror, the instrument of faith. Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.

It was through this instrumentality — articulate

words, and visible signs, symbols, types—that the Patriarchs and Prophets recognized Jehovah in the Person and character of the Logos. Abraham, Jacob, Moses, Joshua, Manoah, Jephtha, David, Isaiah and others heard His voice, and saw Him in the sign, symbol, similitude of His human nature; Moses, the Israelites, the Priests and Prophets, in the cloud-like form in the wilderness, and the shekina in the tabernacle and temple, and elsewhere on particular occasions, as, after His advent, on the mount of transfiguration, and as He appeared to Paul on his way to Damascus, and to John in the Isle of Patmos. The beholders of these interposed signs saw Him in them, heard His voice, and had indubitable evidence of His personal presence. The signs supplied the place, and were as significant and as intelligible as words, and were equally the medium and instrument of thought and faith.

The appropriate and conclusive inference from these considerations and references, is, that the *language*—the words, signs, symbols—by which Jehovah, the Logos, conveyed the Divine thoughts to man, which also He employed as the vehicle of His power and grace to Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, and which He commissioned holy men to write and publish as His words, infallibly expressing His unchangeable thoughts, His testimonies, messages, commands, counsels, covenants, promises, predictions, warnings, instructions, were not selected or modified by man's wisdom or agency. By the instrumentality which He assigned to His word, as He spake it to His servants, and inspired it into the minds of His chosen penmen, He magnified it as His vehicle of manifestation, above all His Name—

all the other methods by which He manifested His perfections to His creatures. As His vehicle of intelligence and intercourse, it is as infallible, and unchangeable, as His nature and His purposes.

To this mediate instrumentality of words, as the vehicle of thought, the constitution of man is perfectly adapted. Thinking is voluntary conscious mental action. Thought is the effect, product, of such action; realized to our consciousness by being conceived in words as its necessary condition, mode, form, vesture, vehicle; the instrument of the mind in conceiving it, of the memory in retaining it, and of the voice and the pen in conveying it to other minds.

As seeing is the conscious action of the mind through the visual organ, as its instrument preädjusted to the effect of light reflected from external objects; so thinking is the conscious action of the mind through language — words and signs of which the meaning, usage, and relations, have been previously learned, and which, as memory reflects them, are preadjusted to the cogitative action. And as hearing is the conscious action of the mind through the auricular organ, preädjusted to the effect of different sounds; so thinking is the conscious action of the mind preädjusted to the use of words as its instrument and vehicle, so that, having learned the meaning of words, it distinguishes between them, and uses those which its thoughts require. Such preädjustment, adaptation, capacity, power, is dormant and ineffectual, till the meaning of words and signs is acquired; as the organic preadjustment, adaptation, capacity, power of the eye, is dormant in the absence of light; that of the ear, in the

absence of sound; and that of our primary beliefs, in the absence of conscious thought.

Hence, according to our constitution and our consciousness, we think in words as the element, pre-requisite condition, matrix, pabulum of thought; insomuch that a thought as such, is realized to our consciousness, only in its concrete verbal form; the form in which it is conceived and remembered, and in which it is expressed vocally to the ear, and chirographically to the eye.

All our thoughts accordingly originate, exist, are realized, remembered, and expressed, in this concrete form. The thoughts which rise in our tranquil and solitary musings, in our busiest excitements, in our highest efforts of mathematical, logical, and scientific abstraction, and in dreams, trances, and visions, present themselves in this verbal form—thoughts in words. And, in like manner, all the thoughts which are conveyed into our minds and realized to our consciousness from without, are conveyed and received in this concrete form; whether they are conveyed to us by vocal articulations, and received by hearing the spoken words, or are conveyed to us by chirographic characters, and received by seeing the written words; or whether, in like conformity to man's constitution, they are conveyed to the intelligent consciousness of prophets, from the Divine Intelligence, by Inspiration.

Such is the law of our minds—of the cogitative action, of the intellect, of thinking, of consciousness, of memory, of imparting and receiving thoughts, of rendering them audible by the voice, visible by the pen, permanent by written characters, and transmissible by printed marks and by electric influence.

CHAPTER IV.

REFERENCE TO AN ARTICLE ON INSPIRATION, IN THE BIBLOTHECA SACRA.

If the Holy Scriptures are the word of God, it can, no doubt, be clearly shown on what ground they are properly so denominated. An inquiry into the subject, however, necessarily involves the consideration of a variety of incidental questions. What is meant by the assertion that they are the word of God? Is it meant that they are His word, in the same sense that words as uttered by men, in their intercourse with each other, are their words? If so, must He not have uttered, imparted, inspired them to express His thoughts, as really as men utter their words to express their thoughts? Can they be His words, His infallible words, involving His infinite authority, unless He uttered them, any more than words which a man does not utter can be made his words? Is it said that the words were selected by man, but that God adopted them and thereby made them His? If He so adopted them as to make them His, and invest them with His immutable authority and infallibility, does that—supposing there were any evidence of it—at all help the matter? Is not that equivalent to an original selection

of them by Him? Were they not as much His words as if He had dictated instead of adopting them? Did they not become authoritative and infallible simply as being His, and not as being man's words? Were they any longer, in any sense, man's words after they were rendered infallible? Is not a man's adopting the words of another so as to make them his and involve his responsibility, equivalent in every respect to his speaking or writing them? If one man adopts as his own the words of another, he must know the words, how they are arranged, what, as so arranged, they signify, and their purpose and effect in relation to himself and others. To adopt them with such knowledge, implies that he could as easily utter them vocally or otherwise, as he could, on hearing or reading them, signify his acceptance or adoption of them.

Is it inspiration which makes the Scriptures the word of God? What then is meant by the term *inspiration?* Does it mean simply an act of God by which He conveyed His thoughts to those whom He appointed to record them? If so, did He inspire into their minds His words as well as His thoughts? Did He do this with respect to all the contents of Scripture, all, as what He determined should be written in His name and on His authority? Or did He do it with respect to His direct original revelations, and not with respect to matters which were within the knowledge and experience of the writers? Did He so inspire a part exclusively by His own Divine act, and only aid, assist, guide, the writers in respect to the rest—guide them in the exercise of their faculties in recording their own thoughts in their own words? Is such guidance

warrantably called inspiration? Do the Scriptures so denominate it? Do they tell us of more than one kind of Inspiration? If guidance and assistance is Divine Inspiration, how shall it be distinguished from those restraining and sanctifying influences which are common to all good men, or from those influences which are common to all men? If portions of the Scriptures consist of the thoughts and words of men, not expressly inspired into their minds to be recorded, but simply as known to them in the ordinary way, and recorded by them under a Divine influence which merely assisted them to record them accurately, did that influence affect the character of the record any further than to secure its accuracy? Did it extend back and decide, and select, what should go into the record? Did it make man's thoughts and words God's thoughts and words? Did it invest them with His authority? Is their being truthfully and accurately recorded, the ground on which they are called the word of God? Is their infallibility asserted on the ground that what is accurately recorded is for that reason infallible truth?

If there are different kinds of inspiration, are there also different degrees of the several kinds? If that kind which guided and assisted the prophets to record with accuracy what they previously knew as men, was of different degrees; if there was a higher degree of assisting and guiding influence on the minds of some prophets than on the minds of others, or on the mind of the same prophet at different times; if they were less effectually guided at one time than at another, and in respect to some things than in respect to others, how

shall we distinguish the different effects of these different degrees of influence—the different degrees of accuracy, authority, and infallibility?

We appeal to those who are conversant with the subject, whether the various treatises, essays, reviews, etc., of all the schools of theology, philosophy, and speculation, which purport to explain the nature, mode, extent, and effects of *Inspiration*, do not employ that term to signify whatever the preconceived theological, philosophical, or speculative systems or theories of the writers respectively demand for their own support or defense, instead of employing it in the one clear and definite sense which it bears in the Scriptures themselves? Can any two writers, or, at least, any two who differ in their theological and speculative opinions, be named, who define Inspiration alike? Do not the definitions and discussions of the respective writers, manifestly proceed upon the assumption, that Inspiration as asserted with reference to the Scriptures, must mean just what their theory requires it should mean? As they believe in their theory of religion, and philosophy, and in inspiration as being involved in it, or as bearing a certain relation to it, they define that to be Inspiration which is consistent with their beliefs on related subjects, and demanded by them. Which of them has started with the scriptural signification and use of the term, adhered to it, followed it out to its consequences, and adjusted or modified his other beliefs accordingly? Which of them has strictly adhered to his own definition, when exhibiting his proofs and illustrations? Which of them has not in his endeavors to reconcile the express assertions of Scripture

to his theory, crossed his own track and confuted himself?

It is presumed to be quite safe to say, that, in regard to the nature of Divine Inspiration, and the effects to be ascribed to it, the public mind, both in and out of the churches of Protestant Christendom, was never more unsettled than at present, or more extensively under the influence of discordant, erroneous, and dangerous theories. It would be tedious and perhaps useless to verify this by any extended references. An instance, which happens at the moment to be at hand, that of an article in one of the oldest, and most effective and influential of the periodical vehicles of theology and criticism on this side of the Atlantic, *The Bibliotheca Sacra and. Biblical Repository*, No. 109, Jan. 1858, may serve as an illustration. It is an article on Inspiration, and is founded essentially on the discourses of Professor Lee on that subject. From its authorship and the channel of its publication, its sentiments may be presumed to be substantially those of the supporters and readers of the work in which it appears; and both its theory and its inconsistencies, may be presumed to prevail extensively among those who reverence and who believe the Scriptures.

"We might infer," says the writer, from the importance of every part of the contents of the Bible, "that *all* Scripture, whether revelation or not, would be written under such a Divine *guidance* and direction as would effectually secure its *human* authors from mistake, and enable them to write just what God would have them write, and in just the manner in which he would have it written. And this is what we mean,

specifically, by *the inspiration of the Scriptures:* that *degree of assistance* afforded to the writers, which was necessary to preserve them from imperfection and error, *in making the record* of God's truth and will." (P. 33.) "Inspiration denotes the *assistance* afforded in the utterance of God's truth, or in recording what God was pleased to have written in His word. All Scripture is not Divine revelation; but all Scripture is written under a Divine Inspiration, and consequently is an infallible record of what God would have recorded for our 'instruction in righteousness.'" (P. 34.) "We have said that inspiration denotes the special *assistance* afforded to the sacred speaker or writer, *in giving utterance to the Divine word.*" (P. 35.) "Those who hold to the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, do not claim that *the same kind and degree of assistance was,* in all cases, *afforded* to the sacred writers; and for the very good reason, that the same was not, in all cases, needed. When recording direct revelations from God—things about which they had no other means of knowledge; or when recording, as they often did, the very words of the Lord, uttered by Him in His own proper person; they must have had what has been called the inspiration of *suggestion. The very words to be recorded must have been suggested to them.* And when recording things which they had once known, but had been forgotten, they needed (what the Saviour promised his disciples) the aid of the Spirit to bring all things to their remembrance. But when recording events of which they were fully informed, either from personal observation or the information of others, they needed only such a supervision as should prevent all defect and

mistake, and lead them to record, and in the right manner, that, and that only, which was agreeable to the Divine will. In every case they had such assistance as they needed in order to execute their commission, and give to the world a divinely accredited record of the sacred word—an infallible standard of duty and of truth." (P. 36.)

Now, without dwelling on the nature or proof of the alleged *guidance*, which we purpose to touch on elsewhere, we submit that the Scriptures no where teach, that Inspiration was of the nature or produced the effect of guidance. That which they specifically teach is, that what is written was *given, imparted, conveyed* to the writers by inspiration. It was *Theopneustos*, God-breathed, God-inspired — conveyed from God by inspiration to the sacred penmen. We find in Scripture nothing different from this; nothing of different kinds and degrees of inspiration; nothing whatever of *assistance* in writing as inspiration. And we take it to be beyond a question that the definitions above quoted are not definitions of the inspiration which the Scriptures teach and claim. They are definitions of an influence assumed to be necessary, not to put the writers in possession of what they were to write, but to assist and preserve them from error in writing what they were already possessed of. They restrict the object, influence, and effect of inspiration to this. And in respect to considerable portions of Scripture they leave us in the dark as to how the writers became possessed of what they wrote. The author says, indeed that "they *must have had* what has been called the inspiration of suggestion." This, besides not being

covered by his definition, is a mere hypothesis, an inference from a false theory, no inspiration of that kind being taught in Scripture; not guidance or assistance in writing—not inspiration in his sense of that term, neither taught in Scripture, nor consistent with what they teach. The very words, he says, *must have* been suggested to them. But if he means by that the Divine act of Inspiration, which, instead of suggesting, explicitly gave, imparted, the very *words* of a large portion of the Scriptures, why could not that same kind of inspiration as the Scriptures teach, have given all the other words of Scripture, so as to leave us in no uncertainty as to their being all the authoritative and infallible words of God? Why resort to the gratuitous hypothesis that the prophets and apostles were left to select from the mass of facts and events known to them before, such as they thought proper to insert in their records, subject only to a supervisory, assisting, guiding, influence merely to insure their recording them accurately? Why rest the infallibility of what they wrote on such a basis? If the very words in which *all the revelations* are recorded, were conveyed to the writers either by vocal utterance or by inspiration, as the author holds, then more than half of all the words recorded in the Bible were so given, and on that ground it is that they are the infallible words of God. He spoke them audibly to the prophets, or conveyed them to their minds by inspiration, and spake them by the mouths of the prophets and "all the prophets since the world began." If He conveyed and spoke revelations in this way, why should He not convey and speak all the other contents in the same

way, by the only kind of inspiration which the Scriptures themselves assert? They are all alike declared to be His word. The Scriptures themselves admit no difference. When passages are quoted from one part into another, whether originally direct revelations or not, they are quoted as the infallible words of God. Historical, biographical, and other passages which were not originally revelations, but were within the previous knowledge of the original writers, are quoted, not as the words of men, rendered infallible words by a Divine guidance and assistance afforded to the writers in making their record of them; but as being originally the infallible words of God. Doubtless many *revelations* were made which were not recorded. And if God determined by speaking or inspiring the very words, which should be recorded, could it be less necessary that He should determine and inspire the very words of all the other matter which is intermingled and connected with the revelations, equally necessary to the object of the Scriptures and to which the Divine authority and infallibility is equally essential?

But like Professor Lee, this author, who believes the Scriptures collectively to be the word of God, inspired, and infallible, when he comes to prove them to be such, forgets his theory and speaks after the manner of Scripture. Thus: "In no small part of the Old Testament, we have God himself speaking in the first person. We have what purport to be his own words. And if the Bible is true, these are his own words; and the sacred writers must have been *verbally inspired* in recording them." (P. 38.) Here he assigns to the word

inspired a meaning different from that assigned to it by his theory and his definition—different from that of *guidance* and *assistance* in recording words already known. A verbal inspiration is an inspiration of words—of thoughts in words. It gives the words which are to be recorded. Again:

"There are still other portions of the Bible which (if they are true) must, from the very nature of the case, be inspired. We refer to those parts in which the writer records transactions which took place long ages before he was born. For example, how did Moses know what God said to Adam, and Cain, and Noah, and Abraham, and the other patriarchs, and what these men said in reply, unless he were under a Divine inspiration? He might have received some general account of things by tradition: but he does not profess to record doubtful traditions, but the *very words* which were spoken one way and the other. But in order to do this, he must have had a *plenary verbal inspiration*." (P. 39.) That is, he must have had an inspiration which gave, imparted, conveyed to him the very words which he was to write.

"The writers of both Testaments . . . claimed to speak, not their own words, but the words of God . . . in many instances, through whole chapters, they profess to give the very words of the Most High; a thing which they could never do, unless these words were suggested to them at the time. David says of himself: *The Spirit of the Lord spoke in me, and His word was in my tongue. The Spirit entered into me*, says Ezekiel, *when He spake to me, and set me upon my feet, that I heard Him that spake unto me.* The writers of the New

Testament customarily speak of their communications as *the word of God*. . . They spake *the word of God*, with boldness. . . Our Saviour uniformly speaks of the Scriptures . . . as *the word of God*, and, *inspired*. . . He says, Have ye not read that which was spoken unto you *by God*, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? *The Holy Ghost spake* by the mouth of David. . . Well *spake the Holy Ghost*, by Esaias the prophet. *The word of God*, says Christ, can not be broken. . . Paul says, All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." (Pp. 41, 42.) In these and all the other Scripture testimonies, cited by the author, to prove that the very words of Scripture, as originally recorded, are all and equally the infallible words of God, given by His act of inspiration, spoken by Him to the writers and in them, and reuttered by them vocally and by writing, there is nothing, asserted or implied, of the nature of assistance or guidance in the acts of uttering or writing; nothing to indicate that the guidance, or any guidance, or assistance, or influence, under which the sacred penmen performed the act of writing, was of the nature of inspiration; nothing to indicate that Divine inspiration, as taught in Scripture, is any thing more or less than the act of God imparting to the prophets and apostles His thoughts in His words, to be uttered by them in His name and on His authority as His infallible words. But this Divine inspiration imparts, conveys, what is to be written, and is, in nature and effect, wholly different from that contemplated in our author's theory and definitions.

The same is true of his citations from the Fathers: "We believe in the Holy Ghost . . . who *spake* by the prophets." (*Nicene Creed.*) "Give diligent heed to

the Scriptures, the true *sayings* of the Holy Ghost." (*Clement of Rome.*) "Think not that the words which you hear the prophet speaking, in his own person, were uttered by himself . . . *they are from the Divine Word which moves him.*" (*Justin Martyr.*) "They were unanimous on the subject of Inspiration. . . They customarily speak of the Scriptures as *the word of God*, the *voice of God*, the *oracles of heaven*, the *oracles of the Holy Ghost*, as *dictated* by the Holy Ghost. . . They . . . compare the soul of the prophet to an instrument of music, into which the Holy Spirit breathes. They even represent those as *infidels* 'who do not believe that the Holy Ghost uttered the Divine Scriptures.'" (P. 45.)

These passages which express the sentiments and faith of the Fathers unanimously, imply that they regarded the inspiration of the Scriptures as the act of God by which he imparted to the sacred writers in His own words, what they were to write in His name, and with his infallible authority. They neither imply nor permit the supposition that there was more than one kind or degree of inspiration, or that the actual inspiration was a guiding, assisting, supervisory influence, wholly or in part. They are the testimonies of good men. They accord with the faith of good men in every age. They accord, no doubt, with the assured and cherished faith of our author. But they are not to be reconciled with his theory and definition of inspiration and its effects, as exhibited in this article. The doctrine of the Scriptures and of the Fathers is, that all the words written by the prophets and apostles as Holy Scripture are the words of God. That doctrine is founded on the fact that all the words were

spoken, given, conveyed, to the writers by inspiration of God. Therefore they are His words, and, as His words, are infallible. And this, though his theory and definitions do not provide for it, is just what the case requires, and just what the author insists on as indispensable to our safety.

Thus he writes: "If the Bible is not *all* inspired, then it is not an infallible standard of truth and duty, and nothing can be certainly known or established by it. We may think it a good book, a remarkable book, the work of good and honest men; and yet, if not inspired, it is marked with imperfections, of which its readers must judge for themselves. We may believe that it contains revelations from God; but if it is not an inspired book, if it is not *all* inspired, then who shall tell us what particular parts are inspired and what not; how much to receive as the word of God, and how much to impute to the ignorance or the device of man. One passage may seem unreasonable to me, and I may reject it as constituting no part of the revelation. For the same reason, my neighbor may reject another passage. In this way, the whole Bible may be rejected, while it is professedly received. . . If the Bible is not inspired, *even as to its language*, then it does not come to us duly *authenticated as the word and the law of God.* In all authoritative communications or laws, it is important that we have the *precise words* of the lawgiver. So it is with human laws"—after illustrating which, he adds—"In matters such as these, we want, I repeat, the matured words of the lawgiver. And just so in respect to the Bible. The Bible professes to be a code of laws, coming down to us from

the great Lawgiver of the universe, and binding directly on our consciences and hearts. But in order that it may be duly authenticated, may be a rule of life to us here, and of judgment hereafter, we must have *the very words of God.* A merely human record of His truth and will can not bind us. We must have a Bible, *the whole of which is given by the inspiration of God*, or we have no standard to which we may implicitly appeal, or on which to rely." (Pp. 53, 54.)

This is good doctrine—sound, orthodox, Scriptural, irrefragable; and we have not a doubt but that the author holds it in sincerity and from inward conviction. But it is totally inconsistent with his theoretical definition. He forgets his theory, and employs the word inspiration, in a wholly different sense from that which he assigns to it in stating 'what he means, specifically, by *the inspiration of the Scriptures*,' namely, that degree of *assistance* which was necessary to preserve the sacred writers from error in making their records. He now contemplates inspiration as of one kind and degree only—as *Theopneustos* — as conveying to the writers the very words of God, to be recorded—as so conveying all the words of Scripture, so as to authenticate them all alike, as being all alike the authoritative and infallible word of God.

This illustration is meant, not invidiously, but merely to show with what facility learned men, Biblical critics, theological teachers, whose creed is orthodox, and whose immortal hopes rest on their belief that the words of Scripture, one and all, are the very words of God, can adopt a speculative theory which is, in terms, antagonist alike to their faith and to the

Scriptures. Both the author of this article, and those whom he ecclesiastically represents, and for whom he writes, are understood to hold the Westminster Confession and Catechisms as representing their faith. Those Scriptural and time-honored documents are on no subject more explicit than on that now in question. Thus the Confession: "All the Scriptures"—each and all of the books specified as of the Canon—"are *given* by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life." (Chap. 1.) "The Old Testament in Hebrew, and the New Testament in Greek, being *immediately inspired by God*, and by His singular care and providence, kept pure in all ages, are therefore authentical." (*Ibid.*) This is *Theopneustos*, God-inspired—breathed, imparted, immediately—to the exclusion of every thing like an inspiration of guidance and assistance. Again: "The Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but *the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture*." (*Ibid.*) "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the word of God." (*Ibid.* Art. 4.) "The holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are *the word of God*, the only rule of faith and obedience." (*Larger Catechism*, 2 : 3.) "*The word of God*, which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy Him." (*Shorter Catechism*, 2 : 2.)

Those writers upon the subject of inspiration, who are most concerned to show that the Scriptures are, from first to last, the word of God, stumble at the difficulty of accounting for the fact that the styles of the different books are characteristically the styles of the respective writers; and they inadvertently, or else by means of their theories, treat of inspiration as an influence exerted *on* the minds, or *on* particular faculties, of the different penmen, instead of being simply a Divine act conveying thoughts verbally to them. They seem to assume that the styles employed depended on the men, instead of being determined by Him who determined in every particular what should be written, and depending on the nature and purpose of the thoughts to be expressed; that the reason why the thoughts expressed by David and Isaiah, for example, are clothed in figurative and poetic diction, was that they were poets, instead of the reason being that the thoughts were such as to require that diction, and being inspired into the minds of poets in figurative and poetical phraseology could be received and rightly comprehended by them, with facility, and in accordance with their accustomed exercise of their natural faculties and peculiar gifts. He who determined what thoughts should be expressed in writing as His, and on His authority, of course, and of necessity, must have determined the words that should be written, and their grammatical form and arrangement. For none but certain words, collocated in a certain order, could exactly and infallibly express the thoughts, and modifications of thought, intended to be uttered. To secure the end, therefore, without enlarging, or interfering with, the free and natural exercise of the

faculties of the writers, men were of necessity selected to be the recipients and utterers of the thoughts, who, by their natural and acquired endowments, were adapted to receive and utter intelligently, the particular thoughts and words, literal or figurative, which were inspired into their minds to be recorded. And if all the thoughts which are actually expressed in Scripture, were divinely pre-determined to be expressed in the words which, in the original text, perfectly and infallibly express them; then, beyond a doubt, they must have been all alike inspired into the minds of the writers. If all the thoughts, and, therefore, all the words of Scripture, were not divinely prescribed—if any of them are due, in any respect or degree, to human discretion and volition—if they were not all *theopneustoi*, imparted to the writers by inspiration of God, let those believe them all to be the very, the infallible words of God, who can tell how they became so, or who require no evidence of their being infallibly His. But if they were so predetermined and inspired, then there is no ground of objection to any one phrase, sentence, or passage, on account of its matter, style, or idiom, any more than to every other; and the fact that, in numerous instances, the very thoughts in the very words which men had conceived and expressed, orally or in writing, beforehand, were expressly inspired into their minds when they were to be recorded as part of Scripture, is no more open to objection, than the fact that thoughts wholly unknown to them before were conveyed to their minds by inspiration, to be recorded by them as part of Holy Scripture.

By the words of Scripture being divinely predeter-

mined, reference is not meant to the event merely of their being written or to the act of man in writing precisely those words; but to the act of God uttering, inspiring, imparting them to the writers, to be recorded as His word. It is plain that a mere guidance of man in his acts of writing, or selecting and writing, particular words, would not make his act the act of God, or the words selected by him, the words of God, any more than the Divine guidance of holy men, in acts of prayer or of external obedience, would make those acts the acts of God.

The fact that the thoughts inspired into the mind of Isaiah are highly poetical, and that in his record of them, the actors in the prophetic scenes described, are spoken of as if they were present to his natural vision, no more proves that a supernatural influence was exerted *on* his faculties, than the reception by those who are not prophets, by hearing or reading and understanding the same thoughts from his record, proves that a supernatural influence is exerted on their faculties to enable them to receive and understand those thoughts. If they can receive those thoughts by means of the words which he wrote, surely he could have received them, and they might also receive them by the no less effectual means of inspiration. If this is not sound doctrine, then written words can do what inspired words can not do—can convey thoughts without extra aid, which inspiration alone can not convey; or else the words of Scripture do not in fact put us in possession of the inspired thoughts, and woe to us, if the written words do not convey to us precisely the thoughts which were conveyed to the prophets by

inspiration—and if the words of God are not as intelligible to us as they were to the prophets themselves!

But no one who believes that the Scriptures contain any revelations from God, entertains any doubt but that He has, on many occasions, spoken to men, and conveyed His thoughts to their intelligent understanding and consciousness, by His audible utterance of His own words. It is therefore certain that He could in that way, infallibly convey His thoughts to man. And who can presume to say, that a conveyance, on other occasions, of His thoughts to the same or other men, by inspiration, was less effectual—that He adopted, in some cases, a perfect and infallible method, and, in others, a method of a different character? And with what propriety can it be objected to His conveying His thoughts verbally by inspiration, that it makes the recipient a mere passive machine, any more than that a conveyance of His thoughts by audible vocal utterance, or that the conveyance by articulate speech of one man's thoughts to another, makes the hearer a passive machine? Is any one quite certain that the Divine act of inspiration is of such a nature that it can not convey, and infallibly convey intelligence? that vocal sounds can do what inspiration can not do?

There is abroad in controversial, philosophical, and speculative writings, plenty of sentimentalism, about the insignificance, unreliableness, non-importance, of words. Writers who pique themselves on not believing any thing, except upon such evidence in kind and degree as they approve and demand, affect to regard words either as positive obstacles to their knowledge,

or as of little or no consequence to their convictions. They assume to have thoughts which they have no words to express—thoughts which transcend the office and instrumentality of words. They wish to believe what can not be established and made evident by any selection or arrangement of words. Words are in their way. Words obtrude themselves offensively against what they desire to believe. Words are arrayed against them in the Scriptures, in catechisms, confessions, hymns, sermons, treatises, text books, and in the mouths of those around them, young and old. They dislike them because they will not serve their purposes. An obstinate *no* will not permit itself to be read as *yes*. Instead of being mere servants, words affect the authority of masters. There is no getting clear of them, but by setting them at naught, and despising them.

These non-verbal thinkers can not be met by any use of words. If they can not express their own thoughts in words, a verbal argument, for or against them, must of course be futile. Perhaps the most likely way to confound them, and shock them sufficiently to dissipate their illusion, would be to set them to translate the poems of Homer into other Greek words or the Principia of Newton into other Latin words, than those of the originals. Let them master those authors so as clearly to conceive their thoughts in the words which they respectively used, and then think and express precisely those thoughts, not in another tongue, but in other words of the *same* languages. If they can think without words, then why, after possessing themselves of the thoughts of those authors, can they not think them without their words, and ex-

press them in any other words at pleasure? If thoughts alone are what the intellect has any thing to do with, if words are indifferent, non-essential, unreliable, why can not an author's thoughts be expressed, and as perfectly expressed, by one selection and succession of words, as by any other? If a man is capable of understanding Newton's thoughts, and of ascertaining what they were by reading his record of them, and is also capable of thinking without words, why can he not reject and forget the author's words, remember the thoughts, and write the Principia anew for himself in other words? In this way perhaps he may discover exactly what the matter is with him—that he has in fact, contrary to his pretensions, no thoughts whatever apart from words—that Newton's thoughts are inseparable from words—that words are in the nature of things as essential a condition of thought, as light is of vision, air of sound, figure, extension, outline, of material substances.

Again the writers on this subject, after setting out on the assumption that inspiration is an influence exerted on the faculties of the sacred writers, not only do not regard it simply as an act of God involving His omniscience, His authority, and His infallibility, but they do not distinguish between what He did in respect either to the thoughts or words of Scripture, and what man did in receiving and committing them to writing. Even those of them who declare the result—the Scriptures as written—to be the infallible word of God, do not ascribe either the thoughts or words of Scripture, exclusively to Him. They, indeed, treat of guidance, and infallible guidance. But it is the guidance of ignorant, fallible, human faculties; and where it begins

or ends, specifically what it does, and what man does, what is Divine and what is human in the process and the result, no one has so much as attempted to tell.

The very same writers who, on one page, maintain, that Inspiration in its only, or in its proper and usual form, was an influence *on* the minds of the sacred writers, stimulating them to unwonted energy and activity, on the next, admit, that considerable portions of the Scriptures, predictions of future events, for example, were in the most absolute and exclusive sense, revelations—direct communications from God to man of thoughts wholly undiscoverable by the human mind, however stimulated, and in which the words to be written were as necessarily imparted from the Omniscient and Infinite Mind to the finite and passive recipient, as the thoughts. But, strange to say, instead of seeing in this admission a difficulty fatal to their theory of inspiration—which ought, if sound, clearly to account for such superhuman communications—they treat such portions of the sacred oracles as exceptions to the general rule. . . They do not admit that the words of Scripture were in any case supplied by inspiration. They talk of excitement and guidance, but they do not allow that inspiration supplied either thoughts or words. With the facts before them, 1, that large portions of the Scriptures were audibly spoken by Jehovah, and are recorded in the very words which He uttered: 2, that other portions are expressly said to have been spoken by the Spirit to individuals on various occasions, which also are recorded in the very words which He uttered: 3, that the very words which the apostles uttered in their preaching, and when called

before magistrates, were directly supplied to them by the Spirit: 4, that the Spirit spoke in and by the prophets and apostles, and of course uttered the very words which they uttered: 5, that all Scripture—the words which were written as Scripture—was *Theopneustos*, given by inspiration of God, and, because so given, is called the infallible word of God: 6, that in respect to much of what is recorded as Scripture, the words could, no more than the thoughts, be discovered by finite intelligences: 7, that all that is recorded is alike the word of God, and equally of Divine authority: 8, that, from the nature of the case, every thought and word of Scripture, must have been divinely pre-determined: 9, that those portions of Scripture which relate to matters within the previous knowledge of the individual writers, are not more characterized by their peculiar styles and idioms, than those portions which were audibly spoken by Jehovah: 10, that the Scriptures themselves speak of one kind of inspiration only, and affirm that kind of all their contents indiscriminately:—they yet, by way of showing why the Sacred oracles are, in thoughts and words, what they are, affirm that the writers were inspired, and define and discuss inspiration as being an influence exerted on their faculties, by which, some more and some less, or all alike, they were stimulated and guided.

It is worth a passing notice—as showing the vagueness of their notions of inspiration—that the most learned and most evangelical, of the German critics and expositors of the New Testament, proceed in their criticisms of the original text, first, on the assumption that the evangelists selected the words which they

wrote; and second, on the assumption that they were themselves critically versed in the derivation, meaning, usage and grammar of the words, and in all the peculiarities and niceties of the language. Had they spent their lives in the critical study of the Greek which they employed, no more could be assumed as to their knowledge of it, than the modern critics ascribe to them. Apart from this assumption, there would, with respect to the greater part of their criticisms, be no sense or propriety whatever in them. But were they instructed in this manner? Had they any such critical knowledge? Is it likely that Matthew, for example, had any exact knowledge of Greek syntax, or of Greek grammar, or Greek literature, in any respect? Yet he wrote his text with such conformity to grammar and usage, as to challenge the criticism of those who now devote their lives to the study of Greek. Doubtless he knew enough of that style of Greek, which then prevailed in Palestine, to read and write it: but probably no one will imagine that he had any critical knowledge of the language, and his deficiency in that respect may reasonably be adduced as proving that the words which he wrote were inspired into his mind in the order and relations in which he wrote them, But if that occurred in the case of Matthew, or of any one of the sacred writers, it is reasonable to conclude that it occurred for the same or for other reasons, in the case of each of the others. For if the words could be inspired into the mind of one, they could be inspired into the mind of each of the others, and since, in the nature of the case, we are forbidden to suppose that any thing in the matter or manner of the sacred text

could be erroneous or defective from human ignorance and imbecility—the object being infallibly to express in words, the infallible thoughts of God—we are forbidden to suppose that any thing of the matter or manner, could be left to depend on human discretion, or on the degree or the accuracy of the knowledge of the sacred writer. And who will venture to suppose, contrary to all the analogies both of Divine and of human wisdom, that some men were appointed to write, who, being learned, needed no assistance in the selection of words, and that others were appointed, who, being unlearned, could not select the proper words, nor write grammatically, without an inspiration of the words duly collocated, or such a guidance in the selection of words, as would involve a constant miracle? Or, who, on the latter supposition, can fail to see that the writer could not possess, so as to be conscious of the particular thought to be expressed in any given instance, without possessing and being conscious of it in the words by which he should express it? When conscious for the first time of the thought, he must have been conscious of it in the words proper to express it. Of course the selection of the words could not be an after process. Any change or substitution of other words for those in which the thought was first consciously conceived, would be either to conceive precisely the same thought in words exactly equivalent to the original words; or to conceive the thought not exactly as at first, but with modifications, so as to require new and different words!

CHAPTER V.

REFERENCE TO AN ARTICLE ON INSPIRATION, IN THE PRINCETON REVIEW.

It is by no means with less of consideration and respect that we refer, for an additional illustration, to an article on the same subject, in the very oldest of our theological quarterly journals, *The Biblical Repertory, and Princeton Review*, Vol. 29, October, 1857. At the head of this article is placed the title of the Discourses of Professor Lee, of Dublin, on the Inspiration of Holy Scripture; of which the writer says: "In our number for April [1857] we expressed a high opinion of the general merits of this work, and our conviction of the truth of the doctrine which it is designed to explain and defend. We wish now to call attention to the subject of which it treats." It is somewhat startling to read in the "short notice" of April, that Mr. Lee's "own theory"—the 'dynamical'— "is precisely that of the old writers"—namely, those who held the 'mechanical' theory of inspiration. "It is a mere change of phraseology. *There is no difference either as to the nature of the influence of which the sacred writers were the subjects, or as to the resulting authority of what they wrote.*" (P. 328.) But as the October article

relates no further to Mr. Lee's work than as above quoted, let us see whether it is altogether consistent with itself in its definitions, doctrines, and use of terms.

1. The writer of the article, as every reader of the work which contains it would of course expect, believes the holy Scriptures, and each and every part of them to be the infallible word of God. Thus: "Faith in Christ of necessity involves faith in the Scriptures, and faith in the Scriptures involves the belief that they are the word of God and not the word of man. They come to us in the name of God; they profess to be His word; they claim Divine authority. . . In saying that the Bible is the word of God, we mean that He is its author; that He says whatever the Bible says. . . What the Scriptures teach is to be believed, not on the authority of Moses or the prophets, or of the apostles and evangelists, but on the authority of God, who used the sacred writers as His organs of communication. The Bible is the product of one mind. It is one Book." (Pp. 662, 663.) These sentences undoubtedly mean just what they say. The verbal statements, the thoughts and words, which, as presented to the eye in written characters, are called the Scriptures, are the word of God, and in no sense or degree the word of man. They are the product of one Mind. Their sole author is God, who breathed, inspired, transferred them, into the minds of the sacred writers, as the organs through which he communicated them to the world.

2. He holds in the strictest sense their *plenary inspiration.* "Faith in the Scriptures as the word of God, is faith in their plenary inspiration. That is, it is the

persuasion that they are not the product of the fallible intellect of man, but of the infallible intellect of God." (661.) The word *product* in this passage doubtless relates not to the written characters or the act of writing, but to that which the prophets, by their own proper acts, committed to writing; that which was as truly the word of God when they uttered it vocally and before they wrote it, as after they performed the manual act of uttering it by writing. It was what He said in articulate audible words, or what He as effectually conveyed to their intelligent consciousness by inspiration. Inspiration is here affirmed, not of the writers, but of what they wrote; according to the inspired testimony that all Scripture is *Theopneustos*, given, imparted, by the act of God, breathing, inspiring it into the minds of the writers. The act of writing was, we presume to say, a distinct voluntary human act. It was sometimes performed not by the prophets and apostles themselves, but by scribes whom they employed and to whom they dictated. "Baruch wrote from the mouth of Jeremiah all the words of the Lord, which He had spoken unto him. . . And the princes asked Baruch, saying: Tell us now. How didst thou write all these words at his mouth? Then Baruch answered them, He pronounced all these words unto me with his mouth, and I wrote them with ink in a Book." (Jer. 36.) So the Epistle to the Romans, though Paul received it by inspiration, was not written by his hand, but by that of Tertius. (Rom. 16.) The like, probably, was the case with all his other epistles, except those to Philemon and the Galatians. But he added to each either his autograph salutation, or bene-

diction. No inspiration, of any kind or degree, was necessary to the act of writing the original texts, any more than afterwards to the act of copying what had been written; and it is impossible that the external writing, the characters previously inscribed with ink, should have been Theopneustos—breathed by the Divine act into the minds of the Apostles. Nor does it seem either congruous or safe to suppose that the original writers were preserved from error in the act of writing, in any other way, than that in which the copyists who succeeded them were preserved—namely, by the influence of adequate motives—motives supplied by the nature and importance of the task, and by the ordinary enlightening, restraining, guiding, gracious influences of the Holy Spirit. For, if an extraordinary supernatural influence was necessary, to guide and preserve from error, the prophets themselves in the act of writing what they had received, and were intelligently conscious of in their own minds, and was equally necessary to guide and preserve from error the scribes to whom they dictated by word of mouth, why should not such extraordinary, supernatural influence, have been equally necessary to those scribes whose copies, instead of the originals, have come down to us? And, unless it can be shown that such extraordinary, supernatural influence was exerted on their faculties, how can we be certain that the words which they wrote, are the very words of God—the very words which were imparted to the prophets by inspiration of God? If the prophets and apostles, and the scribes whom they employed, were, in the act of writing, influenced otherwise than as rational beings in the ordinary use of

their faculties as free agents—that is, by motives—if they were subjected to a different, an extraordinary supernatural influence, that different influence must have superseded, intercepted, suspended, their voluntary, intelligent, and conscious exercise of their faculties, and must have operated on them as passive instruments, or machines; and our confidence in the infallibility of what they wrote must in that case depend on the supposition that such a mechanical influence was exerted. And since the like did not happen to the copyists, we are left without the original and necessary ground of confidence in the verity and accuracy of the text.

But while we know that, without intercepting or infringing the intelligent and voluntary exercise of man's faculties, the influence of motives—considerations intelligently apprehended by the agent—is a ground of absolute certainty with respect to his intelligent acts, we know nothing of the supposed mechanical influence either as a ground of certainty or in any other respect. And if such supernatural influence *on* the faculties of the sacred writers, is the 'guidance' so much insisted on by the writer of the article now under consideration, and by other writers, as the ground of our confidence in the accuracy, verity, and infallibility of the sacred text, and as exclusively constituting, or being of the very essence of, inspiration, then we submit, that farther light is needed concerning the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. If the Scriptures "are in truth the word of God," if He is their sole author, if they are the product solely of His one mind, then they are in no sense the product of finite,

dependent, created minds; and their infallibility must be ascribed to Him as their author and inspirer, and not to a supposed mechanical influence exerted on men in their acts of writing.

3. The writer of the article exhibits the following definitions of inspiration. Referring to the faith of all Christians of every age and name, Greeks and Latins, Romanists and Protestants, he says: "All agree in saying, that every thing *in* the Bible which purports to be the word of God, or which is *uttered* by those whom He used as His messengers, is to be received with the same faith and submission, *as though spoken directly by the lips of God himself. This* is the doctrine *of plenary* as opposed to the theory of partial *inspiration*. . . . . The doctrine of the Church on this subject has ever been, *that the thoughts and language*, the substance and the form of Scripture *are given by inspiration of God;* that the holy men of old SPAKE as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. The Apostle Paul, in writing to the Corinthians, sets forth this doctrine in the clearest light. He teaches, first as to *the source of the truths* which he taught, negatively, that they were not derived from human reason, or the wisdom of men. They were neither the product of his own intelligence, nor communicated to him by other men. On the contrary, what he taught had never entered into the mind of man to conceive. This is his negative statement. Affirmatively, he says these truths were *revealed* to him by the Holy Spirit, who alone is competent to make known the things of God. Secondly, as to the mode of communicating these truths, it was not in words which man's wisdom teaches, or which his own mind sug-

gested, but in words taught by the Holy Ghost." (Pp. 664, 665.)

Here we are briefly and emphatically taught, that both the thoughts and words which constitute what is written as Holy Scripture, were imparted from God—given by inspiration of God. Neither the truths, thoughts, or words were derived from human reason or man's wisdom; they were revealed, taught, imparted by the Holy Spirit. On this ground there is no difficulty in understanding that the words which were written were in reality the words of God; for they were the identical words which were conveyed to the writers by inspiration, and which the Spirit moved them to speak and write. They, personally, had nothing whatever, more or less, to do in the selection of the thoughts or of the words. This, also, is what the article elsewhere teaches. "The sacred writers are not the real authors of the Book. In point of fact they disappear, and God takes their place." (P. 680.) "All inspiration in the Scriptural sense of the doctrine is denied, if *the words* of the sacred writers were not *determined* by the Spirit of God." (682.) "How any one can hold that the sacred writers were inspired as to their thoughts, but not as to their language, is to us perfectly incomprehensible. The denial of verbal inspiration is in our view the denial of all inspiration, in the Scriptural sense of the doctrine. No man can have a wordless thought, any more than there can be a formless flower. By a law of our present constitution, we think in words, and as far as our consciousness goes, it is as impossible to *infuse thoughts into the mind without words*, as it is to bring men into the world without

bodies." (677.) "The contents of the Scriptures are not derived from the human mind; they are not due to its elevation and purity, but *are derived from the Holy Ghost*, and consequently the authority of its teachings is not human but Divine. The Bible is the word of God, and not the word of man." (698.) It would be difficult to express, more clearly than these passages do, the Scriptural doctrine of plenary Divine Inspiration, as meaning the infusion, transference, inspiration, of the thoughts and words of Scripture into the minds of the sacred penmen, to be by them recorded word for word as they received them, as the words of God selected, determined, and imparted by Him, and not in any sense as theirs, or of their selection.

But these definitions and expressions appear to be inconsistent with other definitions of inspiration which occur in other portions of the article. The writer undoubtedly believes every word of Scripture to be the word of God in the same sense that every word audibly spoken by Him is His, and that the words which a man speaks of himself, of his own authority, and of his own affairs, are his. Yet it will appear from the definitions quoted below, that he also believes it to have been the *sole* object and effect of inspiration to *guide* the sacred writers and make them infallible in the selection and utterance of the words which they wrote—infallible in the choice and utterance of the words of Scripture. Of course, on that supposition, they must have originated or selected the thoughts as well as the words, for, as he says, "It is impossible that the thoughts should be infused—inspired into their minds without words," and, there being no wordless

thoughts, the thoughts which they selected words to express, could not have been supplied from without, but must have originated within them. "The object of inspiration is to render *men infallible* in communicating truth to others. . . . . The authors of the historical books of the Bible, in many cases, needed no supernatural communication of the facts which they recorded. All that they required was to be rendered *infallible as narrators.* (665.) . . . The simple end and object of inspiration was to render *the sacred writers infallible.* (667.) . . . The view every where presented in the New Testament of the inspiration of the ancient prophets, supposes them to be under the *guidance* of the Holy Spirit *in the selection* of the words which they employ. David sat down to portray the sufferings of a child of God, as in Psalm 22: unconsciously to himself, it may be, *he was led to select such figures and use such language*, as to present a portrait of the suffering Messiah, recognized at once as a *Divine* delineation." (P. 676.) Of course, on this supposition, David must have originated and selected the prophetic and other thoughts, as well as the words and figures. If inspiration did not convey both thoughts and words to the sacred writers, but only guided them in the exercise of their faculties, then, however infallible the guidance, the words which they selected, and the thoughts equally with the words, must, for that reason, have been their words. It is inconceivable that their being guided to select and write them with infallible accuracy, should hinder their being their words, any more than selecting and writing proper words under the influence of ordinary motives should hinder their being their

words. Their acts would be as free and involve their responsibility, and be as much their personal acts, and make the words as truly and exclusively their words, in the one case as in the other. "It is," as the writer observes, "a fundamental principle of Scriptural theology, that a man may be infallibly guided in his free acts." (P. 678.) Words then, selected by a moral agent, acting freely under infallible guidance, are his words, by as high and exclusive a title as his acts are his.

Again: "The whole end and office of inspiration is to preserve the sacred writers from error in teaching." (P. 685.) This would seem clearly to imply that what they taught was not supplied, imparted, given by inspiration. They might consistently with their freedom in selecting and determining what to write, be infallibly guided so as to teach no error, without receiving, in any manner, from any external source, that which they uttered in writing. But how in that case could the words which they recorded be the words of God? Does the fact that a writing is absolutely true and free from error, make it the word of God? And how on this view of the end and office of inspiration, did the sacred writers become possessed of those supernatural truths which had not been revealed by audible vocal utterances? Is there no difference, is there not a palpable and world-wide difference, between saying that "the writers of the Scriptures were merely controlled by the Spirit of God in the choice of the words which they employed in communicating Divine truth," and saying, "that the very words with the thoughts which they uttered vocally and in writing, were con-

veyed to their minds by inspiration"? Is a man's being preserved from error in teaching, the same thing as his being supplied with the very words he was to teach?

The inconsistency above referred to further appears in what the writer says of the nature and effects of inspiration. "As to the *nature* of inspiration, we are entirely ignorant; that is, we have no knowledge whatever of the *mode* of the Spirit's operation. We only know its effects. . . . We know the effects of inspiration by the declarations of the Scriptures, and by the exhibition of those effects in the Bible itself. From these sources we learn: 1. That the effect of inspiration was to render its subject the infallible *organ* of the Holy Ghost in communicating truth, in such a sense as that what was said or written by an inspired man the Holy Ghost said or wrote. Hence the formulas, "Isaiah or David said," and "the Holy Ghost said," mean precisely the same thing, and are in fact interchanged as synonymous in the Sacred Scriptures." (666.) But is it correct to regard the formula, "David said," as importing precisely what the formula, "the Holy Ghost said," imports? Did David speak what is recorded in Scripture, in the same sense as the Spirit spake in and by him? Are the words his as really and in the same sense that they are the words of God? Is there not something necessarily to be understood and supplied in the one case, which is not necessary in the other? Does David say any thing in Scripture which had not been given him by inspiration of God, any thing in his own name, any thing on his own

authority, any thing, except as an instrument, a messenger, a servant, in conveying the word of God?

But what does the writer mean by inspiration rendering a prophet the infallible *organ* of the Holy Ghost in communicating truth? Does he mean that the prophet was passive as a material organ—a trumpet, through which articulate words or intelligible sounds are uttered, with infallible accuracy? Or does he mean as in the passages previously cited, that he was infallibly *guided* "in the selection of the words," which he uttered? Was he an organ in the same sense that the ambassador of a king is his organ, in conveying his messages, word for word, to his revolted subjects or to a foreign prince—the same sense that Moses was the organ of the God of Israel in repeating to the people word for word, the verbal messages which he received from Him; the intelligent receiver from God, and utterer to men, of intelligible messages in words intelligible and familiar to him? If this is the sense in which the sacred writers were organs of the Spirit, then inspiration means the impartation to them of the very words they were to utter, whether vocally or in writing. They no more selected or had any agency or guidance in the selection of the words which they officially uttered, than a regal ambassador selects the words which he is commissioned and sent to utter. They were in no sense their words, any more than the decrees of a king are the decrees of a crier who proclaims them, or than the words of a master are the words of his servant to whom they are addressed.

The writer of the article under consideration, undoubtedly believes that all the words of Scripture are

verily the words of God. He avers this frankly and explicitly over and over again. "They claim to be the word of God: they assume to have Divine authority. . . . The Bible claims to be the word of God. This claim is enforced and sustained, not only by the immeasurable superiority of the truths concerning God and his Law, concerning man and his destiny, which it contains, but by the absolutely undeniable *supernatural character of its contents.* It presents one grand concatenated system of truth, gradually developed during fifteen hundred years, implying a knowledge of God, of man, of the past, and of the future, beyond controversy superhuman and Divine. This book which thus claims and reveals its Divine origin, has a corresponding Divine power." (679.) "But this view necessarily supposes, that the sacred writers are not the real authors of the book. . . . Every Christian knows that when he reads the Bible, the voice to which he listens, to which his reason bows, his conscience submits, and to which his inmost soul responds, which calms his fears, which illumines, purifies, and elevates him above the world, *is not the voice of man.* But if the voice of God, it must be true. The Scriptures must be infallible. It is the Bible, the Bible as a book, the whole Bible from Genesis to Revelation, which reveals itself as Divine." (680.) And yet he seems as explicitly to hold that the Scriptures are the voice of man in the same sense that they are the voice of God—that man speaks in them in the same sense that the Holy Ghost speaks.

The difficulty, the inconsistency, verbal and real, results from the writer's erroneous apprehension of the nature and effect of inspiration. He infers from what

he takes to be an effect of inspiration, that inspiration itself is of the nature of guidance. From the fact that the sacred penmen wrote correctly the very words which behooved to be written, he infers that in the act of writing they were rendered infallible by inspiration, "infallible as narrators," "infallible in communicating truth to others," infallible "in the selection of the words which they employed." He knows and heartily believes, that the words, as written, were the infallible words of God. But they were written by men, and therefore he thinks that the men must have been "rendered infallible" to insure their writing the words correctly. He argues that "if inspiration be simply that influence of the Spirit of God, by which men were rendered infallible, then there is no difference *as to correctness and authority* between one portion of the Bible and another. There can be no degrees in infallibility; and therefore no degrees in inspiration . . . in the attribute of infallibility the sacred writers were on a par." (P. 668.) In his use of terms he rests the doctrine of the infallibility of the Scriptures not on the fact that they consist of the words of God recorded, but on the fact, real or supposed, that the writers were rendered infallible in selecting and recording the words. He labors this point earnestly and variously, forgetting that what they represented in written characters, existed in their minds, was present to their intelligent consciousness, as the infallible word of God, before they uttered it vocally or in writing—that the thoughts to be expressed, and the words coëvally and jointly with the thoughts, must have been consciously in their minds with every attribute of infallibility and Divine

authority which they possessed after they were uttered by mouth or pen. For that which they recorded was the word of God given by His inspiration. No infallibility or other attribute could have been added to it by their agency as organs of communication. But let us hear what he says in support of his view: "Verbal inspiration, or that influence of the Spirit which controlled the sacred writers in the selection of their words, allowed them *perfect freedom* within the limits of truth. They were kept from error, and guided to the use of words which expressed the mind of the Spirit, but within these limits they were free *to use such language, and to narrate such circumstances as suited their own taste or purposes.*" (678.) This passage, if we understand it, teaches that the human agents, notwithstanding the supposed control and guidance of inspiration, had, as men, a discretion in the choice of the words which they used, and in the choice of the thoughts and the subjects which they introduced into the Scriptures. It was at their option as men, "to narrate such circumstances as suited their taste or purposes." The choice was their act as men in the free and intelligent exercise of their faculties. The control and guidance did not interfere with the free exercise of their faculties. The choice was their act by every consideration which distinguishes any human act from a Divine act. Whatever it suited their taste or their purposes to insert, they might insert at discretion, provided it was true. On this point they were controlled and guided. The legitimate inference, we presume, must be that the Holy Scriptures are the word of God not because He spoke

them, but because what they assert is true, the sacred penmen having been kept from error in writing them.

Again: "Inspiration being an influence by which a man was so guided in the exercise of his natural faculties, as that what he thought and said should express the mind of the Spirit, it follows that the *individuality* of its subject was fully preserved. His character was not changed by his inspiration. He was not thereby rendered more refined or cultivated, more intellectual or logical, more impassioned or eloquent. He retained all his peculiarities as a thinker and writer. If a Hebrew, he wrote the Hebrew language. If Greek was his ordinary language, he wrote Greek. If he lived in the time of Moses or Isaiah, he wrote Hebrew in its purity. If he belonged to the time of the captivity, he wrote Hebrew with all the idiomatic and grammatical peculiarities which the language had at that period assumed. If he wrote Greek, it was the Greek which he and his contemporaries were accustomed to use. The apostles did not use the Greek of Athens, but of Palestine. They wrote as Jews, using the Greek, modified by their Jewish training. These are facts, and they are facts which must determine our views of the nature of inspiration." (P. 673.) Now all this is perfectly consistent with what we allege and rely on, both in the former and present volume, in support of our view of the nature and effect of inspiration: namely, 1. That the thoughts which are expressed in Scripture were *theopneustoi*, breathed, inspired, of God into the minds of the sacred penmen. 2. That they were inspired into their minds in words, because they could no otherwise have been conscious of them. 3. That

the words were of their native or accustomed language, and such in style and idiom, culture and peculiarities, as they were familiar with, and would naturally use to express the same thoughts, for the very reason that they and their contemporaries understood those words with those peculiarities, just as when used in their intercourse with each other. 4. That being so inspired into their minds, they were, to their intelligent consciousness, the words of God as really and perfectly as after they had exercised their faculties in the act of recording or otherwise uttering them; and as such were infallible and needed no special supernatural guiding influence to make them so. 5. That the Divine act by which the thoughts and words were inspired into the minds of the prophets, did not suspend or derange their faculties or their ordinary exercise of them, or affect them otherwise than they were affected by receiving—hearing or reading—the thoughts and words of their fellow-men; that they were in fact as passive in the one case as in the other, and had no more agency in selecting either the thoughts or words in one case than in the other. 6. That this is not theory, but the express doctrine of the Scriptures themselves—namely, that the contents, the thoughts and words which constitute the Scriptures, are theopneustoi—given, imparted to the sacred writers, by inspiration of God. This Scripture doctrine is perfectly consistent with the constitution of man, the natural use of his faculties, and all the phenomena of the case, and wholly supersedes the necessity of a theory of supernatural guidance. It is no more mysterious or remarkable that thoughts in words should be conveyed from the Divine mind to

man by inspiration, than that they should be conveyed by vocal utterance, as they undeniably were to Moses and others, or than that one man's thoughts should be vocally conveyed, in his words, to other men. And if a large proportion of all the words of Scripture are the words of God because He, personally, spoke them; if all the facts and doctrines taught by the Apostle Paul in his preaching and his writings were *revealed* to him by the Holy Spirit; if the words which he used were not his or any man's, but were the words of the Spirit; if the Spirit could convey intelligence, doctrines, thoughts, in words, otherwise than by audible utterance; and if all Scripture was theopneustos, that is, if all the words recorded were given to the writers by inspiration of God, then the doctrine of this "article" concerning the nature of inspiration, and concerning guidance and infallibility as its effect, is erroneous and inconsistent alike with other portions of the article, and with the teachings of the Scriptures. If the Divine Lawgiver and moral Governor of men determined to administer His moral system over the fallen race through the instrumentality of His own authoritative and infallible word, and in perfect conformity to every jot and tittle of its meaning as His word; then assuredly He determined beforehand every thought and every word that should be written as His and in His name; and conformably to His own account of His mode of communication, we are bound as a plain induction from the premises, to conclude that in some way, worthy of Himself and of the infinite importance of the subject, He would convey His thoughts in His own words to His chosen servants, to be recorded and

published by them. It is in derogation of His attributes and claims, and of all that is sacred and momentous in the subject, to suppose that He would leave the insertion or omission of a single word, thought, or shade of thought, to the taste, purposes, volition, or discretion of the writers. The propriety and force of this induction, are enhanced by the consideration that there was in the nature of the case no necessity of man's selecting words for Him. He could and did infallibly convey His thoughts to men by articulate vocal utterance—audibly on some occasions, in dreams and visions on others; and all alike when they were to be written by breathing—inspiring—them into the minds of the writers. No man can say that it was not as competent to Him to inspire all the words that are written, as any of them—the history of the creation, the prophesy of Enoch, the moral law, the Acts of the Apostles, or the Psalms, the Gospels, and Epistles.

Doubtless there are many passages of Scripture, like Paul's greetings and salutations to individual Christians, acquaintances, friends, at Rome, at Colosse and elsewhere; his request to Timothy to bring him the cloak, books, and parchments, which he had left at Troas with Carpus; his directions to Timothy for the preservation of his health; his uncertainty as to how many converts he had baptized at Corinth, and many others expressive of the personal feelings, acts, sentiments, good wishes, intentions, purposes of the writers. Such passages express the very thoughts which, under like circumstances, the same writers would have expressed in ordinary uncanonical letters. They actually had, as men, the feelings, wishes, sentiments, intentions,

which they expressed. But what of that? Does that forbid that those thoughts should be divinely realized to their intelligent consciousness by inspiration, when in their official capacity they were to write them as part of Holy Scripture? Was there not the same necessity that these particular thoughts, in distinction from all the other thoughts of which they were personally conscious, should be divinely selected and specially inspired into their minds to fulfill the purposes of God as moral Governor, that there was, that particular historical facts in distinction from all others, concerning the lives and acts of Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, David, and other Scripture characters should be so selected and inspired? And if He actually determined and selected what should be written in His name, on His authority, and as His word, would not His act, verbally inspiring such particular personal thoughts into the minds of the sacred penmen, make the words which He used His words, as truly as if He spoke them audibly, or as the words which He used on any occasion or in any manner, to express direct revelations, were His words? Does the nature of the thoughts to be expressed determine whether or not the words may be His? May He not inspire into a prophet's mind to be written in His name and as His, the very thoughts and words, private and peculiar though they were, which the prophet was already conscious of? Does He not know the inward and peculiar thoughts and feelings of all men, and whether an infallible report and expression of them in Scripture would fulfill His purposes? If the fact that a prophet was, at a certain time, under certain circumstances, conscious of certain

thoughts, occasioned by his personal feelings, emotions, desires, intentions, and modified by his peculiar tastes, habits, sensibilities, education, his constitutional aptitudes, his mental or physical condition, his experience, his trials, anxieties, joys or sorrows, should preclude those thoughts from being, at the time, or afterwards, specially inspired into his mind to be expressed by him in writing, for the instruction, edification, warning, or encouragement, of others; why should not the fact that he was conscious of knowing certain truths concerning past and passing events, the history, experience, sayings and doings of his contemporaries, preclude those truths from being given to him by inspiration of God, to be written on His authority, in His words, as part of Holy Scripture?

The true, conclusive, Scriptural solution of the difficulty in this matter, is furnished, we apprehend, not by any notion of infallible guidance, nor by any distinction between Revelation and Inspiration, but by the Divine declaration that all Scripture is *Theopneustos*—all alike inbreathed, imparted, given by inspiration of God, and therefore all alike infallibly of His authority—His word. He determined in every particular what should be written in His name and published as His word, and to make it infallibly certain that just what He foresaw to be necessary to the objects and issues of His moral sytem, should be accurately recorded, He, by His inspiring acts, conveyed it all alike to the minds of those whom He employed to record it. We have the same ground of certainty that He determined all of it in every particular, that we have that He determined any of it in any particular. He, Him-

self, in various forms and aspects, declares it all alike to be *His* word, as explicitly as He declares any of it to be *His* word. His declaration that He gave it all by His inspiring efficiency, necessarily assigns to the writers the subordinate ministerial function and relation of ambassadors, messengers, servants. Moses, and others of the sacred penmen, were, accordingly, commanded to speak, and to write, the words which God had spoken to them, put into their mouths, conveyed to them by special messengers angelic and human, facts and doctrines revealed to them by the Holy Spirit. There is no hint that they had any more discretion, or any higher function in one case than in another. When it is said of the prophets, ever and anon as new messages were to be recorded, that "the word of the Lord came to them," we can understand no less than that the verbal message was realized to their intelligent consciousness by inspiration of God, The Hebrew term *dabar*, which is uniformly employed in this formula, denotes, says Olshausen, 'the revealing utterance of God'—that is, the articulate vocal utterance. 'The word of the Lord came, *saying*'—the prophet heard vocal utterances, the voice of the Lord, saying—do, speak, or write, this or that.

The theory which the writer of this article exhibits, concerning the nature of inspiration, as being an influence which, instead of conveying thoughts and words to the sacred penmen to be recorded by them, only guided the exercise of their faculties in selecting and recording the words or the thoughts and words of Scripture, necessarily requires him to suppose a radical distinction between the Divine act of Revelation and

the Divine act of inspiration; according to which no truth could be revealed, disclosed, imparted, by inspiration. The objects and effects of these different acts are by that theory wholly distinct and different. "Inspiration," he says, "is *essentially* different from revelation, although the two were often united in experience, and although the two ideas are often expressed by the same word. The object of the latter—revelation—is *to impart knowledge* to its subjects or recipients; the object of the former—inspiration—is *to render men infallible in communicating truth to others.*" (P. 665.) We need not dwell on this. If his view of the nature of inspiration is erroneous and unscriptural, as we believe and have endeavored to show, then this distinction is without foundation. To reveal is to disclose—make known—and in our view of the subject, it was just as necessary that God should disclose to the sacred writers precisely which, out of all the facts and events that were previously known to them, He had selected and determined to have recorded in His name and in His words, as it was that He should disclose to them precisely those of His own acts, purposes, commands, predictions, which He had determined to have recorded in Scripture. And it is because He often did both by the same act of inspiration, disclosing supernatural, and natural or previously known truths, by one and the same act and influence, that the two ideas, that of revelation and that of inspiration, are united in experience and expressed by the same word. A disclosure by inspiration is virtually, and as to its object and effect, the same as a disclosure by audible utterance, or any other, or conceivable mode of revelation.

How on this theory of guidance the sacred writers became possessed of those prophecies, supernatural truths, or historical truths not previously known to them, which were not made known to them by what the writer denominates revelation, he does not inform us; and we rest satisfied with the inspired declarations of Paul, that the mysteries, the doctrines, all that he knew and uttered in his official character, orally and in writing, was revealed to him by the Holy Spirit.

In the belief that we have not misunderstood the meaning of the language of this article, or, by quoting insulated and dissevered passages, misrepresented it, we are constrained to regard it as affording the strongest evidence we have hitherto met with, of the existence in the soundest quarters, among the ablest men, the ablest theologians, and the ablest writers of the day, of unharmonious and unsatisfactory views, concerning this most important subject. The nature and effect of the Divine act of Inspiration—the act of God in communicating His thoughts and His words to the creature whom He has made and whom He upholds and governs; His thoughts and His words which constitute that creature's infallible rule of faith and life, and on which his destiny depends—the nature and effect of that Divine act, seem to be inconsistently defined, at the very head-quarters of Biblical knowledge and Scriptural orthodoxy. Let it not be an offense that the most insignificant pen should utter this. Owing especially to the nature of the modern and new-fledged philosophical and rationalistic assaults on the plenary Divine inspiration, infallibility, and authority of the sacred oracles, this subject demands renewed investi-

gation at the hands of the official magnates, the Nestors, the guardians and teachers of Christian theology. It will not do to retreat behind the answers to an earlier and wholly different class of assaults. It will not do supinely to repose on the undoubted fact that the Holy Spirit will teach and effectually convince those whom He renews and sanctifies, that the Scriptures are the infallible words of God, to be believed solely on His authority, and to be received and obeyed as the rule of faith and life, prescribed and enjoined by Him. It is just as true that He will enlighten, guide, and enable them to discern, believe, and love the essential doctrines of theology which are contained in Scripture. There is, in the nature of the case, the same reason and necessity for teaching them by human ministerial instrumentality, what the Scriptures teach concerning Inspiration, as for teaching them what the Scriptures teach concerning the doctrine of atonement, or any other essential doctrine. And therefore the Divine wisdom has instituted a ministry expressly to preach and teach what He has disclosed in His written word, to all men indiscriminately, as a means, an instrumentality through which men are renewed and sanctified by the Spirit. It will not do to waive the subject of inspiration as in its nature an inscrutable mystery. The Scriptures treat of it. Skeptics and heretics assail it. Some intelligible, consistent, conclusive statement and elucidation of it is loudly demanded. That there should be inscrutable mysteries proposed to our faith in the sacred oracles, is no objection to them. Without such mysteries they would be incredible. But so far as they explain and illustrate

any fact or doctrine, it is relieved from the condition of inscrutable mystery. The fact and the doctrine of plenary Divine inspiration are in this category. The fact is stated in express terms. The doctrine is variously illustrated, and, in part, by the effect ascribed to the Divine act. In treating of that effect the danger lies in construing what is ascribed to the act. Did it *convey* intelligence *to* the sacred writers? or did it only *guide* them in the exercise of their natural faculties? No two things can be more different, or arise from more widely different apprehensions of an efficient act. To illustrate this, a further reference to the article so long under consideration, will be in point. "As to the nature of inspiration we are entirely ignorant; that is, we have no knowledge whatever of the mode of the Spirit's operation. We only know its effects. The case is analogous to the Divine influence in the work of regeneration. We know nothing of the manner in which the Holy Ghost *imparts* spiritual life to those previously dead in trespasses and sins. We only know that the effect of that influence is *to convey* the principle of a new life. So we know nothing as to how the Spirit operates *on the minds* of those whom He makes His organs in communicating Divine truth." (P. 666.) Now beyond a doubt there is a certain analogy between these two cases; but it is not between the two acts in respect to their nature or source, for they are both alike Divine acts of the same agent; nor is it between the effects produced as to their nature or species, for there is no analogy between a spiritual life, and any effect of inspiration. The analogy therefore exists between the specific manner of the act in one case, and

in the other. The specific manner of the act was, that of communicating, imparting, conveying. The Divine act in regeneration, as the writer of the article says, *imparted* spiritual life — *conveyed* the principle of a new life. Accordingly the Divine act of inspiration breathed, imparted, conveyed knowledge, truths, thoughts, words. This analogy might be largely confirmed by the Scripture use of terms. The same Hebrew word which is translated *breathed*, to signify the impartation of natural life, is translated *inspiration*, to signify the impartation of knowledge. "The Lord God . . . *breathed* into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." (Gen. 2.) "There is a spirit in man: and the *inspiration* of the Almighty giveth them understanding." (Job 32.) There is, we apprehend, as indubitable evidence that the Divine act of inspiration conveyed the thoughts and words which the recipient was to record in writing, as there is that the act of regeneration by the same Divine Person, conveyed the principle of a new life, which the recipient was to manifest by appropriate acts, dispositions, and affections. But the writer, not adverting to the real point of analogy in the case, construes that which the Scriptures ascribe to the act of inspiration—the manner, object, and effect of the act, in a different way—as not conveying any thing, but as merely guiding the recipient in the exercise of his natural faculties.

There is in this article, very much that is of sterling value—of rare excellence in matter and manner; and we heartily wish that every intelligent man in the whole country might read the whole of it. For no man can read it without benefit, and if it has the defect

which we ascribe to it, that defect will appear more palpably than by any analysis or abridgment of its contents; as it will appear in immediate contrast with the light of Scriptural truth and goodness—a fixed idea, struggling to reconcile itself with the infallible authority of Scripture, and the inward consciousness of spiritual discernment and assurance of the truth. It is just because of its excellence that we venture to hold up our farthing candle, not in a spirit of controversy, but solely because the article affords materials and scope for that sort of elucidation, which the present state of the subject most evidently calls for. To those who turn their attention to that subject, nothing can be more manifest than that the term *inspiration* is, by writers generally, and the best of them, employed, not uniformly in one clear, well-defined sense, but variously in different senses. To exhibit and illustrate that fact is a main purpose of the present volume. The reader, very likely, may tire of the reïterations which are demanded by the various aspects of the subject that present themselves, but he will, it is hoped, be satisfied, that every erroneous and every inadequate theory, starts with an unscriptural, an erroneous, or at least an inadequate statement of what is meant by Inspiration.

CHAPTER VI.

INSTINCT, INTUITION, AND INTELLECTUAL ACTION CONSIDERED.

I. The manifestations of our intuitional perceptions, compared to the manifestations of instinct by inferior races of creatures, and distinguished from intellectual operations—Reference to Mill's System of Logic—His doctrine of intuition.

It is the purpose of the following observations, in opposition to the intuitional rationalists, to make manifest the fallacy of supposing that Divine truths can, consistently with our constitution and modes of intellectual action, be discovered by intuition, or be conveyed to the human mind, otherwise than in words; that the power of intuition is not a receptive, but merely a perceptive power; that it is exercised immediately and involuntarily, and is not susceptible of enlargement or improvement by instruction, and therefore can not be the subject or organ of inspired thoughts, whether with or without words, or of any inward spiritual inspiration, inspiration of genius, or awakening of religious consciousness; that the mental power of perceiving truths intuitively is, on the one hand, distinguished from instinct, by its attribute of intelligence,

and on the other, from intellectual cogitation, by the fact that intuitive perceptions are immediate, natural, involuntary, and necessary, and are neither acquired nor improved by instruction, whereas, intellectual cogitation is mediate, through the intervention of words, is consequent on instruction, and is voluntary.

The mind, in rational creatures, while dormant, or not conscious of action, is unconscious of its intuitive apprehensions, convictions, and beliefs. In thinking, it acts, not intuitively, but voluntarily, and only according to instruction previously acquired through the senses or otherwise. Its action in thinking depends on its knowledge of words, acquired by education and employed as its instrument and vehicle of thought. Its knowledge and memory of words are the ground or condition, of its foresight of the results of mechanical motions and physical acts. It is conscious of thinking—whether of results to be effected, or of any thing, intellectual or physical,, past or future—only in words which are the correlate and vehicle of its thoughts. But in thinking and being conscious of its thoughts in words, it thinks and becomes conscious of the words which signify those of its intuitive perceptions which coincide with the particular subject of its thoughts. Those intuitions, spontaneously and with a rapidity and by a process of mental action, of which we are not conscious, present themselves as if preädjusted to the words in which we think. We are conscious of them only in the act of thinking as we are conscious of perceiving external objects only by reason of the preädjustment of the visual organ to the objects seen and to the act of the mind in seeing.

On the other hand, though instinct in the inferior races is a part of their nature, as intuition is a part of man's nature, the inferior races do not think. They have no vehicle of thought. They have nothing corresponding to our words, by which to become conscious of thought; nothing to be the instrument of memory, reflection, or of forethought of mechanical results. If they have a sensational language, by which they are conscious of and remember sensations, it is not a language of intellect — it is not articulate, it can not be spoken or written, it is in no respect analogous to words, it is not interposed between sensation and thought, it is not a subject of consciousness or memory, as any thing distinct from sensation. They act independently of instruction and prior to experience. Unlike man—who is conscious of his thoughts by being conscious of the words in which he thinks—they have no analogous consciousness of thought, intention, or foresight in any of their organic movements or mechanical constructions. The bee constructs her cell, and the bird her nest as perfectly at first, and without instruction or experience, as after the first or of any number of trials. They work with exact precision towards a perfect structure of the proper form and with the needful adaptations and furniture, without any previous knowledge of the process, or foresight of the issue of their toil. Such instinct is in their nature as a basis, condition, or rule of physical and mechanical action, without intelligent design, foresight, or reflection, what intuitions in man's nature are, as a basis, condition, or regulator of intellectual action, the acquisition of knowledge by instruction, the use of language as the medium

and instrument of thought, the exercise of the power of thinking, of comparison, foresight, and reflection. These phenomena of rational minds, presuppose and require an intermediate instrumentality which is wanting to the irrational, non-cogitative, and non-responsible races, namely, words, as the medium and instrument of thought wherever the intellectual power of thought exists. By the possession of this power, this instrument, and the natural capacity of intuition, the child, rising by degrees, as the exigencies of his complex nature and the progress of his responsibilities demand, to the intelligence of man, is as well qualified to exhibit the phenomena of a thinking being, as the new-fledged bee is by its natural capacity, qualified to exhibit the phenomena of instinct. Our thoughts, whether of sensational or of intuitional perceptions, are conceived in words. Back of this, we know nothing. Back of this, we are as totally ignorant of the intellectual as of the intuitional acts of the soul; and as totally ignorant of intuition as a constituent of the nature of the soul, as we are of instinct as of the nature of the irrational tribes. The one characterizes the irrational, whose acts have no moral character. The other, coupled with the use of words and with volition, in the act of thinking, and with consciousness of the thoughts conceived, characterizes the rational, as moral and responsible agents. The nexus between the soul and its responsible acts in willing and thinking, is language, words, in which it conceives the thoughts which it wills to think. Because thinking is a voluntary act of the rational mind—because it wills to think, and necessarily thinks and is conscious of its

thoughts, in words, it is responsible for its thoughts; the act of voluntary thinking, is a moral act, for which the agent is responsible.

A knowledge of the signification and usage of words is as necessarily prerequisite to intuitive moral perceptions, as it is to the testimony of conscience, to the intellectual conception of thoughts, to volition, and to faith. The mental power of intuition is excited by the action of the intellect. When we intellectually conceive and are conscious of truths which have a mathematical, a logical, or a moral relation to each other, we intuitively perceive that relation, and the fact, proposition, inference, or truth, which it necessarily involves, and on the basis of which, after perceiving it, we reason. When we conceive in words the numbers one and two, we intuitively perceive the relations of those numbers and the facts that two is twice one, and that one is the half of two. When we conceive a proposition, we conceive certain thoughts in words which are related to, and involve, and imply, other thoughts, and which in that relation excite the intuitive perception of those other thoughts. Every logical proposition expresses certain real or assumed truths as premises, which involve and imply other truths, the reality of which is the evidence of certainty in the premises. If what we intellectually conceive in words as premises, is truth, the mind will intuitively, immediately, involuntarily, and necessarily, perceive the correlate, involved and implied truths.

To this process, however, a previous knowledge is necessary, both of the words in which we intellectually conceive the premises of a proposition, and a knowledge of the words which express the truths which we

intuitively perceive when those truths, by being so perceived, become objects of intellectual conception.

The mind can have no innate knowledge of words or of thoughts, concerning any one more than of any other class of truths, without previous instruction. To suppose the contrary would imply omniscience or plenary knowledge. And if a knowledge of words must be gained by instruction prior to our conception and consciousness of thoughts in words, a knowledge of words to signify the truths which we intuitively perceive, must be acquired by previous or by coïncident instruction. This seems to be an unavoidable conclusion from the fact, that intuitions are not instincts, but are intelligent acts of the mind, and acts immediately related to what the mind, at the same time, intelligently and consciously thinks. All intelligent acts imply mental intelligence. To perceive truths intuitively when the mind had not been so instructed concerning related truths, as, under the requisite conditions, to render the perception obvious and necessary, would imply omniscience.

Thus when we intellectually conceive the proposition that "order universally proves the existence of mind," and the fact that "order exists and is manifest in the works of nature," we conceive certain definite truths in words which we have learned by instruction. These truths are not intuitively perceived; and no man thinks them who has not been instructed, or uses the words to express them without having learnt the meaning of the words. But to one so instructed as clearly to conceive those truths, the correlate truth, the legitimate logical inference, 'that the works of nature prove the

existence of mind,' becomes obvious and is intuitively and immediately perceived. No man, however intuitively, perceives such a truth, who does not at once conceive it intellectually in words, and the knowledge necessary to the intuitive perception is supplied or rendered obvious, by the knowledge necessary to the prior intellectual conception of the cognate truths. Intuition, considered simply as an intelligent act of the mind, is immediate and involuntary, considered relatively to our voluntary intellectual cogitations, it is a logical process. In the proposition, "I think," a fact is expressed of which we are intellectually conscious. The logical induction, "therefore I exist," is intuitively perceived. The proposition is a premise, from which the inference necessarily follows, and is therefore immediately, involuntarily, and unavoidably perceived. The conscious verbal knowledge pre-requisite to our conception of the premise, suffices with whatever knowledge we previously have relating to our existence, to quicken and evolve the intuitive perception of the inference.

The exercise of the power of intuition, and the immediate effect of its exercise, are perfectly simple. But no sooner is a truth perceived by intuition, than it becomes an object or occasion of complex attention and influence—of voluntary thought, of sensibility, of consciousness, of memory, of association with other truths. And hence the confusion which arises from the use, interchangeably, of terms which denote the simple exercise and immediate effect of that power, and terms which relate to subsequent, mediate, and complex effects connected with the intellect, the will, and

other faculties, states of mind, and associated truths. A like confusion has occurred in respect to other phenomena of the mind. Thus the will, or power of volition, the exercise of which, (determined, as it uniformly is, by the immediately preceding state of the mind,) and the immediate effect of its exercise, are perfectly simple, is represented by the same term—will—sometimes, by the same and by different authors, to denote the power itself, as an efficient, executive power, the simple exercise of it, and its immediate effect in deciding on present and future acts; and again, in a wide and complex sense, to denote or include all the moral preferences, inclinations, disinclinations, desires, and affections of the soul. In this general sense it is contra-distinguished from the understanding, as comprehending all the faculties, states, and exercises of the soul which are not included in that faculty. Such a use of terms, without due discrimination, can not but confuse and mislead. For these mental phenomena, these inward states, affections, feelings, desires, inclinations, are in relation to executive acts of the will, but motives, which excite, influence, move, determine, the will to decide on our acting one way or another in every instance of responsible action, internal or external. The efficiency, however, is not in the motives. They are simply the reasons why the agent determines to act, wills to exert his efficiency, in one way—to one effect—rather than another. In this sense and to this extent they are causes. They are reasons, considerations, inducements. Whereas a moral agent, is, in the nature of things, the efficient cause of his own acts. The will is the efficient power, by the exercise of which,

the agent determines, wills, decides, on his acts. He decides in view of considerations, desires, aversions, likes, dislikes, whether good or bad, which are present to his mind, and excite him to exert his power of volition and to act. He can not decide without such reasons immediately in view, nor against the preponderance of some of them over the others. The freedom of his will consists in his freely deciding according to the reasons, good or bad, which preponderate. Comparing his decision with those reasons, he is conscious that in his decision he acts freely. Those reasons—the desires, aversions, feelings, affections—except so far as they are animal or physical desires, etc., are nevertheless morally good or bad, and as such, give the like character to the acts decided on by the will, whether they be external or internal acts. They are morally good or bad, virtuous, or vicious, as they proceed from a depraved nature, a corrupt heart, or the contrary. They are morally good or bad as they exist prior to the acts which they influence the will to decide on, as the acts are on which the will decides. They are free, unconstrained, and if they are not, or in so far as they are not effects of prior volitions, they are not all necessarily contrary to, or agreeable to, the will. If in their very nature, and as motives, they are all bad, the will merely decides on acting them out, or on further cherishing and manifesting them in internal or external acts. If as motives, good and bad affections are in conflict, the will decides according to those which preponderate. Primarily, morality is predicable of the motives—that is, of the desires, feelings, affections —in the view and under the influence of which the

will decides; so that to determine the moral quality of an act, we must ascertain the motive on account of which the will decided on it. The simple act of the will in deciding is the same in all cases; and though it involves the responsibility of the agent, does not itself, independently of the motives, determine whether the act decided on is good or bad. As holiness is that in the moral nature of the agent—that moral quality which, as manifested in the affections, volitions, thoughts, and acts, is conformable to the Divine Law as a rule of duty; so morality is that in the moral nature of the affections, desires, etc., which, as motives, influence the will, which makes the volitions and the acts which they induce, morally good or bad. As the motives—the desires, affections, etc.—do not originate in volition, their moral quality necessarily results from their source in the moral nature of the agent.

Accordingly our intuitive perception of the moral quality of a volition or voluntary action, pre-supposes intellectual, that is, acquired knowledge of a standard of comparison, and of the meaning and usage of the words, action, moral, good, bad, and such others as are necessary to the intellectual conception, consciousness, and expression of what we intuitively perceive.

Knowledge, strictly defined, is intellectual apprehension, cognition, of revealed or other truths—of external or internal phenomena. It implies, and is dependent on, instruction. It is that which we conceive, are conscious of, remember, and express, in words; and is limited to that which we have words to express. Intuitive perceptions are not primarily in this category. To suppose them to be, would be to suppose that we

have intuitive, immediate, involuntary, spontaneous, in distinction from acquired knowledge of words: which, assuredly, no one will pretend. Revealed truths, therefore, can not be conveyed to the mind in any way so as to be *intuitively* perceived. They must be conveyed in words, so as to be intellectually conceived, realized to the consciousness, remembered, and expressed. If inspired truths, revelations, or any other truths, from without, must be primarily perceived by intuition, then they must be perceived without words directly or indirectly signifying, implying, or rendering, the perception of them obvious and necessary; and can not be conveyed or confirmed by testimony, nor bring with them any external evidence or authority. On such a supposition, an external revelation is impossible. Skepticism, mysticism, and utilitarianism, may remain, but, to us, truth and right, morality and moral obligation, can have no foundation or existence out of our own minds.

If there is in reality, in our feelings, desires, and affections, and in our external acts, what we understand and are conscious of as truth and falsehood, right and wrong, morality and immorality, then we are bound, under moral obligation, to feel and act in conformity to truth and right, and not to feel or act the contrary; which implies a standard, a criterion of truth and right out of ourselves, as clearly as a civil or a criminal act, under a civil government, implies a law of that government, as its criterion. Man is bound by that law because he is a subject to that civil government, and responsible to it for his acts so far as they are enjoined or forbidden by its laws. So man is un-

der moral obligation, because he is a rational creature, under a moral government—a government of moral laws concerning moral feelings, desires, affections, and actions, the enactment and enforcement of which is morally right, because it is according to the nature, will, rights, moral perfections, righteousness, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, of the Divine Lawgiver; and conformity to which, therefore, is right, and the opposite is wrong. Those laws take cognizance of the feelings, thoughts, and actions, of the rational creature, and are the ultimate standard and criterion of them. They are therefore good or bad as they conform to the laws or the contrary.

Accordingly there is nothing more absolutely ultimate, more unresolvable into any thing less complex, or more exempt from indefiniteness and uncertainty, or which we more clearly conceive, and are conscious of, than what we denominate *moral right*. Every effort to explain it by something else, pre-supposes and assumes just what we conceive in those terms as the criterion, and as immutable in its nature, and independent of human speculations. Nor is any thing more obvious than the necessity to a moral system of such an ultimate principle, and immutable criterion. For a moral system implies a moral lawgiver, a moral law, moral obligation, moral sanctions, and moral results; and, therefore, an immutable standard of moral rectitude. But to suppose an intuitive revelation of truth and right as founded in the Divine nature and perfections, and exhibited in the inspired writings, so as to harmonize with our natures and our consciousness, without an acquired knowledge of words, and of

involved and implied truths, would be to arrogate omniscience.

Whatever of mystery there may be in respect either to instinct or intuition, for aught that appears, there is no more of mystery in the facts, that the rational agent is originally endowed with the power of intuition, that the power is excited by intellectual cogitation, and that the truths perceived are realized to the consciousness in words, than there is of mystery in the facts—constantly exposed to our observation concerning instinct in the inferior races—that it is excited by natural exigencies, that without any consciousness of its import or of its tendency, it invariably and infallibly guides the irrational agent to a specific and perfect result, and controls and restricts its agency to acts, which, in the directest possible manner, tend to the production of that result. No one entertains a question but that such instinct, in whatever degree it may exist, and in whatever ways it may be manifested, is inherent in the nature of the inferior races. It is the sole guide of the acts by which their exigencies are provided for, and by which the succession of their species is maintained. It is not improved by time, instruction, or experience, but is as perfect at the dawn of their existence, as at any stage of their progress. So of the intuitional power of the rational mind. It is as evidently of the nature of the soul, as instinct is of the nature of the irrational tribes. Intuitive perceptions arise, become objects of thought, and are realized to the consciousness coïncidently with the earliest consciousness of thought. In relation to the intellectual exercise and consciousness of thought, this efficient power preëxists,

as truly as the understanding, or the will, or any constituent of the rational mind exists, prior to any manifestation of intellectual phenomena. The exercise of this power is not improved by literary instruction, or by intellectual experience, though it occurs only in conjunction with intellectual cogitation.

A type of these constituents of animal and rational natures, is exhibited in mineral and vegetable organisms throughout the realms of nature; in the specific and invariable forms which result from electric and magnetic influence, and from chemical affinities in the phenomena of crystallizations, and of vegetable growths. It is that in the nature of vegetable seeds and germs, which, as quickened under the requisite conditions, determines the forms, the colors, and all the characteristics and products of the full-grown plant or tree. For according to the record of the creation: "The earth brought forth grass and herb, yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind." So that the nature of every seed after its kind, when excited by the stimulants of germination, and manifested in the growth, the foliage, and all the characteristics of its kind, exhibits the same forces, tendencies, and results as every other seed of the same kind; as the nature of every bee, when quickened into life, and excited by its exigencies, manifests itself with unerring precision in the construction of cells of identically the same forms and proportions, as those fabricated by its predecessors, its contemporaries, and its followers; and as the nature of the intuitional power, when excited by intellectual cogitation, manifests itself uniformly by the same iden-

tical intuitions, which, being as objects of thoughts intellectually conceived, are realized to the consciousness, as all our intellectual conceptions are, in words, the appointed, intermediate, and exclusive, vehicle and instrument of thought.

That attribute of material nature the effect of which, under the proper conditions, is the formation of crystals of the same identical figures and proportions, may be regarded as a primary exemplification of that order in the works of nature which necessitates the ascription of those works to the will and purpose of the Divine Mind, and in that respect as a type of that attribute of the nature of sentient irrational creatures, called *instinct;* the effect of which is the mechanical construction by insects of one kind, of cells of the same identical forms and mathematical proportions, and by insects, birds, and quadrupeds, of the several species, each in its own invariable manner, in the construction of its habitation, the selection and acquisition of its food, the care of its young, and in a thousand other particulars; and yet further, as a type of that attribute of man's rational nature, the effect of which is the spontaneous evolvement, under the proper excitement, of *intuitions*, mental perceptions, convictions, beliefs, that capacity of rational agents, which, though subject to appropriate excitement, is independent of instruction.

The attribute affirmed of as an endowment of material nature, is that of *adaptation*, under prescribed and well-known or ascertainable conditions, to certain specific, limited, and uniform changes. The attribute affirmed of, as of the nature of irrational creatures, is that of *sentient impulse* to certain specific and uniform

results, without knowledge, foresight, or consciousness of design. The attribute affirmed of, as of the nature of rational minds, is that of *efficient agency* in the perception of certain truths concerning ourselves as agents, and concerning the relations, agreements, or disagreements, of moral, intellectual, and mathematical propositions, geometrical figures, numbers, proportions, and the like—absolute and self-evident or necessary truths, on the basis of which, as the regulator or test, our acquisition of intellectual knowledge depends, and the existence and cognizance of which is essential to such action of the will, whatever may be the degree of acquired knowledge, as to determine that the agent is morally responsible.

Accordingly it happens in the first of these cases that adaptation to specific changes, is ineffectual, except under the prescribed conditions; in the second, instinctive, sentient impulse, is dormant, when the stimulus of exigency ceases; and in the third, where the coincidence of efficient intuitional agency with voluntary intellectual cogitation, has not occurred—as in infancy —or has been destroyed by physical or mental disease —as in idiots and maniacs, moral responsibility is not imputed.

It may be imagined that intuitive perceptions imply a knowledge of truths which there had been neither means nor opportunity of acquiring by instruction, and, therefore, that such knowledge must be asserted to be innate, or of the nature of the soul. But the inference is not warranted; for it is not simply knowledge acquired by intellectual instruction, that is implied; but the perception, to which the soul is constitutionally

qualified, of truths, which, under the circumstances and in the connections in which they are perceived, are perfectly obvious, and can not but be perceived when the mind is excited by the intellectual conception of cognate truths; just as the mind can not but perceive the forms and colors of visible objects through the eye when opened in the presence of those objects, and excited by the presence and agency of light. And if there is in the nature of every vegetable seed a constituent, a capacity, a quality, which, in the process of germination and development, manifests itself in the stem, the branches, the foliage, the seeds, of the herb or tree, after its kind; and if there is in the nature of the inferior races a capacity, an aptitude, a sensitive impulse, which, under the stimulus which life and exigency supply, manifests itself in all the results of instinct; we may, without incredulity or wonder, conclude that there is in the nature of the rational soul a power, capacity, efficiency, which, without prior instruction, manifests itself in the perception of self-evident truths when excited by intellectual cogitation; truths, which, under the alleged conditions, are obvious to the mental eye, and are of necessity perceived, and are realized to the consciousness in intellectual verbal conceptions.

What takes place in the laboratory of the soul in the intervals of intellectual excitement, when its intuitive perceptions are not conceived in words, and, therefore, are not realized to the consciousness, we know not; and while we are morally responsible for the affections, thoughts, and acts, of which we are conscious, it may not specially concern us to know what intuitions, if

any, occur in those intervals. For aught that we have any means of knowing, the mental power of intuitive perception may be as dormant as the susceptibility of change in matter, in the absence of the requisite conditions; as the capacity of development in seeds prior to germination; as the instinctive power of impulse, when excitement ceases; or as the visual faculty in the absence of light, and the auditory, in the absence of sound.

We know the mind by the mental phenomena of which we are conscious. It discerns external things by the instrumentality of our physical organs of sensation. Through the eye it sees external objects. Through the ear it hears external sounds. Through one class of sentient nerves it feels, through another it distinguishes what we taste, and through yet another it discriminates agreeable from repulsive odors. These physical organs are its instruments of intercourse and communion with external nature in its several modes of contact and manifestation, while it is itself diverse from matter and distinct from the investiture of flesh and blood by which its spiritual and imperishable nature, its essence and its acts, are alike concealed. But it has its own peculiar powers and modes of action and of manifestation to its own consciousness and to that of kindred minds; the efficient power of volition; the intuitional power of perceiving propositions, relations, obvious, necessary, undemonstrable truths, inductions, corollaries, the agreement or disagreement of different propositions; the intellectual power of thinking—of conceiving—being conscious of remembering and expressing thoughts in words; the power of conveying

and of receiving thoughts by vocal articulations and by written characters; the power of internal communion with itself, and of external communion with all the phenomena of the physical, intellectual, and spiritual universe.

There is neither any apparent nor any conceivable reason, why the rational agent should not by its nature and constitution be capable of intuitional perceptions, as well as of intellectual conceptions; nor why intuitive perceptions should not be excited and occasioned by the action of the mind in its intellectual cogitations, and, like them, be realized to the consciousness in words. All the manifestations of mind which we are able to observe, and all the phenomena of mental action, are in evidence of this conclusion; since the truths intuitively perceived are not occult and difficult, but obvious and necessary, and are, by the intellectual action which induces the perception of them, made objects of intellectual conception, that is, of thought in words, and are thereby realized to the consciousness, as thoughts intellectually conceived in other cases are.

It will be observed that a distinction is made between intuitional perceptions of truths, and intellectual conceptions of thoughts. The former is not thinking any more than sensation is. It is not sensation. It is seeing mentally. It is the mind's involuntary apprehension, cognizance, conviction, belief, of existing, obvious, necessary truths, whereby they become objects of intellectual conception—of thought in words, so as to be realized to the intelligent consciousness, and to be remembered. The intuitional power, capacity, efficiency, like instinct, acts without volition, and without

instruction; the intellectual, acts only in accordance with instruction, conceiving thoughts in words as its medium and instrument, of which the meaning has been learned, and which are adequate to each and every thought that we intellectually conceive. The intuitional power, is, in the view thus taken, independent of the will; the intellectual is its deputy acting in obedience to volition and according to instruction.

How far this view may differ from that commonly taken, needs not now to be considered, the present object being only to illustrate the distinction between intuition and intellectual action, the facts that we conceive thoughts only by the intellect, and that we invariable conceive thoughts—whether of intuitive truths or of other objects—only in words; and the conclusion, that inspired thoughts, to be conceived by the intellect, and realized to the consciousness, must be inspired in words.

There are, indubitably, among the manifested phenomena of mind, involuntary, unpremeditated, spontaneous intuitions of certain self-evident and immutable truths. But those truths are realized to our consciousness not as non-verbal intuitions, but only as we intellectually conceive them in words. And since the conveyance of truths from one human mind to another so as to be intellectually conceived or understood by the intellect, and realized to the consciousness, is of necessity a conveyance in spoken or written words, or equivalent signs; and since our intuitional perceptions are realized to our consciousness only as we intellectually conceive them in words, it is a just induction that the conveyance of the Divine thoughts to our minds

can not be by exciting, or employing instrumentally, our power of intuition, or by a spiritual, emotional, non-verbal inspiration, but like the conveyance of thoughts from one human mind to another, must be a conveyance and a realization of them to our consciousness in words.

The chief difficulty apparent in all the discussions of the subject of intuition, appears to arise from not considering that we *think in words*, and that thinking in words is an exercise of the faculty of *intellection;* while on the other hand *intuition—mentally seeing*, is not dependent on the instrumentality of words as its medium, and is not in itself an act of which we are immediately conscious, but of which we become conscious by exercising the intellectual faculty. A right apprehension of these diverse mental operations, may perhaps be attained by supposing the mind from its nature, and its capacity of intelligence, to be capable of perceiving truths, which a consciousness of other correlate truths renders obvious to its view as inferences, facts, convictions, and which, as perceived under that condition of excitement, are, like external objects which the mind perceives through the eye, objects of intellectual conception in words by which they are realized to the consciousness.

The activity of the mind, the rapidity of its exercises, surpasses our comprehension. We are distinctly conscious only of a portion, perhaps a very small portion, of its acts; and of that portion we are conscious only as we intellectually conceive them in words; and we so conceive them, only when, like sensations, facts, and truths, learned by instruction and experience, they

occur in such relations and under such conditions as to be objects of distinct intellectual apprehension and cogitation.

In our present mode of existence, the action of the mind is, at least in many particulars, modified by its relations to our physical nature and organization; but we are warranted in saying that we are held accountable for all those mental acts which are voluntary and of which we are conscious. But in the working of this constitution intuitions are involuntary, as seeing is, when visible objects are exposed to the opened eye. To bring our intuitive perceptions, and our visual acts, into correlation with the voluntary exercise of the intellect, as objects of thought, an appropriate instrumentality is requisite—in the one case that of the visual organ, in the other, that of intellectual action in thinking. Intuition, it is plain, is neither the same thing as intellectual cogitation, nor any more like it than visual perception is. It is a different exercise of the mind. It is involuntary, which intellectual cogitation is not. It is spontaneous, not prompted by motives like voluntary acts. It is not a precursor, but a consequent of voluntary thought. It is like seeing. When by the distinct exercise of particular faculties—the will and the intellect—the attention of the mind is directed to facts, truths, propositions, of which we are conscious, and from which certain inductions, convictions, beliefs, necessarily follow, we involuntarily and unavoidably perceive those inferences, and as we proceed to associate and reason from them, we intellectually conceive and think them in words.

Perhaps the foregoing suggestions concerning the

difference of the intuitional from the intellectual functions, may furnish ground for supplying the defect of the leading systems of mental philosophy and ethics on the one hand, and the defect of the best theological systems on the other, respecting the nature, the claims, and the operations of conscience. The point at which conscience asserts its prerogative is that at which the principles, motives, or actions of men, are compared to the revealed will of God, or to some other standard which is recognized and received as of authority in the case, in such manner as clearly to evince the agreement or disagreement of the one with the other, and to produce, in a higher or lower degree, as the perceptions are more or less vivid, agreeable or painful convictions and emotions. The decision is intuitive. As the motive and the voluntary action are brought into comparison with the binding rule, the mind sees the coïncidence or disagreement with such force of conviction as to excite corresponding emotions. The intuitive perception and the emotion are objects of thought, which the intellect conceives in words. The initial step in this process, is that of comparing a moral act, a motive, a state of feeling, a habit, a purpose, or the like, to the rule of moral obligation and accountable agency, which we regard as binding on us. Thus a man is convicted of sin, guilt, just obnoxiousness to punishment, by a comparison of his moral acts with the Scripture rule of faith and duty which he regards as of binding obligation on him as a moral agent. In proportion as his intellect is excited and aroused to think of his acts, and of the rule or standard—the moral law which he has violated—will be the vividness of his spontaneous, intui-

tive perception of the contrariety of his acts to the rule which he was bound to obey. The rule exists prior to the act; and whether it be Scriptural and right, or unscriptural and wrong, he is voluntary and responsible in choosing and adopting it as his rule. The intuitional power does not originate or give authority to the rule. It is not itself a standard of right and wrong. It is not itself conscience. The Scriptural rule is of Divine prescription and authority. All other rules are without authority. The intuitional power does but perceive the conformity or the contrariety of the acts to the rule to which they are compared.

The word *conscience* strictly signifies joint knowledge, namely, of a Divine law, or of some other rule of moral action, and of specific moral acts, to be compared with such rule. A knowledge of the rule is as absolutely prerequisite as is the commission of acts to be compared with the rule. Under these two conditions the intuitional decision of conformity or non-conformity results spontaneously and unavoidably. Knowledge of the rule, joined with knowledge of the acts, brought into comparison with the rule as a test, is conscience. The intellectual apprehension of the judgment, decision, induction, is consciousness.

Such accordingly is the view of the subject every where exhibited in the Scriptures. The Apostle Paul, referring to his own personal experience, says of the manner of his becoming conscious of the sinfulness of his acts, "I had not known sin, but by the law"—that is, I should not have known, realized, been conscious of, the sinfulness of particular acts, had I not known that the law forbade those acts. "For," he adds as an

illustration, "I had not known selfish desire [to be sinful] except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." . . . "For without [a knowledge of] the law, sin [as to my consciousness] was dead, . . . but when the commandment came, [was felt to be obligatory on me, my consciousness of] sin revived. . . . Sin, that it might appear [to be] sin, working death in me by that which is good—[namely, the law]—that sin by the commandment—[by being brought into comparison with the commandment]—might become [be perceived to be] exceeding sinful." With the purport of this, agrees what he says concerning the heathen: "When the Gentiles which have not the [written] law, do by nature [pursuant to the oral law of the natural system] the things contained in the [written] law, these having not the [written] law, are a law unto themselves. Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, [the work demanded by the written law, as enjoined by the natural law and retained in their minds] —their consciences also—[their joint knowledge of that law and of their acts]—bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another"—that is, the Gentiles, comparing their acts with the natural law—the precepts of natural religion, or the primary oral system as perpetuated by tradition—condemned, or approved them, as they coïncided with, or were contrary to that system. So, when the Scribes and Pharisees brought to Jesus, one whom they accused of having broken a law acknowledged by all to be obligatory, to see whether he would condemn her; their design being to try him, and, if possible, to find something to accuse him of. At first, he gave no heed

to them. But as they continued to call for His decision in the case, He said: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. . . . And they who heard this, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one." (John 8.) His manner, and the test to which he subjected them, induced a comparison of their own acts with the law which they acknowledged, which instantly caused them to condemn themselves—to perceive and feel intuitively the truth which the joint knowledge of their acts and the law, and the comparison of one with the other, rendered obvious and unavoidable.

Examples to the same effect occur throughout the Scriptures. When the brethren of Joseph, in their trouble, recalled their cruel treatment of him and compared it with the rule of conduct which they acknowledged to be obligatory, they said: "We are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear." When David was led by the parable of Nathan to compare certain acts as of a third party with the rule of right, he clearly perceived the wickedness of those acts, and his conscience dictated and constrained him to pronounce the sentence of death. On being told that he was the guilty man, and the acts referred to, as his, being specified, the decision of his conscience recoiled upon himself; and he said: "I have sinned against the Lord."

Those who treat of conscience as if it were an original mental power, a faculty as it were of omniscience, or at least of spontaneous perception and knowledge of moral truths—including truths which

are known to the intellect only by Divine revelation and by instruction, labor, at best, to very little purpose, in their attempts at elucidation. They conceive of it as being a faculty of the mind, instead of its being merely an effect of mental action. They assume for it an efficiency and competency to decide spontaneously and involuntarily, the gravest of all questions concerning human actions—the question of sin and guilt or the contrary. But there is no such separate and independent faculty. What are termed the decisions of conscience, are but intuitive perceptions of what is decided and made obvious by the comparison of acts with a known and acknowledged rule. Such decisions, inductions, results, accordingly, are perceived, and become objects of thought, only while the comparison of the acts with the rule is taking place. The rule must exist independently of the mind, and must be known and be deemed to be obligatory; and the comparison must be made, or no agreement or disagreement will be perceived, and no verdict will be rendered.

A late writer of note in the English world, observes, that: "Truths are known to us in two ways: some are known directly and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of intuition, or consciousness; the latter of inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others are inferred." (*Mill's System of Logic.*) This dictum, though seemingly just within certain limitations, is not sound in the latitude and application which he assigns to it; even supposing him to intend only truths of which we have logical

evidence. For not to dwell on the obvious exception of Revealed Truths—which are neither subjects of intuition, nor inferences from intuitional premises; but of which we have, nevertheless, evidence as logical as we can have of any other truths: it is more than our consciousness will warrant, to say, that all the other truths which we know are inferred from those which we know by intuition. For, beyond a doubt, intuitive perceptions are consequents of intellectual conceptions and cogitations of cognate truths, a knowledge of which we attain by instruction: that is, the act of intuitional perception is consequent on intellectual action, though the truths perceived are themselves preëxistent and ultimate.

Considered in relation to the particular truths which we know intuitively, it is apparently correct to say that we infer other truths from them. But the statement of Mr. Mill does not appear to indicate the actual process. It implies that we are conscious of the truths which we intuitively perceive, before we proceed to infer the truths of which the intuitions are said to be the premises. Whereas the intuitions themselves do not occur except as they are excited by our thinking and being conscious of the correlate truths. In the order of sequence they follow our intellectual conceptions; and we are not in fact conscious of them until we are rendered so by intellectually conceiving them in words.

Hence the absolute necessity to us, as rational and moral creatures capable of intuitions and of voluntary intellectual cogitation—of thought and consciousness of thought in words—both of literary instruction and

of Divine Revelation. Without prior instruction our capacity of intellectual cogitation and consciousness is dormant. Without intellectual cogitation and consciousness our capacity of intuitions is dormant; and without Divine Revelation we should remain ignorant of truths which it is most essential to us to know, but which neither our capacity of intuition, nor our capacity of instruction and of intellectual cogitation, could ever supply.

His work, his premises being granted, is very acute and able in its way, and is a subtle and potent auxiliary to the "Positive Philosophy." His statement that "the province of logic is that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known, . . . and that logic is not the science of belief, but the science of proof or evidence," is by itself unexceptionable. But the towering fallacy of his statements, "that the truths known by intuition are the original premises from which *all other truths* are inferred; that the province of Logic is that portion only of our knowledge which consists of such inferences; and that intuitive truths are themselves without evidence, as if their being to our consciousness, self-evident, was no evidence, and did not therefore justify their being taken, as he himself declares them to be, the original premises of all deductive truths, is fatal to the inferences which he logically deduces from them.

Because we intuitively perceive certain truths, he assumes that we possess a knowledge of these truths prior to our receiving any instruction, direct or indirect, concerning them, the subject of them, or the correlates which they imply; which as plainly implies

omniscience, as that attribute would be implied by the assumption that we perceive and know the form, color, and other qualities of an external object prior to our first seeing it by the instrumentality of the organ of vision. He confounds the capacity of intuition—of mentally seeing, under certain conditions of intellectual action, which render the intuitions obvious and unavoidable—with the acquired knowledge and consciousness implied in these conditions. He, in short, inverts the order of our mental phenomena. We are not conscious of perceiving truths intuitively, or of inferring from them other cognate or collateral truths, till after we have acquired knowledge enough of those other truths to conceive them intellectually in words. But when we conceive and are conscious of them in words, we intuitively perceive the primary truths which they imply, conceive them intellectually in words, and assign them their place as primary truths and premises from which the cognate truths previously learned and conceived in words, are logically inferable. It is at this point that logic steps in formally to deduce the truths previously known by instruction from the intuitive self-evident premises, and thereby formally to *evince and prove* that they are truths.

This conclusion is the more apparent when we consider that an inference of truths from premises previously known, is not, as Mr. Mill assumes, an inference exclusively from truths, as premises, which we previously knew by intuition. The logical process is as legitimate and as conclusive, when applied the other way—that is, when, knowing certain truths by instruction, we infer from them as premises the very truths

which we characterize as intuitional. This, indeed, if it be not the only, is the ordinary way, by which our perception of truths by intuition is occasioned. It is the intellectual cogitation of truths which we have learned by instruction, that induces and gives occasion for, the intuitive perception of those related, implied, primary truths, from which, as premises, we in turn infer the very truths with which the process commenced.

An intuition can not be stated or contemplated as a premise, till it has been perceived, and has been realized to our consciousness by being intellectually conceived in words. It can not be perceived till we intellectually conceive in words such cognate truths as make it obvious, and render the perception of it unavoidable. It is perceived, not as a premise, but simply as a distinct primary truth. It is perceived, not at pleasure by an independent act of the mind, but of necessity as a consequence of the intellectual action in thinking of cognate truths. After these conditions are fulfilled, it is within the province of Logic, as a premise—as a primary general truth, arrived at, as all other general propositions are by the instrumentality of distinct intellectual cogitation in words. In this process, such distinct intellectual action supplies the instruction and knowledge which is prerequisite to intuition. We have learned and intellectually conceive truths which clearly and indubitably imply, and which necessitate the perception of, other truths, which the mind therefore intuitively perceives.

This, we venture to say, is the process, to which our experience and consciousness, unbiased by theory, and unembarrassed by prejudice, unequivocally testify.

By nature, at the outset of our existence, we are as entirely without knowledge of one class of truths as of any other. All the knowledge which we afterwards acquire or receive, we acquire or receive through some instrumentality, which, in the constitution of things established by the Creator, is adapted and adjusted to our nature, our capacities, our necessities, and our responsibilities. As we emerge into existence as moral agents, and from infancy to maturity, and from maturity in our earthly to our immortal unearthly existence, the constitution of things which He has established, works in harmony with our capacities. Our capacities of sensation, of sensational perception, of volition, of intellectual conception and consciousness of thoughts in words, of intuitive perceptions, of emotions, of memory, of comparison, of induction and reasoning or logic, of vocal and chirographic expression of our thoughts, of all the phenomena of created minds, are rendered effective, stimulated, excited to action, by appropriate, adequate, effective instrumentalities, which are provided and preädjusted in the constitution of things. This is not more true of any one of our natural capacities, than it is of that of acquiring knowledge by instruction. Undoubtedly the capacity of intuitively perceiving primary self-evident truths, under appropriate conditions and excitements, is a constituent of our nature, as the capacity of perceiving and distinguishing external objects under appropriate conditions, is of our nature, and as the capacity of intellectually conceiving and becoming conscious of thoughts, is of our nature. But who can pretend to say, that *knowledge* of primary, mathematical, moral, or

theological truths, for the acquisition of which these and other capacities are given, exists in us as an object of intuitive perception, or of intellectual cogitation, prior to and independently of the acquisition of it by instruction? Were that true, why were the capacities of acquiring that knowledge by instruction superadded? Why, after all, is any instruction necessary? If some truths, instead of being merely perceived, *recognized*, to be truths, by intuition, are *known*, *consciously known*, and *comprehended* intuitively, as if they had been learned by instruction, and if all other truths known to us are inferred from those, why do we not *intuitively* deduce those inferences? Why is instruction, and voluntary intellectual action — cogitation, reasoning — necessary to the making of those inferences?

On the contrary: intuition is an effect of intellectual action, as our perceptions of external objects are effects of sensations, and as our emotions are effects of mental cogitation. And since in our intuitive perceptions the mind acts immediately, without the intervention of words, and in thinking it acts and becomes conscious of acting, through the intervention of words as its instruments, there is, manifestly, a radical formal distinction between these two modes of mental efficiency; though intuition takes place conjointly with the voluntary act of thinking, as is evident from the fact, that our intuitions are, in every instance, exclusively such as coïncide with the present subject of thought. And since we are not conscious of our intuitions till we think of them in words, to speak of them as knowledges—as being known and consciously realized, prior

to our acquiring any other knowledge, or exercising the power of intellectual cogitation in words, is as solecistical and contrary to experience, as it is to speak of our seeing physical objects in the absence of light or with bandaged eyes. They are immediate perceptions of truths, which, being perceived, are like sensitive perceptions, objects of thought in words. The mind *directly* apprehends the truth which it intuitively perceives. The truth exists independently of its being apprehended. The involuntary spontaneous apprehension or recognition of it, does not constitute an act of which at that stage we are conscious. A further mental act is necessary. The intuitive perception brings the truth into such an attitude or relation to the mind, as to make it an object of intellectual cogitation—of voluntary thought in words; and it is then only, when we think it in words that we become conscious of it. Then, by its invariableness as a truth, and by our unavoidable perception of it, under the requisite conditions, it is a basis, regulator, test, of our acquired, intellectual knowledge, conception, cogitation of related truths. When we conceive these acquired truths, the intuition occurs, is intellectually conceived in words, and is thereby realized to our consciousness. Such, at least, appears to us to be the process; and it appears to us wholly to preclude the reception, or conveyance into our minds, of revealed truths unverbally, or independently of words. For a revelation, or an inspiration, the effect of which was only to bring the revealed truths within the power of intuition, would not supply the prerequisite intellectual action which excites that power, nor provide in any

way for our becoming conscious of them. So far as we can conceive, a revelation by Divine Inspiration must be made to the mind without words, or it must be made in words. It can not consist of sensations or emotions. If made in words, the mind, as it was received, would be conscious of it. If made without words, neither the consciousness necessary to the expression of it in writing, nor any consciousness of it, would be occasioned; and it would be necessary to suppose it to be a condition precedent to a revelation, that the recipient should have learned truths cognate to those to be revealed, and to be thinking of them at the moment of a revelation, so as to be excited to perceive these revealed truths by intuition.

II. Sir William Hamilton's "Philosophy of Common-Sense—or our primary beliefs considered as the ultimate criterion of truth," shown to afford no support to the notion of revelations being discovered by intuition.

The terms *intuitive* and *intuition* are employed to signify those acts of mental perception, (whether defined as perceptions, cognitions, convictions, or beliefs,) which are immediate, involuntary, and spontaneous; and which occur unavoidably with respect to the truths, facts, or whatever phenomena they relate to, when the attention of the intellect is occupied in thinking of collateral truths which pre-suppose, involve, and imply them. To the mind under the requisite condition of excitement, they are obvious, spontaneous, and involuntary, as acts of visual perceptions are, when the eye is opened in the presence of visible objects. When we think for the first time of a particular truth or fact,

the appropriate intuition, the perception of the correlate truth then occurs for the first time. When we afterwards think of the same truth or fact in the same connection, the same intuition recurs, not indeed simply as a mental perception unassociated with memory, but as an object of thought in the given connection. At this point our intuitions are by many, and not improperly, called cognitions, convictions, beliefs, and by various other terms of analogous import.

Hence Sir William Hamilton, regarding them in all the aspects in which they occur in our experience, and which are indicated in the nomenclatures of different authors, comprises them under the term *Common-sense*, to signify comprehensively those primary mental perceptions—cognitions, convictions, beliefs—in which all men agree. With respect to these mental phenomena, the first question behooves to be, Whether as realized to our consciousness, they involve the necessity of concluding, that the mind is gifted with *knowledge* naturally, and prior to instruction? that is, knowledge of the truths which we intuitively, involuntarily, and spontaneously perceive. The affirmative of this question would seem to have been positively held by many philosophical writers, both of ancient and modern times, and to be at least tacitly held by all. They are brought to this conclusion probably, by confounding, or failing to distinguish between that class of involuntary mental acts which we properly call *intuitions*, and that class of voluntary acts which we call intellectual cogitations, and which largely comprise antecedent intuitions. There is a broad line of distinction between the two. The first are not only spontaneous, but they

are immediate. The second are not only determined by the will, but they include the mediate intervention of words, and depend on a previously acquired knowledge of words and of what they signify. It is clear that prior to our first intuitive perceptions of particular truths, there can be in the mind no *such knowledge* of those truths as the direct intellectual cogitation of them requires; and therefore if there is in fact any *knowledge* of them whatever, it must be an original natural endowment; for prior to any intellectual cogitation, no knowledge of any truths could possibly be acquired. But the supposition that there is in the mind, prior to instruction and intellectual cogitation, a *knowledge* of the truths which under certain conditions, we intuitively perceive, is not sustained by our consciousness, and is in fact inconceivable; and if our intuitions are to be traced back to this supposition, they must be regarded as inexplicable and beyond our comprehension.

Probably the writers who have treated of this subject, even the best of them, have ascribed to the mental power of intuitive perception, a great deal more than actually proceeds from it; as he who should ascribe to the mental power of perceiving external objects through the medium of the eye, a perception of all that pertained to those objects, or of any thing more than what was distinctly visible, and of which the perception would be involuntary and spontaneous, would ascribe to that power what was beyond its capacity and out of its sphere. Our visual perceptions are as truly acts of the mind as our intuitions; but they do not necessarily require or imply any prior knowledge of the things perceived. They include only what is mani-

fest and obvious concerning those things, under the conditions in which they occur. So our intuitions, under the conditions in which they occur, include truths which are obvious and can not but be perceived under those conditions. The conditions include a present action of the intellect—cogitation—concerning correlate or adjunct truths of which a knowledge has been acquired by instruction. By that knowledge and intellectual action the known truths are brought into the view of the mind, in such a relation, that the correlate, implied, intuitive truths, are rendered obvious; so that the mind unavoidably perceives and recognizes them as truths. It sees them by the light of the known truths which are the present subject of cogitation. The perception is, according to the constitution of the mind, consequent on such intellectual cogitation; as the perception of external objects is consequent on the exposure of visible objects to the eye.

The gifted author above mentioned, in his "Philosophy of Common-Sense—or our primary beliefs considered as the ultimate criterion of truth"—deals with our intuitive perceptions as original cognitions, and as though we were conscious of them as concrete propositions, independently of any intellectual conception of them in words. He says: "Our cognitions, it is evident, are not all at second hand. Consequents can not, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of antecedents, which are themselves only consequents. Demonstration, if proof be possible, behooves us to repose at last on propositions, which carrying their own evidence, necessitate their own admission; and which, being as primary, inexplicable, as inexplicable, incomprehensi-

ble, must consequently manifest themselves less in the character of cognitions than of *facts* of which consciousness assures us under the simple form of *feeling* or *belief*." (*Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. Appleton's Ed.* 1855.)

In this paragraph at the commencement of his Treatise, *intuitions*—intuitive knowledges, cognitions—are contemplated as *propositions*, which carry their own evidence and necessitate their own admission; and yet, because they are *primary*, they are held to be inexplicable and incomprehensible—and, therefore, as necessarily becoming manifest rather as *facts* of *feeling* and *belief*, than as knowledge, or cognized propositions. Surely the terms or the purport of a proposition which is inexplicable and incomprehensible, can hardly be said to be *manifested* in a consciousness of *feeling* or *belief;* and to speak of propositions, which are inexplicable and incomprehensible, as being cognized, comprehended, understood, is, in an extreme degree, solecistical. The truth we apprehend to be, that while we have innumerable *intuitions*, they are not propositions, but only mental perceptions, under certain conditions, of simple and obvious, or necessary truths. The fact that we perceive them, supersedes and precludes the necessity of any other evidence of their truth, or of any explanation of them. In what respect they are less comprehensible, or less to be relied on, as the basis of intellectual cogitation and consciousness in words, than our visual perceptions of external objects, is by no means apparent. When we open our eyes and see the sun, we need no extrinsic evidence to demonstrate to us that we perceive that luminary; nor is the truth of the fact that we perceive it, in any way affected by

the question whether the perception, and the object perceived, are, or are not, inexplicable and incomprehensible. So with immediate mental perceptions. What we intuitively perceive is, therefore, true and to be relied on, whether explicable and comprehensible or not. Back of the intuitive perception we know nothing; it is, therefore, ultimate and conclusive to us, and we necessarily rely upon it as a basis of intellectual cogitation and consciousness in words.

The facts, that intuitive perceptions are alike in different minds, and that, under the same conditions, every mind will have spontaneously the same intuitions, are of great significance in this discussion. They demonstrate that the truths perceived are founded in the immutable natures and relations of things. They depend in no degree on our volition. They are tests of the truthfulness and accuracy of our acquired knowledge, of our intellectual convictions, and of our moral feelings; and are, in these relations only, realized to our consciousness as subjects of thought in words. Being from the constitution, capacities, and mode of efficient action, of the human mind, necessary perceptions, they are ultimate and unquestionable. They can not be hindered, contradicted, or modified, by any other mental action, any opposite deliverances of consciousness, or any acquired knowledge. That which we intuitively perceive, and of the perception of which we are conscious, can be doubted and denied only upon assumptions which would equally justify doubt and denial of our existence.

But as is hinted above, a great deal more is ascribed to intuition than is due to that exercise of mental power.

It is made to trench largely on the domain of intellectual action—to include what we learn by instruction, observation, and experience, our cogitation, conception, and consciousness of thoughts in words—all the mental phenomena of which we are conscious. This will appear from a glance at "*The Nomenclature*, that is, the various appellations, by which the principles of common-sense have been designated;" as exhibited in "The Philosophy of Common-Sense." The first of these designations is that of *immediacy;* concerning which the author observes that: "In our primitive *cognitions* we apprehend *existence* at once, and without the intervention of aught between the apprehending mind and the existence apprehended." Here the words "cognitions" and "existence," give a wide and indefinite reference to the mental apprehensions; as if their province included *knowledge* in a sense equivalent to acquired intellectual knowledge, and existence, in the sense of phenomena in general. The *immediacy* is indisputable; but it is the *immediacy of perception.* And but for comprising too much in the "principles of common-sense," the explanatory comment would only indicate that, "in our *intuitive perceptions* we apprehend *truths* at once, and without the intervention of aught between the apprehending mind, and the *truth* apprehended."

"The second condition, which, along with their *immediacy*, seems to have determined a class of names, is the *incomprehensibility* or *inexplicability* of our original *cognitions.*" The author's comments under this head, imply that "cognitions" comprise far more than simple mental perceptions. He employs the terms, *original*

cognitions and *immediate knowledge*, as equivalent. And to illustrate the alleged inexplicability, he says: "Let us suppose an act of *immediate knowledge* [an intuitive perception]—By external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon of mind or matter, as existing; I therefore affirm it to be. Now if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of mind may not be, in reality, a mode of matter, or that what I apprehend as a mode of matter may not, in reality, be a mode of mind, I can only say, using the simplest language, I know it to be true, because *I feel* and can not but *feel*, or because I *believe* and can not but *believe* it so to be."

Now an *external* perception is not *immediate*. The eye or some other organ is interposed and is an indispensable condition. It therefore lacks some essential characteristics of intuition, and is by no means to be classed with intuitive mental perceptions. And on the other hand, *feeling* and *believing* are not intuitions, or intuitive perceptions, but indubitably are consequents of intuitive perceptions, and of intellectual conceptions. The intuitive perception of a truth may excite emotion and feeling; and the intellectual conception of a truth, or proposition, or fact, may have the same effect. But the feeling excited is as distinguishable from the intuition as from the conception. The feeling excited by an intellectual conception is no certain evidence of the truth of that conception. Intellectual conceptions, which are wholly erroneous and unfounded, may, nevertheless, excite feeling. And to say that one feels his internal perceptions to be true, can hardly be taken as evidence of any thing more

than that he *feels* in consequence of his perceptions and in accordance with them.

"The third quality, in reference to which our primary cognitions [knowledges] have obtained certain appellations, is their *originality*." Whence they are called primary, primitive, ultimate, etc. The fourth is that they "are *natural*, not conventional—*native*, not acquired." The fifth is, "the necessity of those cognitions." The sixth, "that they afford the conditions and regulative principles of all knowledge." Which, of course, must be taken to mean all acquired knowledge. The seventh is, "their *universality*, this being at once the consequence of their *necessity*, and its index." "The eighth is, their presumed *trustworthiness*, either as veracious enouncements, or as accurate tests of truth. Hence in the one relation they have been styled *truths*, *first*, *primary*, etc., and in the other *criteria*, natural, authentic," etc.

"The ninth is, that the principles of knowledge, must be themselves knowledges." The author himself, under the third of these specifications—that of *originality*—defines the word *principles* to mean, "literally commencements—points of departure," with reference to the phrases, "principles of common-sense—principles of thought, reason, judgment, intelligence." And under the first head he cites as an "appellation determined by the condition of immediacy, that of intuitions —intuitive cognitions, [knowledges,] notions, judgments." Besides its original meaning, that of a visual perception, he observes that "the term *intuition* has been employed to denote a kind of apprehension, and a kind of judgment—to denote a perception of the

actual and present—to denote an immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, in contrast to a representative, vicarious, or mediate apprehension of it, in or through something else—to denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, that the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what are called self-evident propositions—to denote perception proper (the objective) in contrast to sensation proper, (the subjective,) in our sensitive consciousness—to denote the knowledge which we can adequately represent in imagination, in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' knowledge which we can not image, but only think or conceive, through and under a sign or word." "All these meanings except the last," he further observes, "have this in common, that they express the condition of an immediate, in opposition to a mediate knowledge. It is, therefore, easy to see how the term was suggested in its application to our original cognitions, and how far it marks out their distinctive character."

Now we submit, that the term *cognition,* knowledge, is improperly applied to that mental act or class of acts, which we denominate intuitive perceptions, and involves what is not immediate, original, natural, necessary, or universal, namely, knowledge which we acquire by instruction, and which is not, like intuition, spontaneous and involuntary. And, on the other hand, that all that ought to be or can legitimately, be comprised, in the doctrine of *Common-Sense*, has the above specified characteristics, and is restricted to the involuntary acts of intuitive perception; or else that the doctrine of Common-Sense is far more comprehensive than the doctrine of immediate, natural, necessary, intuition.

The fact that the terms of nomenclature which he cites have been used by the authors to whom he refers, is undoubted. But they do not prove that the mental act in question, is any thing else but simple, involuntary perception. The mental act which is immediate, original, natural, necessary, universal, is not knowledge. It is an act; knowledge is an effect. When by an involuntary act of the mind a truth is perceived, we may indeed be said to know it. It has then become an object of intellectual cognizance, conception, cogitation, thought in words, consciousness, memory. But the act itself is not knowledge, nor is the immediate effect of the act knowledge, but perception of truths in certain relations, and under certain necessary conditions. These perceptions do not occur independently and at random. No man is conscious of them separately and independently of his acquired knowledge, and intellectual conception, of other and allied truths, which suggest or imply them. The whole question turns upon the act. Mental intuition is mental seeing, looking on, the act by which the mind immediately perceives truths, without argument or testimony. Knowledge, at least in the ordinary use of the term, is an intellectual acquisition, not a natural, necessary, original, immediate possession. It implies more than simple perception, as a knowledge of visible objects implies more than is mediately perceived through the eye. It implies intellectual conception, consciousness, and memory in words.

To say then that the principles of our knowledge—the commencements, the points of departure—which can not strictly be taken to mean any other than

natural, necessary, immediate, original intuitions, for all other "points of departure" are attained by instruction—must be themselves knowledges, is to ascribe to the involuntary acts in question what does not belong to them; or else the thing affirmed in the sentence, is that the knowledges of our knowledge, are knowledges. For the sentence itself shows that the words, *knowledges* and *principles* of our knowledge, are employed as equivalents. And this is confirmed by the author's illustrations under this head. He says: "The principles of our knowledge, if viewed as cognitions, in general, have been called,

1st. *Cognitions* or *knowledges*, with the discriminative attributes, *first*, *primary*, *ultimate*, *original*, *fundamental*, *elemental*, *natural* . . . *native*, innate, etc., etc.

2d. *Facts*, *data*, *revelations*, etc., of consciousness.

3d. Notions, conceptions, pre-notions.

4th. As complex cognitions—*self-evident*, *intuitive*, *natural*, *common*, *à priori*, etc., judgments, propositions."

Now all this may belong to the doctrine of Common-Sense as exhibited in this treatise, but it includes mediate acquired knowledge, which does not belong to the doctrine of immediate intuitive acts of the mind. If, therefore, revelation and inspiration are from without, and if it is their object to impart knowledge, to teach original truths, doctrines, facts, then what they teach can not be perceived by immediate intuition, and they can not be made through a power, the exclusive exercise of which is immediate, involuntary, necessary, and universal.

That intuition is simply mental seeing or perception,

excited by the intellectual apprehension of related truths, is taught by Sir William Hamilton in his translations, and comments on the doctrine of the authors whom he quotes. Thus he interprets a passage of Aristotle: "When we once become aware of the sense of the terms *whole* and *part*, then the intellect of itself spontaneously enounces the axiom—*the whole is greater than its part.*" (P. 89.) That is, the intuition does not precede, but follows, or is occasioned by the action of the intellect in thinking of the terms *whole* and *part*—thinking what had been learned by instruction of the meaning of those terms. The intellect apprehends the import of the terms in their necessary relation, and thereupon spontaneously perceives and enounces the axiom which that relation implies.

The genuine doctrine of Aristotle, as represented by Duns Scotus, is thus exhibited. (P. 101.) "On the one hand he maintains (against Averroes) that principles are not, in a certain sense, innate in the intellect; that is, not as *actual cognitions* chronologically anterior to experience." On the other hand, against another antagonist, he maintains that principles, though not innate in the intellect as actual cognitions, were *potentially* innate. "For he shows that the intellect is not dependent upon sense and experience, except accidentally, *in so far as these are requisite in affording a knowledge of the terms, to afford the occasion on which*, by its native and proper light, it actually manifests the principles which it potentially contained; and that these principles are certain, even were those phenomena of sense illusive, in reference to which they are elicited:"—which is the same as to say, that the in-

tuitional action of the intellect is dependent on a previously acquired knowledge of terms to give occasion to the intuitive perceptions which are elicited. It does not follow that the intuitive axioms or truths which are rendered perceptible by the light which the knowledge of terms affords to the intellect, were innate or preëxisted in the intellect, any more than that the proportions of quantities or numbers, exist in the mind prior to their being perceived, instead of existing in the nature and relations of the things which are signified by the terms of which a knowledge has been acquired by instruction. The principles which are perceived by intuition are not *actual cognitions* prior to their being intuitively perceived. To say that the mind *potentially* contained them, so as actually to manifest them under the condition of the light requisite to the perception of them, is only to say, that when the intellect has the requisite light concerning the terms, or the phenomena, to which the intuitive principles have reference, they are spontaneously perceived and become actually manifest. The author refers to other passages of the same writer, "where it is frequently repeated that sense and experience are not the *cause or origin*, but only the *occasion* on which *the natural light of intellect* reveals its principles or *first truths*. . . . Scotus professedly lays down as the very foundation of his doctrine—that reflection finds in the mind, or intellect itself, principles or necessary cognitions, which are not the educts of experience, howbeit not actually manifested prior to, or except on occasion of, some empirical act of knowledge." (P. 102.)

These and many other testimonies in harmony with

our experience, are to the point:—that all intuitions, intuitive perceptions, are occasioned by prior intellectual knowledge and cogitative action, concerning that to which the intuitions have reference. To suppose, therefore, that the truths of revelation were perceived, revealed, manifested by intuition, would be to suppose that the prophets had acquired, by prior instruction, a knowledge of such related truths as would afford to the intellect sufficient light to make the otherwise undiscoverable truths immediately, spontaneously, and necessarily manifest. To suppose this possible in the case of the sacred writers, is to suppose it possible to all other men; for the power of intuition is universal and common to all men; and, by the supposition, theological truths, if intuitive, must, as absolutely and in the same sense as any others that are intuitive, be necessary truths, and be originally discoverable by one as easily as by any other man. This might, perhaps, suit those who imagine that all the theological and religious truths which are known or which it is necessary to know, were discovered by the prophets, and are discoverable to all by intuition, but for the circumstance that there could not on that supposition be any diversity in such truths, since all intuitive truths are original, universal, and necessary, and therefore must be the same to all minds. Were religious truths, doctrines, creeds, the product of intuition, therefore, they could not be diverse, inconsistent, contradictory, but must necessarily be uniform, identical, and, moreover, they could not be held speculatively and dubiously; but must be consciously and implicitly believed. For it is impossible intuitively to

perceive a truth without believing it, beyond all doubt and question, to be a truth. The perception of a truth by intuition is inseparable from a consciousness, a conscious feeling and belief that it is truth. To imagine spiritual intuitions or inspired intuitions, which are inconsistent with each other, is therefore absurd. And the facts—that the power of intuition is not *receptive*, but only *perceptive;* that what is perceived by intuition is, in respect to the same things, invariably and necessarily the same, because the natures and relations of the things to which intuitions have reference, are ever the same; that intuitive perceptions are immediate, spontaneous, involuntary, and unavoidable under the conditions which are requisite to occasion them; and that the truths perceived by intuition are realized to the consciousness only as they are intellectually cognized or apprehended in words,—these facts are conclusive against the supposition of truths being, through the faculty or power of intuition, revealed, imparted, *conveyed to the mind* by any *external agent or influence;* and equally conclusive against any spiritual or extraordinary exercise of the power of intuition as enabling some minds to discover what every other mind is not equally capacitated to discover.

CHAPTER VII.

REVIEW OF LEE ON INSPIRATION.*

I. Introductory Statements and Observations.

As preliminary to a particular examination of this work, it may be of use to state briefly the different theories of Inspiration as now held by different schools of theologians and philosophers; which may be classified as follows:

1. The *Pantheistic;* which treats of *inspiration* as common to all men, and as of the same nature as sensations and impulses, on the assumption that the Divine Being is the sole actuating power alike in the phenomena of spiritual and of material existences.

2. The *Rationalistic;* which denies the supernatural origin of the Scriptures, and ascribes them to that elevation and excitement of intellect, imagination, and genius, which in poets, sages, historians, and philosophers, is popularly called *inspiration.*

3. The *Idealistic;* which, assuming the non-existence of any thing external to the mind, regards revelations

* "The Inspiration of Holy Scripture, its Nature and Proof: Eight Discourses. Preached before the University of Dublin, by William Lee, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin. London, 1854. Pp. 539.

merely as mental intuitions, and *inspiration* as the power of apprehending intuitive revelations, "in their perfect fullness and integrity," by an elevation of the religious consciousness, and *spiritual vision;* not as conveying thoughts or truths from without, but as an exercise and product of faculties and powers already possessed, "the process being in no sense *mechanical*, but purely *dynamical*."

4. The theory of *illuminating* influences, the same in kind as the enlightening and sanctifying influences of the Spirit which are common to all holy men in every age of the Church.

5. The theory of different degrees of supernatural influences, exerted on the faculties of the sacred writers as by superintendence, elevation, suggestion, etc.

6. The Dynamical theory, which contemplates inspiration as the result of a combination and coäction of the agency of the Holy Spirit, with the agency of man, in which the Spirit coöperates with man's faculties according to their natural laws.

7. The theory of infallible *guidance*, which differs from that termed "mechanical"—by substituting infallible guidance, for direct dictation.

8. The Mechanical; which ascribes both the thoughts and words of Scripture to the immediate agency of God, and contemplates man only as the instrument through which they are uttered, vocally and in writing.

With the exception of the last, no one of these theories treats of Inspiration as a divine act by which thoughts were verbally conveyed to the sacred writers to be uttered by them vocally or in writing; nor do

any of them satisfactorily exhibit the ground of infallibility in what the prophets and apostles officially spoke and wrote. The best of them treat of the inspiring influence only as an influence exerted on the intellectual or other faculties of men. As theories, they are not consistent with the plenary inspiration of all and every part of "Scripture." They regard the language as of man's selection, and, with respect to the matter, they differ widely as to the extent of what they call inspiration. With the exception of the seventh, they variously impute the knowledge of the sacred penmen as exhibited in what they wrote, to the ordinary exercise of their natural faculties, to intellectual and spiritual intuition, to an elevation of religious consciousness, to inward illumination, suggestion, direction, superintendence, and other diverse species and degrees of influence. Those who hold the theory of *infallible* guidance, however, practically believe, as firmly as those who adopt the language of the "mechanical" theory, that the original words of Scripture are the words of God. They, nevertheless, believe in an essential difference between revelation and inspiration.

The mechanical theory teaches that the words of Scripture, as they were originally written, were supplied by immediate *dictation*, or in a manner equivalent to that, and therefore that they were literally the words of God, and infallible. The theory of infallible *guidance*, without expressly indicating the mode in which the language was supplied, except as the writers were guided in selecting it, imports, that the prophets and apostles were *guided* both in thought and language

by the Holy Spirit, so as to be in such a sense His organs, that what they said, He said.

Now the Scriptures themselves expressly claim to be the infallible word of God, given, imparted, communicated, by His inspiration, — His act inspiring the thoughts and words, which are represented by the writing, into the minds of the prophets and apostles, to be by them committed to writing. As such, they claim to be of infallible Divine authority, and the only rule of faith and practice; and as such, they have ever been regarded by the Church of God,—all those in every age whom they characterize as holy and faithful.

What then is required in a Scriptural definition of Inspiration?

1st. That it should exhibit that inspiration which is affirmed of the sacred writings, as simply a Divine act, inspiring, conveying, into the minds of the prophets what they were to represent by written characters. According to the proper usage and signification of the term, Inspiration is as purely a Divine act, as inhaling air into the lungs is a human act. It is an in-breathing, an impulsion, from without, of intelligence, thoughts, truths, into the minds of men who are as involuntary in receiving it, as they are in hearing sounds from a foreign and invisible source, and as voluntary in speaking and writing what they so received, as in uttering the thoughts conveyed to them vocally by their fellow-men.

2d. A Scriptural definition should contemplate the thoughts conveyed, as *Divine and infallible*, on the ground that they were conveyed to the writers by the Divine act of inspiration; and should so contemplate

the words no less than the thoughts, since words are the vehicle of thoughts, without which thoughts can not be transferred from one mind to another, nor be conceived or realized to the intelligent consciousness.

3d. Such a definition should wholly preclude the supposition of any element or effect of human agency in the thoughts or words, which were inspired into the minds of the prophets and apostles to be uttered by them vocally or by written characters; for being communicated to them from God by inspiration, they are exclusively His thoughts and words, and as such, can, in no sense or degree, be man's, or a result of man's agency, any more than the act of one man in thinking and conveying his thoughts to another by vocal utterance, can, in any sense or degree, be the act of another man who, whether voluntarily or otherwise, hears what is so uttered.

The whole question is founded on a few simple considerations. 1. It was necessary to man that the thoughts of God should be inspired into his mind, because he could not of himself discover them, and yet the knowledge of them was indispensable to him. 2d. It was necessary that they should be inspired in words, because he could not otherwise apprehend, conceive, be conscious of, and intelligently and infallibly express them in writing. 3d. It was necessary that he should write them, because they behooved to be made known to others as the infallible words of God, and the only rule of human faith and practice. 4th. It was necessary that they should be inspired and written in the language, style, and diction of the recipient, that he and his readers might, in their own accustomed and

familiar words and idioms understand correctly what had been conveyed by inspiration; and because no other than the inspired words could perfectly and infallibly express and convey the inspired thoughts. 5th. Inspiration being, not a Divine influence exerted *on* the faculties of man, but an act of God conveying the thoughts which He alone selected, determined on, and inspired into the minds of men appointed by Him to receive, and to utter them in writing, there was the same necessity for His inspiring agency in respect to every portion as to any portion of what was written officially by them.

With respect to all those theories which represent inspiration as a Divine influence *on* the "understandings, imaginations, memories, and other mental powers of the writers of the sacred books," it may, we apprehend, be justly said, that they wholly fail to show either how those writers became possessed of the thoughts which they expressed, or how the words which they employed became the words of God. Many, nay, all the most important of those thoughts were, in the nature of things, undiscoverable by the human mind, however acted on by a superior influence; unless it be pretended that inspiration made man's mind as omniscient, all-knowing, infinite, as that of the Creator. But one of those writers expressly tells us that: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him. But God hath *revealed* them unto us *by His Spirit:* for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is

in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." That is, "as no one knows the thoughts of a man but the man himself, so no one knows the thoughts of God, but God Himself." (*Hodge*, 1 *Cor.* 2*d.*)

No degree or kind of influence then, ever was, or possibly could be, exerted on man's mind, enabling him to discover or know the thoughts, acts, or purposes of God, till He revealed them by His Spirit. But the act of revealing them, was not an influence *on* the faculties of the sacred writers, but an act which imparted, conveyed, transferred *to* them, those otherwise inscrutable and unattainable thoughts of God. If inspiration was an influence *on* the faculties of man, then the Spirit did not by His inspiring influence reveal the deep things of God. They must have been made known to the sacred writers by some other Divine act or influence. The province of inspiration must have been limited to what the prophets and apostles already knew, and what, under that influence, they were capable of discovering. There is nothing in these theories of inspiration to show how they became possessed of those Divine thoughts which were undiscoverable by their finite faculties. If it be said that, in part, those thoughts were revealed by vocal utterances, that can not be affirmed of all of them. How did they become possessed of the remainder?

And why should a special, supernatural, inspiring influence *on* the mental faculties of the sacred writers be necessary to enable them to apprehend, understand, or remember, thoughts already known to them, any more than such an influence was, and still is, necessary

to enable those who read what they wrote, to understand and remember the thoughts made known by their writings? If any influence of the Spirit is necessary in the latter case, is it an inspiring influence? and is there then no difference between inspiration and sanctification? Could not Moses and the prophets and apostles, without any Divine inspiration, speak and write what they already knew? Were they not as competent to write what they understood and had occasion to communicate, as Sennacherib was to write his letter to Hezekiah, or as Claudius Lysias was to write his letter to Felix?

But it is alleged, that, supposing the prophets to have written only what was known to them by revelation or otherwise, prior to their inspiration, the inspiring influence exerted *on* their faculties *guided* them, infallibly, as to the thoughts they were to express, so that out of all the thoughts known to them before, they were restrained from expressing any others than those which they actually expressed in their writings, and, in regard to those, were effectually preserved from error. This is alleged by many writers as the sole or the principal effect of Inspiration; and if inspiration was an influence on the intellectual faculties of the writers, it may be deemed a necessary inference from that doctrine. But how could such guidance make that which the prophets wrote the infallible word of God? If in writing they expressed certain of their own thoughts which were familiarly known to them before, and were so guided by inspiration as to express those thoughts accurately, and to avoid expressing other thoughts known to them, how did those of their

thoughts which they actually expressed become Divine? How did they become the authoritative and infallible thoughts of God? A guidance in the selection of some thoughts in preference to others, could not invest the selected thoughts with any new quality or attribute. Nor is it possible that a mere guidance of man in the exercise of his natural faculties, should enable him to discover the 'deep things of God'—things wholly beyond the scope of his faculties, till revealed by the Spirit?

Moreover, if it was the end of inspiration to guide the writers infallibly, in their selection of the thoughts to be expressed in the Holy Scriptures, it was no less necessary that the same influence *on* their faculties should infallibly guide them in the choice of words by which infallibly to express the selected thoughts. If the Scriptures are the infallible word of God, then there must be as much infallibility in the selection of the words as in the selection of the thoughts, contained in them. The words convey the thoughts. All that we know of the thoughts is expressed by the words. But is it possible to conceive of an influence on the faculties of the human mind, which, without suspending the free exercise of those faculties, should determine it to adopt certain particular words whereby to express its thoughts? Must not such an influence amount to express dictation? Must it not supersede the voluntary and intelligent action of the mind itself? And does not the supposition of such an influence determining the selection, both of words and thoughts, preclude all interference of human agency in the selection?

It may be satisfactory to one who firmly believes

that the Scriptures are the infallible word of God, to say, 'that inspiration is essentially different from revelation—that the object of revelation is to impart knowledge to its recipients—and that the end and object of inspiration is to render men infallible in communicating truth to others—that we know nothing of the nature of inspiration, that is, of the mode of the Spirit's operation; but only know its effect; and that the effect of inspiration was to render its subject the infallible organ of the Holy Ghost in communicating truth, in such sense as that what was said or written by an inspired man, the Holy Ghost said or wrote.' But how can such statements relieve the subject, or serve to explain the difficulties which are so generally deemed to require explanation? How can they settle the points, whether the inspiring influence was exerted *on* the faculties of the sacred writers, or was exerted in breathing, imparting, conveying to their minds that which they were to write? or whether it was the 'organ' that was rendered infallible, or the truths conveyed through the 'organ'? If man was the organ, was he rendered infallible as a voluntary agent, or as an involuntary subject? If as a voluntary agent, what should hinder his being infallible in every thing else as well in his writing? If as an involuntary subject, how could the effect of inspiration be any other than that of conveying the Divine thoughts to his mind to be uttered like all other thoughts by his voluntary acts in speaking and writing? If the inspiring influence was exerted on his intellectual faculties, then is it not assuming to know something of the *nature* of inspiration to say that it is essentially different from revela-

tion—essentially different from imparting knowledge to its recipients? Is it not assuming to know something of the *mode* of the Spirit's operation, to say that the end and object of His operation on the faculties of men by inspiration, is to render them infallible in communicating truth to others? Does any man know so certainly, that this was the end and object of inspiration, as to justify him in asserting that inspiration is shown and demonstrated by its effect, to be essentially different from that Divine operation, the effect of which is revelation? Can any man say that revelation is the effect of one *mode* of Divine operation, and that the effect of another and essentially different mode of Divine operation is that of rendering man infallible in communicating truth to others?—without assuming to know something of the nature and mode of operation in the respective cases. Can any man safely say that inspiration was a Divine operation on the faculties of man, and that its effect was not to communicate truth to him, but to render him an infallible organ of the Spirit in communicating truth to others—an organ in such a sense that what he said or wrote, the Spirit said or wrote—unless he certainly and infallibly knows something of the nature and mode of such Divine operation? Must he not know that the operation was of such a nature as not to impart knowledge, but only to render man as the subject of it, an infallible organ in communicating knowledge to his fellow-men? Can any two things be more palpably different, or imply more widely different operations; and does not a positive and exclusive ascription of one specific effect to one of these operations, and of an essentially different

effect to the other, imply some knowledge or theory of the nature and mode of those operations?

But what is meant by man being rendered by Inspiration 'the infallible organ of the Spirit in communicating truth, in such sense as that what was said and written by an inspired man, the Spirit said or wrote'?

1. By an inspired man, undoubtedly is meant a man on whose understanding, imagination, memory, and other mental powers, the inspiring influence was exerted. 2. By his being rendered by that influence, the organ of the Spirit in communicating truth, must, as we apprehend, be meant, that he was rendered the passive organ, instrument, machine, of the Spirit. For he was the Spirit's organ in communicating truth. It was the Spirit who communicated the truth through man as His organ; as certain intelligible sounds are communicated through a trumpet, or through the pipes of an organ. 3. It therefore, can not, with any more truth or propriety, be affirmed in the same sense of the organ and of the Spirit, that what the organ said the Spirit said; than it can be affirmed of a material organ, and of the musical performer on it, that the particular notes of a tune were evoked by the instrument, in the same sense that they were evoked by the agency of the performer. The instrument indeed was necessary to the effect; still it was but a passive instrument, vehicle, medium, of that which was communicated to and through it. The prophets and apostles spoke and wrote in their official capacity, not of their own motion, not on their own authority, any more than an instrument sounds the notes of a tune of itself and independantly of the performer's agency. When it is said that

they spoke, it is not meant that they spoke or communicated truth, in the same sense that the Spirit spoke to and through them, any more than when it is said that echo speaks, it is meant that the reverberations of the air utter articulate sounds in the same sense as the voice of a human agent. An organ, and the performer on it, are of distinct and diverse natures. They can not be confounded or resolved into each other. The one is active, the other passive—acted on. The act of one can not be made identical with that of the other. The effect produced on the one as an instrument, can not be the same thing with the efficient cause of that effect.

On the contrary, if Inspiration was a Divine act or influence, exerted, not on the intellectual faculties of the sacred writers, but exerted in conveying thoughts to their minds, and conveying them in words, whether original revelations, or thoughts previously known—all the thoughts and words in their due order and succession which they were, officially, to speak or write—then there is, as we apprehend, no confusion, combination, or identification of Divine and human agencies in the process. The acts of the respective agents are distinct, and those of each, are appropriate to his nature, capacity, and office. And the effect of Inspiration in that case, was not that of rendering man the infallible organ of the Spirit in communicating truth. That was not necessary. All occasion for it was superseded by the mental constitution which the Creator had given to man—that law of his mind by which he thinks in words, and receives the thoughts of others only in their words. He could not but infallibly receive and be

conscious of receiving the thoughts and words which were conveyed into his mind by Divine inspiration; and having received them, he could infallibly speak and write them as he was appointed and moved, constrained, necessitated to do, by the Holy Ghost. But the effect of Inspiration was, the reception and intelligent consciousness by the sacred penmen, of the thoughts in the words which they were to speak and write. The thoughts and words were breathed, inspired, conveyed, into their minds by the Spirit, to be by them reüttered—spoken, or written—as they received them. Accordingly, they 'spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.' 'God at sundry times, and in divers manners'—by His audible voice, by intelligible signs, silently in dreams and visions—*spake to* the Fathers, *by* the prophets. He *spake* by the prophets, as really as, at a later period, He *spake* by His Son. He inspired, conveyed by His act, His thoughts and words into the minds of the prophets to be by the natural use of their faculties, uttered, reëchoed, vocally articulated, written, as His thoughts and words.

It is indubitable, if the Scriptures are in any proper sense the word of God, and the infallible and only rule of faith and life, that He must have determined in every particular each thought and expression that should be written as His. No influence on man's faculties, no guidance of man in the exercise of his faculties, could possibly have had any thing to do in determining what should be recorded as the thoughts in the infallible words of God. Both thoughts and words must have been prescribed by Him, if they are His thoughts and words, and involve His immutable authority, and

constitute the rule by which the faith and life of His rational creatures are to be judged. How then did He prescribe them? We answer, that according to the Scriptures themselves, He prescribed them by His act of inspiration—by inspiring both the thoughts and words into the minds of those whom He employed to write them. He gave the Scriptures—that which is written, and constitutes the Holy Scriptures by His inspiration of them. All Scripture, that which is written, is *given*, conferred, imparted, by inspiration of God.

The Scriptures indicate but one kind of inspiration —that of inbreathing—imparting, conveying, what was to be spoken and written. It left to the speaker and writer no option, no discretion, no premeditation, as to the thoughts he should utter, or as to the words he should speak or write. It were absurd to suppose that the sacred penmen were any more at liberty to premeditate, select, or determine, what they should write for the guidance of all coming generations of men, than the Apostles were at liberty when arraigned before kings and magistrates, to premeditate, choose, and determine, what they should say in defense of themselves. They were expressly forbidden to take any thought beforehand, what they should say; and were required to utter that which was given, inspired into their minds at the time, by the Holy Ghost. It was not they that spake—not their thoughts or words which they uttered—it was the Holy Ghost that spake —it was His thoughts in His words that were uttered.

In this view the subject is freed from all embarrassing perplexity. That which is inspired, conveyed by

the act of inspiration is the word of God. The thoughts are His as being conveyed from Him. The words are His as being the words in which He conveyed the thoughts. There could be no human element or quality in the thoughts or in the words as their vehicle, any more than in the mind from which they were conveyed, or in the act by which they were inspired. There could be no intermixture or interference of human agency in the selection or the transmission of the thoughts or words, for the recipient could anticipate neither, and was involuntary in the reception of both; and though his agency was intelligently, freely, and responsibly, exerted in writing what was divinely inspired into his mind, he could have had no knowledge, volition, consciousness, or responsibility, in respect to what he was to write prior to his involuntary reception of it by inspiration. And if the Creator has ever communicated His will intelligibly to man in any way, if He has spoken to man in an audible voice, and in speaking has used the same articulations as the vehicle of His thoughts, which man uses in speaking to his fellows, there can be nothing any more incredible or mysterious in His acts of inspiration, than in His acts of vocal utterance.

Now a discussion of the subject of inspiration must be a discussion intended either to show that the sacred writers were themselves inspired, or to show that what they wrote was given by inspiration. It must therefore relate to the *nature or mode* of inspiration. At present, the fact that the Scriptures are the result of some kind and degree of inspiration, is generally admitted. The diverse theories and opinions concerning

it, relate to its nature or mode, and involve a variety of questions. Was it a supernatural operation or influence? Was it exerted on the faculties of the prophets and apostles, stimulating, elevating, and guiding them? Or was it a Divine act by which the thoughts expressed were conveyed into the minds of the sacred writers? Were the thoughts conveyed in the words which were recorded, or were they conveyed without the words? If the latter, were the writers infallibly guided in their choice of words, and was such guidance of the nature of inspiration? Would an infallible guidance of man in his choice of words, make the words which he selected the words of God? Are the Scriptures affirmed to be the infallible words of God, solely on the ground of His agency in their inspiration? If so, can the words any more than the thoughts, be ascribed in any respect to the volition of man? Can thoughts be conveyed from without to the human mind consistently with its laws, without the words in which they are conceived and expressed? Are we not so constituted that we can think, receive from others, be conscious of, remember, and express thoughts, only in words, and signs equivalent to articulate sounds?

Supposing the fact to be admitted that the Holy Scriptures are the result of Divine inspiration, the question which behooves first to be considered is, whether the Divine agency in inspiration was exerted *on the faculties* of the sacred writers, or was exerted in conveying to their minds what they were to express in writing? This at once involves the *nature* of inspiration. These two modes of agency have nothing in common. Either the inspiring agency was exerted

in exciting, illuminating, and guiding men in the exercise of their mental faculties, or, their exercise of those faculties continuing as before, that agency was exerted in transferring to their minds, the thoughts of the Divine Mind. Of the mode in which the Divine Being acts, or exerts His efficiency relatively to created minds, we know nothing. But we can distinguish between acts of creation and acts towards creatures after they exist; and, with equal certainty, between acts of regeneration, and acts of revelation by vocal utterance of words, or by inspiration. There is a difference in the nature of the effects produced by these different acts, and therefore there is an equal difference in the nature of the acts. Each class of acts produces its own appropriate effects, and not the effects of any other class. When we speak of the *nature* of Divine inspiration, we mean a Divine act of which it is the nature, not to change the heart, not to sanctify, not to elevate, or excite the intellect, the affections, or the will; but to impart intelligence, convey to the intelligent consciousness particular thoughts. In the Scriptures themselves, nothing is more clearly distinguished than are the enlightening, guiding, sanctifying, influences of the Holy Spirit, from His agency in imparting new thoughts, infallible truths, revelations, by vocal articulation, or by inspiring them into the minds of those appointed to receive and commit them to writing. It is not within the province of those enlightening and sanctifying influences to reveal new truths, or to impart or employ any Divine truths not already inspired and recorded in the Scriptures. Those influences are, in fact, limited to the use and instrumentality of those

Scripture truths which are already more or less perfectly known to the subjects of them. Hence the necessity of publishing, proclaiming, preaching, the Gospel, in order to the conversion, sanctification, and salvation of men. "The Spirit of God maketh the reading, but especially the preaching of *the Word*, an effectual mean of convincing and converting sinners, and of building them up in holiness and comfort, through faith unto salvation." (*Assem. Catechism.*) These gracious influences are common to all true believers, and have in them nothing of the nature of inspiration. The Divine acts in the two instances, like the effects produced by them, are wholly distinct and different. Yet nothing is more common, in treatises on the subject of inspiration, than to confound these two distinct agencies.

Hence, in treating of that subject, it is necessary to treat of the *nature* of inspiration—inferring its peculiar nature from its peculiar effects. And in considering its effects we must have reference to the object to be accomplished, and to the constitution, capacity, mode of intellectual action, of the recipient. If according to the constitution, laws, mode of action, of his mind, man thinks in words, and receives thoughts from other minds only in words or signs of equivalent significance, then if thoughts are conveyed to his mind by inspiration they must be conveyed in words; they can not consistently with the natural and intelligent exercise of his faculties, be conveyed and consciously received, independently of the words which are required to express them, any more than the thoughts of one man can be conveyed to the mind of another without words as their vehicle.

This we humbly conceive is no "metaphysical theory as to the laws of the human mind, or as to the absolute necessity of words to the exercise of thought;" but merely a question as to a fact of consciousness: and as such it relates only to adults who have such exercise of all their faculties as to be capable of discerning and deciding on the facts of their own consciousness. Infants can not be deemed to be thus capable; and if they have thoughts before they have words, does it follow that they have thoughts prior to their having sensations, and perceiving, by sight, hearing, feeling, or otherwise, signs no less significant and intelligible than words? Do they exhibit any evidence of thought, apart from their perception and memory of such signs? Is not the entire process of teaching them to think, discriminate, reason, while they are infants, carried on first by means of signs, and then step by step by means of words? Is it not a point of progress and of triumph, when one word after another is successfully substituted for the signs which had been employed to signify the same things? And so with respect to deaf mutes. Has not every attempt to instruct them, and every system of instruction from the beginning, proceeded on the assumption that an exhibition of some species of signs, the instrumentality, significance, and purpose of which was obvious to their apprehension by sight or touch, was indispensable to their exercise of thought? Is there any evidence that they ever think apart from the instrumentality of signs, casually, or systematically furnished, consciously cognized, and remembered?

But whether or not infants and mutes have, or possibly may have, thoughts without words or equivalent

signs, is in no respect essential or important to our question. It is, we presume, a fact which the consciousness of all adults, who are not deaf and dumb, will verify, that they think, are conscious of, and receive thoughts only in words; and therefore if there be any inspiration of thoughts into the minds of such adults, it must be an inspiration inclusive of the words which express the thoughts. This conclusion, we are fain to believe, is not impaired by any metaphysical theory, unless it be a theory to the effect, that no thoughts are conveyed by inspiration; or a theory that by inspiration thoughts are conveyed without words. But this, contrary to our view, would imply a suspension of those laws of the mind by which men consciously think and receive thoughts only in words.

The question comes finally to this: Did the inspiration which is affirmed of the Holy Scriptures impart, convey, transfer, to the minds of the sacred penmen the thoughts which they were to express in writing; or did that inspiration, instead of conveying any thoughts whatever, only excite, enlighten, assist and guide the writers in the exercise of their faculties? There is no middle ground between these two views; and under one or the other of them, every theory of inspiration is necessarily to be classed. A theory founded on the view first mentioned, will include revelations and all that is supernatural and Divine in that which constitutes the Scriptures. A theory founded on the second view must exclude revelations, and include only what human agency, assisted and guided according to circumstances, is able to accomplish.

Hence the 'dynamical' theory, though if strictly

construed, it would ascribe to human agency with the rest of their contents, whatever of original revelations the Scriptures contain, as amended and held by Professor Lee, excludes revelations altogether, and imputes to human agency, assisted, enlightened, guided, combined with the agency of the Holy Spirit, the *form* and *substance*, the thoughts, and language, the composition and recording of the Holy Scriptures.

II. The Author's Theme, Theory, and Definitions.

The author of these Discourses announces as his theme: "The *inspiration* of Holy Scripture." He proposes to supply "a fundamental examination of the *nature* of this Divine influence." (Pref. iii.) But it is evident from his definitions, and from his reasonings and illustrations, that he had no distinct and definite apprehension of his theme. Inspiration is an act—a breathing into. He treats of it as an effect. It is purely a Divine act. He treats of it as a joint effect of Divine and human agency combined. Practically, he believes that the Holy Scriptures are the infallible word of God. Theoretically, he treats of them as constituted of a Divine and a human element. He believes them, as written, to be the infallible word of God. But he rejects the belief that the words which constitute the writing were conveyed to the minds of the writers by inspiration. He holds to the *plenary* inspiration of the Scriptures, and rejects the notion of different degrees of inspiration. But he holds also that the words of Scripture, as denoting the human element, were selected by the writers. He holds that there is a specific difference between revelation and inspiration; that

revelation is the peculiar function of the *Logos*, and inspiration the peculiar function of the Holy Spirit; and he also holds that revelations included the words in which they were made, and that inspiration, whether of what had been revealed, or of what was previously known, did not include the words. He holds that the Divine influence in Inspiration was exerted as a *guiding* influence on the faculties of the sacred writers in combination with their exercise of their own agency according to the peculiarities of their education, temperament, genius, social position, and circumstances, respectively. He rejects the so-called 'mechanical' theory of Inspiration, because it excludes what he terms the 'Human element of the Bible'; and adopts the 'Dynamical theory,' on the hypothesis that a combination and coäction of Divine and human agency in the 'composition' of the Bible, will account for the peculiar styles and idioms of the respective writers.

Such are some of the paradoxes exhibited in his discussion; and they call for notice because they occur in what are set forth as the reasons why we are to believe the Holy Scriptures, in the human language, styles, and idioms by which they are actually characterized, to be the infallible word of God. The reasons set forth are, as we apprehend, not the true reasons; and therefore, as the author adheres throughout to his belief that the Bible is the infallible word of God, he is inconsistent with himself. His theory is unsound; and his efforts to sustain it, are confused, bewildered, and inconclusive. He rejects a verbal inspiration, because the language, phraseology, and style of the sacred text is the language, phraseology, and style of man, which, there-

fore, can not be relied on in support of "the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture." Criticism, he says, decides this. Yet the Scriptures are the infallible word of God as they actually exist in that very language, in its various styles and idioms, which the alleged criticism condemns. The criticism, however, evidently contemplates the words of Scripture as merely human, and as having been employed at discretion upon mere human authority, and therefore decides against their infallibility. One would think that a firm believer in their infallibility, would reply to the critics: 'You mistake the matter. You assume that the words employed to express the thoughts which were conveyed to the sacred writers by inspiration, were selected by them, and employed on their authority. Whereas, though the words were such as the writers understood, and were in the habit of using, and would naturally use in such a case, they were, as the infallible vehicle of the thoughts to be expressed, selected, and inspired into their minds by the Divine Author and giver of those thoughts, by whom all Scripture—that which is written—was given by inspiration: and therefore they are the words of God. Though the words were the same which men used in their intercourse with each other, they were also the same which God used in speaking audibly to men, in writing on the tablets of stone, in conveying His thoughts to the minds of the prophets and apostles, in visions, trances, dreams, in recalling and renewing to their consciousness what he had previously spoken—in every act by which He inspired, inbreathed, conveyed, His thoughts into the minds of men. As used by Him

to convey His thoughts to men, they were as truly His words, as they are man's words, when he uses them to convey his own thoughts to his fellow-men. To criticise the Scripture use and authority of them as though they were not God's words, and infallible as He uses them, but man's words, and fallible as he uses them, is a mistake, and no inference from such criticism can stand.'

But instead of replying after this manner, the author yields what the rationalistic critics assume, and sets himself to contrive and show how man's words can become the words of God. And this, which he regards as the great problem of Inspiration, he labors to solve by assuming that Inspiration is not simply a Divine act; but a *result* of Divine and human action combined. "The Bible"—that is, the Scripture, the writing, the words written—"consists of both a Divine and a human element." (P. 21.) "On the one hand, God has granted a revelation; on the other, human language has been made the channel to convey, and men have been chosen as the agents to record it." (P. 18.) But the fact that human language was made the channel or vehicle to convey the revelations to men, which are written in the Bible, does not prove that the Bible consists of "two distinct elements, the Divine and the human." The language existed prior to any revelations being made. It is not *human*, as being of the *nature* of man. He was not born with it. He did not invent it. It is no further *human* than as being used by men to convey their thoughts to each other. In that sense it is as much angelic and Divine as it is human. The earliest account we have of its being spoken, represents it as being spoken by Jehovah; and the first

notice we have of any thing having been written in it, is that of its being written by the finger of God. If it is man's as used by him, it is God's as used by Him. If he used it in conveying revelations, that use of it could not impart a *human* element to what He revealed. If the prophets and apostles received the revelations in the words of God, audibly uttered, or conveyed to them by inspiration, their writing the same words could not alter them or impart to them a *human* element, any more than their speaking the very words which they heard, or received, and were rendered conscious of, by inspiration, could impart to them a *human* element. If they were the words of God, spoken or inspired, before the prophets vocally repeated them, or committed them to writing, neither their involuntary acts in hearing, or receiving them by inspiration, nor their voluntary acts in speaking or writing them, could possibly add any *human* or other element to them, or affect their nature or character in any respect. As well might one pretend that the vocal utterance by Satan of words which men use and understand, imparted a Satanic element to them and to the book in which they are recorded; or that the utterance of words by angels imparted an angelic element to the book containing them. And with equal propriety it might be assumed as the basis of a physical theory, that the respiration of inhaled air from the lungs, imparted an element of man's nature to the atmosphere. That which the author treats as a distinct human element of the Bible, is no more an element of it than paper, types, printing and binding. The Bible consists of the words of God as they were received, by the writers, by inspiration,

to be written by them, with their own hands, or by the hands of amanuenses to whom they dictated, as Jeremiah to Baruch, "who wrote from the mouth of Jeremiah all the words of the Lord, which He had spoken unto him, upon a roll of a book." (Chap. 36.)

If it be supposed that the author only meant by the *human* element, the peculiar styles, idioms, and collocations of the respective writers, that can not help the matter in any way. For the Bible is infallible notwithstanding those peculiarities; and if the contents, exactly as they are written, were conveyed into the minds of the writers by inspiration, then it is their being inspired that renders them infallible, and they are the words of God solely because He used and inspired them. If they were not inspired, but are a human element, added as man's words by man's agency, then they are not, in their source or their nature, or as he used them, infallible, and coming from that source and being in their nature fallible, it is as inconceivable that as such human element, they should be rendered infallible, as it is that man's nature, the elements of his nature, or his acts, peculiarities, and passions, should be rendered Divine.

If in any sense the language, the words of which the Bible consists, or the act of writing them, or both together, constitute a distinct human element of the Scriptures, then the same words when audibly spoken by Jehovah to the Patriarchs, to Moses, the Israelites, the prophets, the people of Judea, and the apostles, and when spoken to angels, or by the Father to the Son, and by the Son to the Father, must have had that same human element in them; and must therefore have been

otherwise than infallible. And so also if vocally uttered by Jehovah to a prophet, and vocally *reüttered* by him, as really as if reüttered in writing. If the human element is an inherent quality of the words, then it must have been an element of what Jehovah himself wrote, as much as of any thing which He commanded Moses and the prophets to write; and an element of what He spoke—comprising more than half of all the words contained in the Scriptures—as much as of what He commanded the prophets and apostles to speak: and therefore, to that extent the human element was not the result of any *combination* of Divine and human *agency* in His writing and speaking, for there was none. And if the human element was not inherent in the words, but was imparted by the acts of man in hearing, repeating, and writing the words which had been audibly spoken by Jehovah, and which, as spoken by Him, were infallible, and free from the alleged element, then, as repeated and written by the prophets, they were not the same as before, they were tainted by a new quality, a human element, rendering them fallible. And so of all the words of Scripture which were conveyed to the sacred writers by inspiration. As conveyed, they were free from any human element; they were in the strictest sense, the words of God. And if the sacred penmen wrote those words as they received them, then their acts in receiving and writing them, did not add any human element or any other quality to them.

The author primarily mistakes and is misled by his assumption that the Bible consists of two distinct elements—a Divine and a Human element. His entire

theory rests upon this baseless assumption. For this he rejects the doctrine of verbal inspiration, and holds that inspiration was an influence exerted on the faculties of man in conjunction or combination with man's agency. Hence, as he rejects the idea that man's agency had any thing whatever to do in originating or imparting revelations, he holds to a specific difference between revelation, as to its source and author, and inspiration and its source and author.

We propose, after some further notices of the author's own theory, to speak of the tendency and the inconsistency of his views; to illustrate his paradoxes by quotations, showing that he had no clear or definite conception of his theme, and that his statements and reasoning are painfully inconsistent and inconclusive; to examine his reasons for rejecting the doctrine of verbal inspiration; and lastly, to examine what he advances to sustain his peculiar views of revelation as distinguished from inspiration.

We shall pursue these topics at some length, and probably at the expense of some tedious repetition. For if he has rightly conceived of the nature, the mode, or the effects of Divine inspiration; if his reasons for rejecting the doctrine of verbal inspiration are sound; and if there is such a distinction between revelation and inspiration as he endeavors to maintain, then the whole question concerning the plenary inspiration and infallibility of the Holy Scriptures is involved in far deeper embarrassment and difficulty than has hitherto been imagined by those who, on their own internal evidence and the witness of the Spirit, have believed the Scriptures to be in truth the word of God. And,

on the other hand, if he has erred and failed in these salient and leading features of his system, then his discourses are not adapted to accomplish their professed object; they can not fail to bewilder and mislead the inquirer; they clear up nothing that the main question really involves; they advance new assumptions and new theories, and support them by inconclusive reasonings and citations, but they contribute nothing towards removing any real difficulties, or refuting any of the objections or false theories of philosophical or other skeptics.

At the same time, while such are the conclusions which we entertain, and shall endeavor to justify respecting these discourses, it is but just to say, that the author appears, in so far as his personal character is disclosed, to be a devout and sincere Christian man, and a firm believer in the Divine inspiration and infallibility of the Holy Scriptures. And he is evidently a very diligent reader and collector of the opinions and sayings of other men. But it is quite manifest, that his powers of discrimination and judgment are among the least of his qualifications. He does not appear to discern whether or not his reasonings and quotations are apposite as proofs of the point he has in hand; nor when a position is, or is not, established by argument or testimony. He is sincere, warm-hearted, zealous—but wanting, in respect to the *logical* faculty. If this is disparaging to him as a writer on one of the most important and most sacred of all subjects, the admission of it, nevertheless, is absolutely necessary to account for the inconsistencies which are to be noted, between his speculative theories, and his practical religious feelings and beliefs.

The leading positions which are advanced and defended in this work, are:

That every part of the Holy Scriptures is *inspired:*

That the so-called "Mechanical" theory of inspiration which teaches that all the words of Scripture were conveyed to the minds of the sacred writers directly, or by dictation of the Spirit, is to be rejected as making the writers mere machines; and not accounting for the diversities and peculiarities of their styles and idioms:

That inspiration was not a Divine act by which thoughts or words, or thoughts in words, were conveyed to the minds of the sacred writers.

That inspiration is "that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit which *guided* the prophets and apostles in officially *proclaiming* the will of God by word of mouth, and in *committing to writing* the several portions of the Bible." (Pp. 28, 148.)

That the real question with which the inquiry or discussion is concerned, is *the result* of this Divine influence as presented to us in the Holy Scriptures.

That the Bible consists of two distinct elements—a Divine and a human element. This is "the first of the two conditions of the problem of inspiration; a condition which can be satisfied only by showing how the two elements may be combined."

That there is a radical distinction between *revelation* and inspiration; revelation being the peculiar function of the Logos—inspiration, that of the Spirit in combination with the agency of the sacred writers: and a specific difference, since the influence of the Spirit in inspiration is an influence exerted on the faculties of man, not a Divine act conveying revelations to him.

That the language of the sacred writers, was, with the guidance of the Spirit, selected by them; and that the Spirit, "embracing the entire activity of those whom He inspired, rendered their language the word of God." (P. 33.)

That "in the combination of the *two elements*, namely, the actuation by the Spirit of God, and the distinct, but subordinate agency of man,—consists the 'dynamical' theory of inspiration," which the author adopts. (P. 142.)

That "the human element, instead of being suppressed, becomes an integral part of the agency employed; moulded, it is true, and guided, and brought into action by the coöperation of the Spirit, but not the less really, on that account, participating in the result produced." (P. 145.)

"That a considerable portion of what the Bible contains consists of matters already known to the sacred writers, or the knowledge of which might be—nay, which *we actually know often was*—derived from the ordinary sources of information that were at their command." (P. 145.)

To illustrate his idea of a "vital 'dynamical' combination, or interpenetration of the human spirit and the divine," he says: "The effect produced by the Holy Spirit's influence was a completely harmonious blending of the human and the Divine intelligence; and that the result of this combination—whether we speak of the Old or of the New Testament—was that distinct energy which has received the name of inspiration." (P. 281.)

According to his formal definition, (P. 28,) inspira-

tion was an *energy* of the Spirit, which *guided* the prophets and apostles in *proclaiming* the will of God orally, and in *committing to writing* the several parts of the Bible—that is, guided them in speaking and writing officially. If it was in any sense an act, it was only a guiding act. It did not communicate any thing to them, whether of thoughts or words, but only guided them in their acts of speaking and writing. Whatever was communicated to them to be spoken or written was communicated by *revelation*, which he understands to be "a direct communication from God to man," and which he ascribes, not to the Holy Spirit, but exclusively to the Logos. According to his view, the Spirit communicated, imparted, conveyed, revealed nothing. The part ascribed to Him in relation to the Bible was that only of guiding the human agents, in speaking and writing both what it contains that was known to them before, and what they received by revelation. This is his theory of the *nature* of inspiration. It is founded in his assumption that the Bible consists of two distinct elements — a Divine and a human element. The human element is the agency of men, as speakers and writers; the Divine element is the guidance of them in their acts of speaking and writing. The combination of these two distinct agencies solves the problem of the two elements of which, on his assumption, the Bible consists, and which the mechanical theory knew nothing of, and was not competent to solve! The entire Bible is therefore inspired, because the human agents in speaking and writing it, were equally guided in respect to every part. They spoke and wrote it in their *own* human words,

styles, and idioms, words selected and collocated by them, just as they would have done had all the things of which they spoke and wrote been familiarly known to them beforehand without revelation; but the alleged guidance converted their fallible words into the infallible words of God! Such, if we understand his theory and his language, or discern the import and purpose of his arguments, is his doctrine of inspiration. Whether it is any more scriptural as a doctrine, or rational as a theory, than the doctrines and theories of Davidson, Morell, Coleridge, and their German masters, it would be a waste of time to inquire. We can not hesitate to pronounce it irrational and absurd as a theory, and in every respect and degree unscriptural as a doctrine; not only inconsistent with Scripture, but contrary to every thing that is said in Scripture concerning the agency and the acts of the Holy Spirit in the work of inspiration. The Logos Himself told His apostles with reference to their speaking in their official capacity, "It is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost;" and therefore to preclude their selecting words as their own, or attempting to combine any human element, or mix up their agency with that of the Spirit, He expressly forbade them to premeditate what they should say. So far as their agency was to be employed in uttering any thing officially, orally or in writing, they were to utter it not in man's words, not in words taught or selected by man's wisdom, but in God's words, words taught them by the Holy Spirit, simultaneously with their act of utterance. And Paul avers with reference to his own official utterances and those of his fellow-apostles, inclusive of what he was then writing, and inclusive by just im-

plication of all the apostolic utterances, oral and written, that the things which God had *revealed* to them by *the Spirit*, they spoke in the words which the Holy Ghost taught them, not in the words which man taught. (1. Cor. 1.) That is, they spoke not man's words as such, but God's words, as taught, conveyed, inspired by the Spirit. Again in his 1st Epistle to Timothy where, in writing an express *revelation*, a prediction, made not at some earlier date, from another source or by another Divine person, but by the Holy Spirit, he says, "Now the Spirit speaketh expressly"—utters, expresses, in words—"that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils," etc. To the like effect in reference to his utterances in writing, David, the Psalmist of Israel, in his last words, says: "The Spirit of the Lord spake by me, and *His word* was in my tongue." (2 Sam. 23.) Nehemiah, reviewing the past history of his nation, and the forbearance of God towards them, says: "Thou testifiedst against them by *Thy Spirit* in Thy prophets." (Chap. 9.) To testify is to articulate, utter, declare in words, vocally or by writing. Ezekiel, 2 and 3, says: "The Spirit entered into me when He spake unto me." He then proceeds to record the *words* which were spoken. "I heard Him that spake unto me. And He said unto me, Son of man, I send thee to the children of Israel. . . . And thou shalt speak *my words* unto them, whether they will hear or whether they will forbear; for they are most rebellious. But thou son of man, hear what I say unto thee; be not thou rebellious like that rebellious house: open thy mouth, and eat that I

give thee. And when I looked, behold, an hand was sent unto me; and lo! a roll of a book was therein; and He spread it before me; and it was *written* within and without. . . . Moreover He said unto me, Son of man, eat this roll, and go speak unto the house of Israel. . . . Then did I eat it. . . . and He said unto me, Son of man, go, get thee unto the house of Israel, and speak with *my words* unto them. . . . All *my words* that I shall speak unto thee, *receive* in thine heart, and hear with thine ears. And go, get thee to them of the captivity, and speak unto them, and tell them, Thus saith the Lord God. . . . Then I came to them of the captivity . . . and . . . the word of the Lord came unto me, saying, Son of man, I have made thee a watchman unto the house of Israel: therefore hear *the word* at my mouth, and give them warning from me."

This, in harmony with every thing asserted or implied in the Scriptures from beginning to end, concerning the agency of the prophets and apostles in speaking and writing in their official capacity, plainly teaches, that there was no *human element* in what Ezekiel spoke and wrote; that he was prohibited and debarred from speaking and writing any words but the words of God; that he was to utter no words but those which he received from God by inspiration, into his heart, or understanding, as really as he received food into his physical system by receiving it into his mouth and swallowing it; and, as the 'judicious Hooker' understood it, "that so often as God employed the prophets in their official work, they neither spake nor wrote any word of their own, but uttered syllable by syllable as the Spirit put it into their mouths." If this is that

'mechanical theory' which 'entirely loses sight of the human element of the Bible,' it is nevertheless the theory of the Bible itself. It may be stigmatized by men under the delusions of idealistic rationalism, as degrading the sacred penmen into mere machines, as leaving the diversity of styles in different portions of the Bible unaccounted for, as 'a theory which can not stand the test of close examination,' and therefore has been "tacitly abandoned—at least by all who are capable of appreciating the results of criticism"—that is, the modern rationalistic criticism, of which "each additional discovery in the criticism of the Greek or Hebrew text confirms anew the conclusion that the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture can no longer rely upon such a principle for its defense." (Pref. p. 1.) But however stigmatized, it can not be denied or renounced without denying the infallibility of the Scriptures, and renouncing their Divine authority as being the word of God.

If a man who really believes, or verily thinks that he believes, that the Bible in all its parts, chapters, sentences, and words, is the infallible word of God, gets bewildered by the theories of Morell, Coleridge, Davidson, and the atheistic philosophers, and to escape, invents, or takes up a new theory of Inspiration in opposition to the so-called mechanical theory, we may, with undoubting confidence, expect him to be, in the expression of his practical sentiments, beliefs, and affections, wholly inconsistent with his speculative theory. If he has any true faith, it rests on the Scriptures simply as the infallible word of God; and will manifest itself at every step in his ordinary way of express-

ing himself, when he is not considering and defending his peculiar theory. This accordingly happens in the case of our author, in a way and to such an extent as unavoidably to convince the reader that, as mere matter of speculation, he holds to one theory of Inspiration, while practically he holds the opposite, even the mechanical theory; just as the 'idealist' holds, as a speculative theory, that matter has no existence, and that no physical or other beings or phenomena exist externally to his mind; while, practically, all his thoughts, feelings, and actions, proceed as fully as those of other men, upon the settled conviction that matter really exists externally.

III. The matter of his Discourses—their tendency—His inconsistencies —His paradoxes.

These Discourses are to a painful extent made up of insulated, irrelevant, and inconsistent, sentiments, opinions, and observations, having no logical connection or basis, and being, in general, indebted for their position less to the sense conveyed—which involves all possible forms and degrees of inconsistency—than to the sound of particular words. To an extent which wearies and confounds the reader, they are directly traceable to the appended notes, which constitute more printed matter than the text. One can not read the text and notes together, without receiving an impression that the amiable author, in search of the truth, read all the authors within his reach who say any thing for or against Revelation and Inspiration, and as often as he hit upon a passage in which those words occur, it suggested to him something for his text, and at the same

time furnished him the matter of a note. The text accordingly seems in a large degree to be a mere reflection from the notes, and they often give it a kaleidoscopic variety. In numberless instances the most insignificant conceits, quiddities, conjectures, queries, are fortified by notes pro and con, from German, English, French, Latin, Greek, or Hebrew writers. Did he first write the text of his Discourses, conscious that nearly every sentiment expressed in them would require to be supported or excused by a quotation from some commentator, historian, or philosopher, ancient or modern, and then search out the best auxiliary opinions he could find? That is scarcely credible, or even possible. Apparently he must have read first, and wrote as he read; and, having set out upon the assumption that 'the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture,' as taught by the so-called 'mechanical' theory of inspiration, could not stand the criticism of a school of philosophers who openly rejected that 'doctrine,' on whatever theory it might be affirmed, he, to obviate the assaults of that skeptical criticism, adopted a theory which, having no foundation whatever in the Scriptures themselves, naturally depended on such involuntary and indirect support as might be subsidized in this way. Whether this method of casual aggregation was that actually pursued or not, however, the Discourses undeniably contain a vast number of observations, suggestions, topics, queries, allusions, repetitions, which are in no wise essential to the main subject, and serve only to clog and confuse the discussion, fatigue the reader, and show by their relation to the multifarious notes the extent and routine

of the author's reading. And it is but too evident, that, while honest himself, and sincere in his religious feelings, and in his belief in the Divine authority and infallibility of Holy Scripture, he was bewildered by the doubts and sophistries of the writers whom he read; his judgment vacillated; he imbibed from others, and expressed as his own, contradictory sentiments, without being conscious of their inconsistency.

On this ground only can the sincerity and truthfulness of his frank professions of faith in the Scriptures, as the infallible word of God, be vindicated, and so much the more for that reason, it ought to be exposed. As a defense of the inspiration and infallibility of Scripture, his book concedes so much to the neologists in respect to the nature of inspiration, and in its stigmatizing rejection of the so-called 'mechanical' theory, and in its reliance on a *homo-theistic* theory which precludes all ground of infallibility either in thoughts or words, that it is fitted rather to encourage and embolden the enemies, than to instruct and confirm the friends of its professed object. There is not wanting reason to conclude that it has had this bad effect already. The adoption of its peculiar phrases and distinctions by Dr. Davidson, in his edition of *Horne's Introduction*, vol. 2, strongly indicates that it encouraged and emboldened him in his defection. That Theological professor and Biblical critic, in his "Sacred Hermeneutics," published in 1843, discards the German theories, and employs the phraseology of those who held what is now so flippantly styled the 'mechanical' theory. "It matters not," he says, "through what *instruments* God has communicated His will . . . . in the accom-

plishment of His purposes He may employ whatever agency He pleases. But whether He makes use of the unlettered or the learned, the high or the low, *the revelation communicated is all his own ;* . . . they are to be regarded as the *mere media* of intercourse between the Creator and the creature. We look beyond them to the Great Author of their inspiration. . . . It is the duty of reason to assent to whatever *He has said*, as to the utterance of infinite wisdom and unerring truth." A revelation *communicated*, of course includes the words in which it is expressed in writing, and as such is all *His own*. In 1854 our author published these Discourses, in which, with special reference to the diversity of styles, in the sacred writings, he characterizes the question of inspiration as a *problem* to be solved, treats of the combination of the *Divine and human agency* in inspiration, of the preserved *individuality* of the human agents in what they wrote, and of the *occasions* for which they wrote. In 1856 Dr. Davidson published his revision of Horne, in which, having abandoned his former sentiments, and all that was distinctive of the 'mechanical' theory, he adopts the above-quoted novel phraseology, apparently to disguise and give currency to sentiments as lax as those of any German rationalist. The following are specimens: "There are three things which we look upon, as clearly demonstrable in the writers of the Scriptures, and which serve together to *solve the problem*, how the *diversities* in the teachings of Christ and those of his apostles, are to be explained. Neither the extreme orthodox [that is, of a real inspiration or dictation of thoughts in words] nor the Socinian solution, suffices to clear it up satis-

factorily. 1st. The principle of *individuality*, which presents to us the apostles as *thinking agents*, retaining the peculiar bias and bent of their intellectual and moral powers, their constitutional temperament and tendencies, notwithstanding, and in *alliance with the inspiration they professed*—leads us, while acknowledging in them a real and certain inspiration, [a combination of their agency with the inspiring agency,] whereby they become true guides to the Church, in respect to *general direction*, to conclude that they had *a partial and incomplete inspiration*. [It did not, as a Divine influence, include the words, styles, etc., of the thinking human agents acting in *alliance* or combination with it.] It was not full and universal, embracing all *aspects and particulars* of a subject, nor was it inclusive of *all topics*. In short, it was *partial and so far imperfect*." (P. 473.) "We have no reason to believe that the Divine Spirit ordinarily acts upon the human mind in any other method than by *uniting his influence with it*, and elevating it to a higher and holier tone than it could otherwise reach. The Divine Spirit does not supersede, or set aside, the use of the natural powers, [that is, in inspiration,] but quickens and purifies them, *so that they can see much farther and higher*. This, at least, was commonly the case, though there were doubtless exceptions, to which we shall allude hereafter. When we consider the various *phenomena presented in the prophecies, they are explicable by means of the indwelling Spirit in connection with the natural faculties*. It was the Spirit that enabled prophets to speak in the diversified strains of condemnation, admonition, and comfort relating *to the present and the future, by acting upon their*

mental powers with unusual force, and thus *stimulating* them to give the *merely ideal contents of a divine message*, a practically intelligible character." (P. 449.) Again: "Inspiration does not necessarily and always imply *suggestion by the Holy Spirit.* It does not exclude *individuality*, or suppress the exercise of the human faculties; inspiration *admits of degrees*, and does not usually reach the extent of absolute infallibility." (P. 766.)

We leave the reader to deduce his own inferences from these brief references, only observing, that while our author mistook the nature of inspiration, and yielded the true ground of infallibility, but still held and believed 'the great doctrine of the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures,' Dr. Davidson renounced the doctrine, as well as the reality.

In his first discourse, at page 8, the author distinguishes betwen revelations by *words*, and revelations by acts, *miracles;* and ascribes both exclusively to the Logos. "The being to whom we must ascribe *the words*, although expressed by the messengers of God; He who in like manner, performed *the acts*, although by the instrumentality of these same agents, was the Logos, God's eternal, personal self-revelation; God, who as word, spiritually yet really maintains the world." But if there was a combination of divine and human agency in the revelations made in words, causing them to consist of two distinct elements, a divine and a human element, we must, from his own statement, infer that there was a like combination in the revelations made in acts, causing them to consist of the same two diverse elements; and, in so far as human agency was an element in those acts, those exertions of divine power which we

call miracles — they were neither supernatural nor contra-natural, and could no more serve the purpose of distinctive, peculiar, and conclusive divine attestations, than man's words can have divine infallibility and authority. If the acts of Moses in stretching forth his hand and repeating the words of Jehovah, "that the children of Israel should go forward," imparted a human element to the divine act which divided the waters of the Red Sea, then may we have some probable ground for believing that the utterance orally and in writing by Moses and the prophets, of the words of God, the Logos, whether audibly expressed in their hearing, or silently conveyed to their minds by inspiration, imparted a human element to those words and to the thoughts of which they were the vehicle. But if the instrumentality of the prophets in receiving and uttering the words of God, had no other relation to the truths expressed and their vehicle, than the instrumentality of Joshua had to the act of Jehovah, which caused the sun to stand still in the midst of heaven, then a theory which confounds their instrumentality with the divine efficiency, must be as baseless as the spiritual inspiration, plenary knowledge, and immediate intuition of the '*word*-transcending,' idealistic, and pantheistic magicians and soothsayers of the German school.

The confusion and obscurity of the author's ideas, is aggravated by his use of other than simple language, and other than terms appropriate to his subject. This feature of his work would hardly be worthy of particular notice, but that a dissection of his novel phraseology serves to expose the crudeness of his theory in

contrast with that which he rejects. Thus in the elaborate paragraphs in which he defines and expounds "the 'dynamical' theory of inspiration, or that which implies such a divine influence as employs man's faculties according to their natural laws," and "by which man is not considered as in any sense the *cause or the originator* of the *revelation* of which God alone is the source, but human agency is regarded as the *condition* under which the revelation becomes known to others." (P. 25.) Here, the first assertion, that according to the 'dynamical' theory of *inspiration*, the Holy Spirit employs man's faculties in accordance with their natural laws, is just as true of the 'mechanical' as of the 'dynamical' theory. It means that, in the act of inspiration, the Holy Spirit conveys His thoughts into man's mind, in a way not contrary to the laws which regulate the natural exercise of his intellectual facultics, but in harmony with them, which is what is meant, and all that is properly meant by divine inspiration. This includes the words, as the necessary vehicle of the thoughts. For without the words the thoughts could not be conveyed to man's mind in harmony with its natural laws, so as to be intellectually and consciously conceived by him. And as it conveys thoughts in words, it conveys revelations.

But the 'dynamical' theory is not a theory of conveying thoughts from one mind to another, not a theory of inspiration as a divine act, but a theory of effects on man's faculties in uttering, writing, publishing, making known revelations to others. This is manifest in all his statements and reasonings, and this alone is consistent with the qualifying term 'dynamical.' In mechanical

philosophy, moving powers, forces which cause motion, are termed 'dynamical.' Suppose a fluid to be conveyed, impelled, injected into a man's lungs by an external force, and that the fact was stated in these terms. Would any philosopher think it necessary to add to the statement, that the physical receptacle of the fluid was not in any sense the cause or originator of the external force, but must be regarded only as the *condition* under which the injection took place? And what is this but nonsense? To say that man himself is not the cause of the external force but is the condition of its being exerted, is the same as to say, If there were no lungs capable of receiving a fluid, no fluid could be injected by an external force, and if man had no intellectual faculties, no thoughts could be inspired into his mind, and if he was not an intelligent free agent, he could not utter, speak, write, make known to others, thoughts received by inspiration; which is to no more purpose as a definition or illustration of the nature of divine inspiration, than it would be to say that the fact of there being thoughts to be conveyed and published, is a *condition* of their being conveyed by inspiration and published by writing.

That we do not, in these observations, misconceive or misrepresent the author; that he had neither a scriptural, nor any distinct and definite apprehension of his *theme;* that he conceived of *inspiration*, not simply as a divine act, but as a result of a joint exercise of divine and human agency in the selection and proclamation orally and in writing of the words employed, is further evident from the necessity which he felt, in order to maintain his hypothesis of *two elements* in the Bible, of

asserting a radical distinction in respect to their sources and their objects "between revelation and inspiration, as applied to the contents of the Bible." (P. 31.) "In whatever manner we conceive the Bible to convey to us a revelation," he observes, p. 23, "we must, from the nature of the case, recognize its two elements. Without the divine element, it [the Bible] would cease to be a revelation; [that is, as he defines *revelation,* it would cease to be "a direct communication from God to man;" it would be merely human;] "without the human," [supposing it to have the divine element,] "the communication from God would have been confined to the individual to whom it was originally made;" that is, it would not have been published, orally or in writing. The revelation—the direct communication of the contents of the Bible from God to man, might then have been made to him and received by him, prior to the intrusion or implication of any human element, though in such case it would be unpublished. But that which was so *communicated and received* would not be a *revelation*, even to the recipient, without *words* as its vehicle, and as the instrument of his intellectual conception and understanding of it. If then it was or might have been made in words intelligible to the recipient, why could he not repeat, proclaim, and write those words as easily and as perfectly by the unaided exercise of his natural faculties, as if the communication had been made to him in words by one of his fellow-men? If it was or might have been made without words, and yet was a revelation communicated directly from God, and received and understood by man, and as such of course was free from any human element or

taint whatever, then what inspiration had to do was not to reveal or communicate any thing, not to select, disclose, or convey thoughts, but only to assist the prophet in his selection of his own words in his own style, whereby to express the non-verbal thoughts communicated directly from God to him, and received as revelations.

Such undeniably is his notion, theoretically, of inspiration. "By revelation I understand a direct communication from God to man. By inspiration, on the other hand, I understand that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit, *in whatever degree or manner it may have been exercised, guided by which* the human agents chosen by God have officially *proclaimed* His will *by word of mouth*, or have *committed to writing* the several portions of the Bible. I repeat, *in whatever degree or manner* this actuation by the Holy Spirit may have been exercised—for it should never be forgotten that *the real question with which our inquiry is concerned* is [not the *nature* of *inspiration*, but] the *result* of this divine influence as presented to us in the Holy Scriptures, *not* the manner according to which it has pleased God that this result should be obtained." (P. 28.)

It is apparent from this formal definition that the author's theme as announced in his title-page—The *nature* of Inspiration—is not that which he discusses and endeavors to sustain by proof. He discusses the *phenomena* produced by what he calls *inspiration.* When he comes to execute his task, he vehemently insists, "that the *real question* with which his inquiry is concerned, is *the result* of this Divine influence as presented to us in the Holy Scriptures, *not* the manner

according to which it has pleased God that this result should be obtained." As much as to say: I take up the Book which is commonly called the Bible. As a book it consists of diverse materials. Considered in one respect, it consists of paper, ink, and binding. Considered in another respect, it consists of words which represent particular thoughts. When called the Book or the Bible, without any qualifying term, the paper, ink, and binding, alone, as combined and arranged in a particular form by skill and labor, may be referred to. In this sense the paper and other materials of art are essential to it. They constitute it, as they do all similar products of art. In this sense it is purely human—a *result* of human skill and labor. It is the *result* of no other agency or combination of agencies. It has no other element in it. And all this is as true of the distinct original *rolls* or *books*, which being united constitute the one book.

But when called 'the Holy Scriptures,' *this result* of human agency, skill, and labor, is not referred to. It is the written words and the thoughts which they signify and represent, that are intended and referred to. A Scripture is a writing. A collection of Scriptures is a collection of writings. A writing is a representation and expression of thoughts in words; as speaking is a representation and expression of thoughts in words vocally uttered. The act of writing—delineating alphabetic characters as they are arranged in words and sentences—is as purely a human act, as that of casting, or that of setting types, or that of articulating words by exercising the vocal organs.

What then is *the result* of Inspiration as presented to

us in the Holy Scriptures? It is not any of the constituents of the Bible considered simply as a book; it is not the act of writing, nor those constituents and that act united or combined with other constituents or acts. They are purely material and human. It is something to which those constituents and that act are not necessary and indispensable; something prior to them, and which, as preëxisting, furnishes the only ground or occasion for them; something which may be as perfectly uttered, represented, expressed, by vocal articulation, as by alphabetic characters written on paper. But, excluding those physical materials and acts, there is nothing presented to us in the Holy Scriptures but *thoughts* represented, expressed, made visible, in *words*, as the same thoughts are made audible by a vocal articulation of the same words. The thoughts necessarily existed, and of necessity were intellectually and consciously conceived in words as their vehicle, the condition of their being conceived and realized to the human consciousness, prior to their being made visible to others by written characters, or audible by articulate sounds.

Were *the thoughts*, then the *result* of Inspiration as presented to us in the Holy Scriptures? No, says our author. By Inspiration I understand that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit which *guided* the human agents in *proclaiming* the thoughts (the will of God) by speaking the words, or by writing them. The thoughts are due not to Inspiration but to Revelation; and, "while Inspiration (as the signification of the term denotes) is the peculiar function of the Holy Ghost, so, in like manner, to reveal is the office appropriate to the Eternal Word." (P. 115.)

But the thoughts are embodied in the words. They can not be conceived, any more than they can be spoken and written without the words; and if they were revealed, disclosed, "directly communicated" from the Divine Logos to man, they must have been revealed in words. And if the revelation of them was exclusively the office of the Logos, then the revelation of them was not a result of inspiration. The only effect or result of "that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit" which the author understands by Inspiration, was that of *guiding* the prophets in their acts of uttering the words of Scripture, orally and by writing. It could not have included a selection of the words. That is not in his definition of the result of the *actuating energy*, and is wholly different from 'proclaiming the will of God by word of mouth, or committing to writing the several portions of the Bible.' Besides, their agency could not have had any thing to do with selecting the words whereby to express the thoughts; for without the words they could not have had the thoughts to be expressed; they could not have conceived them, or been conscious of them. If the thoughts were conveyed directly to them, the words must have been conveyed directly to them by the Divine Revealer.

His definition of Inspiration, or rather of what he supposes to have been accomplished by inspiration, is founded on his assumed hypothesis, that there are two distinct elements in the Holy Scriptures, because the Bible as a book consists of a material part fabricated by human agency, and of 'Revelations directly communicated from God to man'; which hypothesis renders necessary his assumed distinction between Revela-

tion and Inspiration, by which he ascribes all revelations to one Divine Person, and all inspiration to another. This theory followed out, leaves nothing for inspiration to do but to *guide* the sacred penmen in the act of *writing*. This is the *result* of that Inspiration, which he variously characterizes as the Divine influence, the actuating energy, the combination of the Divine with human agency, and the like.

Accordingly, he thus defines what it was his object to accomplish: "To show how these *elements*, apparently so heterogeneous, may be combined; to exhibit them as not merely concurrent, but *as absolutely amalgamated in one distinct energy*;—to prove, moreover, that, under the controlling influence of the Divine principle, there has hence resulted the perfect inspiration of all the parts of Scripture, whatever be their subject matter,—such is the task to which I must now address myself." (P. 140.)

But the author's heart is far more correct than his speculative theory. 'With his heart,' he believes that the Holy Scriptures are from beginning to end, the inspired and therefore the infallible word of God; and hence, while speculatively he rejects the theory called 'mechanical,' which directly teaches that cardinal doctrine, the very best sentences in his book are, however inconsistently advanced by him, so many virtual testimonies in its favor, and such as those who hold it would be likely to advance. We adduce a few examples: "On the one hand, God has granted a Revelation; on the other, human language has been made the channel to *convey*, and men have been chosen as the *agents* to *record* it. From this point all theories on

the subject of Revelation take their rise." (P. 18.) . . . "While I can by no means accept the mechanical system as correct, or as consistent with the facts to be explained, it will be my object in the present Discourses *to establish* in the *broadest extent all that its supporters desire to maintain;* namely, the infallible certainty, the indisputable authority, the perfect and entire truthfulness, of all and every, the parts of Holy Scripture." (P. 19.) "It must ever be borne in mind . . . that Inspiration stamps the *word of God, as such,* in the most profound sense of the term." (P. 31.) "The Holy Spirit *operates;* that is, *selects* from the mass of materials which were at the writer's command—whatever may have been their character, whether known, or supernaturally revealed." (P. 31.) "It is plain, that in any communication from an infinite Being to creatures of finite capacities, one of two things must happen. Either the former must raise the latter almost to His own level, or else He must suit *the form* of His communications *to their powers of apprehension.*" (P. 63.) "How can infallible truth be infallibly conveyed in defective and fallible expressions?" [Coleridge.] "What! not even in *the words of Christ?*" [Author.] (P. 64.) The immemorial doctrine and faith of the Church, concerning inspiration, he observes, "Starts from that article of the Creed in which Christians to the present day profess: 'We believe in the Holy Ghost . . . who *spake* by the prophets.'" (P. 73.) "The ordinary style in quoting Scripture was, either to omit the writer's name—'Thus *spake* the Holy Ghost'; or to supply it thus—'So *spake* the Spirit by Solomon,' or 'by Isaiah,' or 'by Paul.' . . . Hence

the numerous epithets applied to every part of Scripture—'The Scriptures of the Lord,' 'The Divine Scriptures,' 'Heavenly letters.' The phrase, however, most usually employed, is that of St. Paul: 'Scriptures given by inspiration of God.' In a word, the evidence under this head may be summed up in the language of St. Clement, of Rome: 'Give diligent heed to the Scriptures, the true *sayings* of the Holy Ghost.'" (P. 75.)

When defining the term prophet, (Nabi, Heb.,) as denoting one chosen and set apart to the prophetic *office*, he says: "The signification of the term, Nabi, may be inferred not only from its admitted etymology, according to which it implies '*a speaker*,' 'one who *announces the sayings and revelations of God*,' but also from the explanation given by Jehovah Himself: 'The Lord said unto Moses, See, I have made thee a god (Elohim) to Pharaoh: and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet, (Nabi); the Lord having previously announced to Moses—Aaron shall be thy spokesman to the people: and he shall be to thee instead of a mouth: and thou shalt be to him instead of God.' And thus the official Prophet was, above all others, God's spokesman to the people—the mouth, as it were, by which Jehovah uttered his commands.'" (P. 162.) "But, we must ever keep in mind, that the *internal suggestion* which prompts his utterance, *neither proceeds from, nor is produced by*, the *prophet's natural powers or personal condition*." (P. 167.) "The men of God were as fully assured of the objective reality of the divine communications, *conveyed thus immediately* to their souls, as we are of the objective reality of the world which surrounds us." (P. 169.) "The revelations *conveyed to*

God's servants . . . were either communications made when the action of the external senses was suspended, and there was no consciousness of passing events; or they were communications made in the natural waking state, when the prophet was conscious of all that took place around him." (P. 170.) How then were these revelations made?—by inspiration? No, says the author—according to my theory there is a total difference between Revelation and Inspiration. Revelations have no human element in them—they proceed wholly from the Divine Agency—they are not inspired—Inspiration proceeds from, and consists of, two Agencies, the Divine and the Human, 'combined, and absolutely amalgamated in one distinct energy'—Revelation communicates, 'from the Divine to the human Spirit'—Inspiration moulds, forms, guides, proclaims by writing. What he ascribes to Revelation, the Scriptures ascribe to Inspiration; and all that is left to be ascribed to Inspiration, is as purely human as the act of one man in recording the words of another.

But to proceed. At page 198, the author has occasion directly to oppose a 'modern school of disbelievers'; and in doing that, as if unconscious of his theory, he gives utterance to his practical belief as a Christian believer: "Holy Scripture, in short, presents the prophets to our view as human instruments through whom *the Spirit of God speaks, and by whose lips He announces the Divine oracles.*"

"The epithet 'Holy' Scripture intimates the special relation of the Bible to God the Holy Ghost; and in this sense it is that the apostle defines 'all Scripture,' as 'given by inspiration of God.'" (P. 257.) By *all*

Scripture, the apostle undoubtedly meant all the words recorded by the sacred writers as given them by inspiration; and if they were given, imparted, conveyed, to them from God by inspiration—breathing them into their minds—then the writers had no agency whatever concerning them, or any part of them, or any of their peculiarities of diction, till after they had received them as what they were to write, and all their agency in relation to them was simply their agency in writing what had been inbreathed into their minds to be written. They were holy men; they were conscious of what was inspired into their minds to be written, and under that consciousness they spake and wrote as they were influenced thereto by the Holy Spirit. If there was any intrusion of a human element into that which they wrote, it must have been by their writing on their own authority and discretion, what was not given them by inspiration of God, which the apostle speaking of the Scriptures as they are, expressly denies.

—"Repeated pledges were given from the lips of the Son of God Himself, that *no* occasion should arise during the course of their ministerial labors in which the Holy Ghost should not instruct them 'how and what they should say':—in other words, that in every exercise of their apostolic office, both the *form* and the *substance* of their statements *should be given them.*" May we not conclude with absolute certainty, that their *receiving*, by inspiration, statements in words which they were to utter before magistrates and persecutors, did not impart a 'human element' either to the form or substance of what they said? They were expressly forbidden to premeditate what they should

speak, because the words to be uttered were not theirs, but were the words of the Holy Ghost.

"The Old Testament writings, with reference to their inward principle, are described as 'given by inspiration of God;' their *language* being regarded as the language of the Holy Ghost: and thus the Evangelist can say, 'all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet.'" (P. 283.) "The New Testament writers, as well as our Lord Himself, ascribe the Old Testament to the *immediate* agency of the Holy Ghost." (P. 325.) "According to that view of the inspiration of Scripture which I have endeavored to maintain, each and every portion of the Bible is perfect and divine." (P. 327.)

But notwithstanding these, and many similar expressions of his practical belief, he every where in subserviency to his 'dynamical' notion of inspiration, treats of the agency of the Holy Spirit with reference to the production, bestowment, inspiration of the Scriptures, as merely *a guidance* of the sacred writers—or a co-operation, coäction, combination of His agency with theirs; so that their agency was as much an element of inspiration and of the Scriptures, as His agency was. "No artificial line of distinction is to be drawn between the human and the Divine elements of Scripture." (P. 283.) "The human testimony of the apostles was exalted into Divine testimony by the co-operation of the Spirit of God." (P. 288.) "It forms a prominent feature of the theory of inspiration maintained in these discourses, that each writer of Scripture made use, on all occasions, of such materials as

were in his power, whether supplied by his own experience or by the information of others. This principle forms the foundation of the distinction between Revelation and Inspiration." (P. 319.)

The author entertains a confused and mystical view of the intellectual condition and the exercises of the prophets when receiving Divine Revelations. He contends that they had the natural exercise of their faculties, and were intelligently conscious of what was passing; and yet, under the influence of his 'dynamical' theory, he treats of them as abnormally and ecstatically excited, and as not understanding, or, at least, not always understanding what was revealed to them. "Strange," he observes, "would the phenomenon be . . . of the preservation of each writer's peculiar individuality . . . had he been deprived of the use of those natural faculties, *by means of which he has embodied in suitable language* the *ideas* which were supernaturally *infused* into his soul, and placed on record the details of the revelation which they *conveyed*. So far, indeed, are the facts of the case from suggesting a suppression of the prophet's intelligent consciousness as being essential or even congruous, that we can at once discern how an *elevation*, rather, *of all the powers* whereby *ideas* are apprehended was, of necessity, required *for the purpose* of enabling him to receive, or to transmit to others, the mysterious truths which were disclosed to him. . . . The prophets tell us how their souls were supported, and enabled to endure the sublime visions upon which they gazed. This is a fact which, while it proves that *the object* of their *intuitions* was no mere creation of their own imaginations—no

mere subjective phantasm—exhibits at the same time, how their *understanding* was qualified to *apprehend* the Divine communication, and enabled to *reproduce* it for the benefit of others." (P. 205.) But: per contra—

"In giving utterance to miraculous communications from God, it would seem, even *à priori*, to be the more reasonable supposition that the prophet should not comprehend the mysteries which have been divinely imparted to him, to the like *extent*, or in the same *degree* as an ordinary teacher understands the various branches of information which he has acquired by study and meditation—by the exercise of human intellect, and the employment of human industry. The full meaning of the *language* which he utters must, from the very nature of the case, extend beyond the prophet's own mental vision. That *supernatural intuition* in which the present and the future are intermingled, and which has arisen independently of the human agent's own reflection, transcends the power of his understanding, and can not be analyzed by the *discursive* faculty of the mind." (P. 208.)

Here we have the incongruous, contradictory, and absurd representations: 1. That the Prophets, when receiving revelation, had the free and ordinary use of their natural faculties. 2. That their faculties were not in the natural state, but were all supernaturally elevated and excited to enable them to apprehend, receive, and transmit, the truths which were revealed. 3. That the ideas were supernaturally infused into their souls. 4. That, independently of their own reflections, they discerned them by *supernatural intuition*. 5. That they transcended the powers of their understandings.

6. That by the use of their natural faculties they em bodied the *ideas* in suitable language. 7. That the full meaning of the language which they selected, extended beyond their own mental vision, elevated and excited as they were to the point of supernatural intuition. 8. That they did not comprehend the ideas which were divinely imparted to them, and infused into their souls, to such a degree, even as an ordinary teacher understands what he learns by the unassisted exercise of his intellect. 9. That they nevertheless selected words to express the ideas which they did not comprehend—language, the meaning of which extended beyond what they saw by supernatural intuition. 10. Truths, ideas, were revealed which in fact were not revealed They were discovered by intuition, but they were not so discovered as to be apprehended and understood. Words were selected to express them which did not justly express them, but expressed more than was revealed or discovered by intuition. The words of Scripture therefore mean more than was imparted to the Prophets by revelation. Ideas only were imparted —imperfectly, obscurely, infused. They were bare ideas, and, in part, at least, imperceptible. They needed a human element. The prophets in dynamically supplying that element, used words which transcend the import of the revealed ideas. Surely a theory which denies that any revelations were made by inspiration; and teaches that revelations were immediate communications from God by the infusion of ideas into the soul, and that the faculties of the prophets were so elevated and excited as to enable them by supernatural intuition to perceive the ideas, ought

to provide that the prophets before they embodied those ideas in words, should be enabled to perceive them clearly, and to select words which would exactly express the revealed ideas, and neither more nor less—so that their readers at the time, and ever afterwards, might know for certain what was revealed. But, says the author concerning certain passages of Scripture, they "Not only illustrate the assertion (1 Pet. 1 : 10) that the prophets *searched diligently* for the meaning of their own words—they also afford conclusive evidence that as each prediction was *uttered*, *reason* continued its habitual efforts to penetrate the *unknown;* and exhibit the important fact, that, while they were subject to the Divine influence, there was carried on simultaneously, a parallel exercise of the *natural faculties* of the *human agent*, who was thus employed to *express* the revelations of God in the language of men." (P. 213.) Again: "The continued exercise of each prophet's consciousness was preserved unimpaired, and his understanding still reflected upon the visions which his *spiritual sense* had contemplated, even while his imagination was engaged in embodying them in certain forms or symbols." (P. 218.) If such deliverances as these do not fully enlighten and satisfy the reader as to how it was that the "human element" became an amalgamated and integral part of Scripture, and how it happened to be after the revelations of God were made to them, that the prophets devised, or selected, suitable words, forms, or symbols, by which to represent them, one may well despair of satisfying him from the pages of the author, and leave him to wonder that a Christian scholar and believer in the plenary inspiration and in-

fallibility of the Holy Scriptures as the Word of God, should be entranced by a theory which can neither be defined nor explained intelligibly.

IV. His illustrations from the Fathers—from trances, ecstasies, etc.—what he ascribes to the Divine and what to human agency.

To sustain his view of inspiration, the author avails himself of certain "allusions, by the Fathers of the Church, to the effect of the Divine influence upon the *intellectual faculties* of the prophets;" with what success the reader may judge. "The primitive Church did not shrink from expressing a decided opinion as to the effect produced upon the sacred penmen while actuated by the Spirit's influence—an opinion clearly indicated by the series of similitudes which the different writers employed who approached the subject of inspiration, and which were admirably calculated, had there been occasion to develop them, to illustrate that mutual coöperation of the Divine and human agencies, which, as we have seen, forms the first condition of our problem. The language made use of plainly denotes that the human element was not thought to have been suppressed or suspended, but to have been filled and exalted by the Divine illumination; and to this notion belongs that entire system of illustration so familiar to the Fathers from the earliest times.

"They compared the soul of the man of God, when subjected to the Divine influence, to an instrument of music into which the Holy Spirit *breathes*, or the strings of which He *sways*, like the plectrum of a harp or lyre, in order *to evoke its vital tones*. Such illustrations were obviously suggested by the very etymology of

the word Inspiration—or as St. Paul terms it, *Theopneustia;* and when they are applied to men, as the agents of the Holy Spirit, we should remember that the tone and quality of the note depend as much upon the instrument itself, as upon the hand which sweeps over its strings. And carrying out the analogy, we can easily see, when we reflect upon the full and deep harmonies of Scripture, how much of their power and beauty lies in the Divine *union* of *the different human instruments* through which we listen to the breathings of the Spirit. Thus, Origen, speaking of the consistency of the various parts of Scripture, finely observed: 'Scripture'—what an illustration! Is Scripture itself the soul of man—the human instrument? 'Scripture, as a whole, is God's one, perfect, and complete *instrument;* giving forth to those who wish to learn its one saving music from many notes combined; stilling and restraining all strivings of the evil one, as David's music calmed the madness of Saul.'" (Pp. 79, 80.)

What the *Divine union* of the different *human* instruments in inspiration may be, we do not comprehend, nor how the power and beauty of the harmonies of Scripture depend on it; nor how Scripture itself can be an instrument of its own inspiration. But the analogies on which the Fathers founded their comparisons of the prophets, as recipients of Divine communications, to musical instruments subjected to physical and mechanical impulses, we clearly understand to be conclusive against the theory of the author. Had they been cited in support of that "mechanical" theory, which modern criticism rejects, they would have been apposite, forcible, and consistent. Musical instruments are, in

themselves, perfectly *passive*. The *impulses* exerted on them, whether tactile or aërial, proceed wholly from the action of an external agent. So the Fathers conceived that the prophets, in receiving the Divine thoughts by inspiration, were perfectly passive; and that the thoughts so received, were breathed, conveyed, inspired into their minds by the Holy Spirit. If their expressions imply any thing more than this, they imply nothing contrary to it, or inconsistent with it. To breathe into an instrument, is to impel air into it. To sway the strings of a harp, is to exert an impulse, equivalent, in its nature, purpose, and effect, to the impulse of air in the other case. In both cases the impulse, the power, the conveyance, is wholly from without. So inspiration is the act of the Holy Spirit, breathing, conveying, inspiring thoughts into the passive mind of the prophet, to be passively received, intellectually conceived, realized to his intelligent consciousness, and, being so received, to be *evoked*, *uttered*, *recorded*, by him in the exercise of his own distinct personal agency.

To construe these similitudes, as delivered by the Fathers, so as to make them support the "dynamical" theory of inspiration, it is necessary to fancy other analogies, and, finally, to run the comparison aground, out of, and beyond, the province of inspiration, in the perfected "organism of Holy Scripture." The "dynamical" theory is a theory, not of the inspiration of thoughts into the mind, but of influence *on the faculties* of the prophets. An analogy is, therefore, imagined between those faculties and the strings of a musical instrument, and the comparison is based on the as-

sumption that the 'intellectual faculties of the prophets needed to be excited and enlightened for the same reason that the strings of the instrument needed to be moved by tactile impulse, "in order to *evoke* their vital tones." But this implies that the evoked *tones* preëxisted in the strings, and owed not their existence in any sense or degree to the impelling power, but only their *evocation*. And, reasoning from this to inspiration, it implies that the *truths* recorded by the sacred writers preëxisted in their minds, and owed not their existence, in any sense or degree, to the Divine influence *on* their faculties, but owed to that influence only the evocation of the truths out of the depths of their illuminated and guided faculties.' This, undoubtedly, is what the "dynamical" theory necessarily comes to; and it is essentially the theory of the paganizing heretics whom the Fathers opposed; but it is not their theory in whole or in part; nor a theory on which the "great doctrine of the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures can be maintained."

In his endeavors to show what the human element, as combined with the actuating influence of the Spirit in inspiration, actually did, he says, in his remarks on revelations in dreams and visions. (P. 172.) "The trance of St. Peter . . . affords a complete proof of how the natural condition and circumstances of the person who received this species of revelation, were employed by the Almighty to furnish *the form* under which His communications were conveyed. St. Peter, we are told, 'went up upon the house-top to pray, about the sixth hour: and *he became very hungry and would have eaten;* but while they made ready, he fell

into a trance.'" Now, what happened? Why, he saw a symbolic representation of certain truths which were to be distinctly and effectually conveyed to his mind, and heard an audible expression and explanation of them in words: "There came a voice to him, Rise, Peter kill and eat. But Peter said: Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten any thing that is common or unclean. And the voice *spake* unto him again the second time: What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common." This was the interpretation of the symbol. As it was unlawful for him as a Jew to eat common or unclean meats, so it was unlawful to keep company or come into one of another nation. The symbol signified that God had abrogated that law. So the voice explained it. And "while Peter thought on the vision, the *Spirit said unto him*, Behold, three men seek thee. Arise, therefore, and get thee down, and go with them, doubting nothing: for *I have sent them*." Accordingly, with this clear understanding of the symbol, the interpretation by the voice of the Lord, and the verbal directions of the Spirit, he went, and, addressing Cornelius and his Gentile kinsmen, said: "God hath showed me that I should not call any man common or unclean." (Acts 10.) This momentous revelation, so difficult to be received by a scrupulous Jew, so difficult to be conveyed and realized to his intelligent consciousness, in such a manner as to revolutionize his sentiments and control his future conduct, behooved to be communicated both in words and in signs of equivalent significance: and all that constituted or was contained in the *revelation*, was so communicated. But, says our author: 'The natural condition and circum-

stances of Peter, at the time, supplied the *form* of the symbolic representation in which the revelation was embodied.' That is, Peter was on a house-top — he was praying—he was hungry—he was in a trance, which, separately or together, make up what the author means by his natural condition. But why should this condition supply the *form* of a symbol consisting of meats unlawful and unnatural to him, and which, sooner than taste them, he would have perished of hunger? If his hunger was a reason for a symbol consisting of animals, one would think they should have been such as he was accustomed to appropriate as food. But suppose there was a coïncidence between his sensations, at the time, and the nature of the symbol, what can that possibly have to do with the revelation, the specific truths signified by the sign, and expressly declared in words? Was it not reason enough why animals prohibited by the ritual law should be selected to teach him symbolically that the law against unclean meats and against intercourse with Gentiles, was abolished? Those truths, and those only, were revealed and taught by the symbol, as interpreted by the voice of God, and as understood and rehearsed by Peter. If his hunger prescribed or modified the *form* of the symbol, it prescribed or modified the truths signified and vocally expressed; and we may go back to what caused or modified his hunger, and still back, step by step, and never get at the bottom of the combinations in "dynamical" inspiration.

Pursuing this theme, he ascribes to the *imagination* of the prophets when excited to a state of ecstasy, the creation or fancying of the agents, acts, and scenery of

their symbolic visions. "Assuming that certain immediate suggestions have been conveyed to the soul of the prophet, we have to consider in what manner they were received and appropriated by him, in his state of trance or ecstasy"—the state, namely, when "the sense of *spiritual intuition* is called into action by means of the new life poured into the soul. Hence visions are *the result* of ecstasy. Now, as it is only by the creation of *new* ideas and conceptions in the mind, that the mysteries of God, and revelations of things unseen, can, in most instances, be conveyed to the soul still fettered by its bodily organization, such ideas and conceptions must receive a certain clothing—assume certain forms—be embodied, as it were, in certain shapes—before they can be apprehended by an understanding limited to the experience of this life of ours. If this be not effected, such revelation, at the utmost, must be confined to the individual who received it; for, were he even enabled, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to comprehend disclosures thus transcending the powers of human thought, and the range of human experience—human language would obviously be incapable of conveying any representation of those ideas to others. . . . But if it were designed that the revelation should be communicated to others, the ideas by which it was conveyed to the prophet's mind, *must be there* invested with certain forms, *supplied by such intellectual powers as now possess activity.* In dreams and ecstasy, *imagination alone is active;* and the forms or symbols *created by this faculty,* acting according to its natural laws, are presented to the spiritual vision of the prophet, to be gazed at as an object of thought;

although, previously, the original of such symbols had been but the subject of thought—or, in other words, mere ideas or conceptions. The nature of the case, of necessity, imposes the several steps of the process which has here been described; and in it we can trace *the source of that human coloring*, by means of which the prophets have been able to render intelligible to their fellow-men the mysteries of the kingdom of God —so far, at least, as God has been pleased to reveal them. To *this origin*, therefore, we are to ascribe *symbolic actions and symbolic visions.* The peculiarity of the former—symbolic actions—consists in this, that the prophet's own personality is so *mingled with the objects* which are presented to his spiritual gaze, that he takes an active part in the drama, representing one or other of the parties engaged in all such intuitions—Jehovah or the people. The symbolic action, however, was no more intended to facilitate the understanding of the revelation, than were the parables of the New Testament to elucidate the sense of the doctrines which they convey. [!] Symbolic visions differ from symbolic actions merely in this, that the prophet *is no longer the actor in* the scenes which he describes; he now regards them simply as a spectator. . . . When the ideas, divinely infused into the prophet's mind, related to things which surpass the bounds of human experience, it is plain, as I have observed, that ordinary language must fail to convey to others what was thus revealed. It was necessary, therefore, that such representations or symbols should be moulded, as it were, for the occasion, which would best conform to those ideas. In this case we may regard the imagination as *productive.* . . .

But there were occasions on which the ideas supplied to the prophet's mind were in some measure related to the world of sense; and here the symbol corresponds to the *form* which such ideas had actually represented. In this case the imagination may be regarded as *reproductive*." (Pp. 173–176.)

This is by far the most ample and most practical elucidation of 'Dynamical' Inspiration, that is to be found in these discourses. It brings the human element out in bold relief, and furnishes materials for trying the 'dynamical' theory by its own jury and its own witnesses. It shows what a single faculty of the mind can do by way of inspiration and revelation, when, in a state of ecstasy, the understanding and all the other faculties were in repose, and the imagination alone active. Its psychological and physiological accuracy we leave to the judgment of the reader; and shall only endeavor to exhibit some glimpses of its consistency with the author's theory of inspiration, and of its inconsistency with the Divine origin, authority, and infallibility of the Holy Scriptures.

In order to render more clear what the author affirms of the actors and their modes of agency, in conveying revelations, and bringing them within the comprehension of the human mind, it will be convenient to consider separately what he ascribes to the Divine and what he ascribes to the human element.

1. He ascribes to the Divine agency the pouring of *a new life* into the soul of the prophet, raising it to a state of ecstasy, and calling into action his "sense," or power of spiritual intuition, and so producing visions. Of this operation we apprehend that the Scriptures are en-

tirely silent; and we perceive no room, thus far, for a combination of the two elements, unless it was in the act of *spiritual intuition.*

2. He ascribes to the Divine agency 'the creation of *new* ideas and conceptions in the prophet's mind,' which he also describes as 'ideas divinely infused.' What he means by 'ideas' is not perfectly clear. If they were the 'phantasms' of the early and later schools of philosophy, then they must have been *objective* to the intellect—immediate objects of thought, and within the scope and comprehension of the understanding; and so also, had they been thoughts or intellectual conceptions of distinct thoughts. But they were neither; for all the mental faculties were suppressed and dormant, when the 'ideas' were created or infused, except the imagination; and if they had not been suppressed, 'such ideas and conceptions could not be apprehended by the understanding, till they had been clothed, invested, embodied in certain *forms* or shapes,' namely, the symbolic *forms*, shapes, and draperies supplied by *the imagination* of the prophet, and created by *that faculty*, acting according to its natural laws, and presented to the *spiritual vision* of the prophet to be gazed at *as objects of thought.* Moreover, if those 'ideas' had been apprehended by the understanding, human language was incompetent to express or convey any representation of them. It was necessary before they could be intellectually conceived, understood, or apprehended by the prophet, that he should, by an effort of his imagination according to its natural laws, create such symbolic forms or scenes as would best conform to those ideas and represent them,

and that he should present the symbols to his own spiritual vision, that he might by their instrumentality intuitively apprehend the ideas. It must have been a laborious and difficult operation for the prophet, cramped and all but stifled as he must have been, in such a state of ecstasy, to create symbols to represent and render intelligible, ideas infused into his mind without notice, and without his consent, and of such a nature that he could not apprehend them, nor be conscious of them. It is a wonder that in so peculiar a state, with all the avenues of light closed up, except his imagination, and a necessity imposed on that faculty of being exercised according to its natural laws, no one of the prophets made the slightest mistake in his creation of *forms and draperies* to represent his infused, unapprehended, and incomprehensible ideas. And it can not but strike one as remarkable, that the Omniscient Being who intended to convey a revelation to the finite creature, should not, when He infused the ideas, infuse also such symbols and such words as should represent and signify them, or at least give some clue to their import. And there is, no doubt, a degree of mystery which the author has overlooked, or at least, left unsolved, in the incidental circumstance, that 'the symbols or symbolic actions were not intended to facilitate the understanding of the revelation.' Probably the revelation was not contained in the 'infused ideas,' nor in the imaginary forms, shapes, draperies, created by the fancy of the prophet, but in the 'spiritual intuitions' which he had while gazing at the forms and scenes of his own creation. If this is a true notion of the process, it may help to account for the circumstance that in committing those

intuitions to writing, he invariably describes the symbolic forms, agents, acts, etc., in literal and intelligible language, so that interpreters in after-ages might have the advantage of his creations, without being themselves rapt into a state of prophetic ecstasy. Still there would be a difficulty, if the symbols were not intended to facilitate the understanding of the revelations. Why in that case, should they be described in writing and constitute so remarkable a feature of the prophetic Scriptures? The answer to this must be that they were intended to be the basis of the unecstatic spiritual intuitions of modern interpreters and critics.

But there is yet, seemingly, at least, another difficulty. In the sacred writings a good many of the symbols are expressly interpreted, just as though the revelation was in fact conveyed in the symbol. The inspired interpretation is but an expression in words of what the symbol distinctively represents. Thus the symbol described in Peter's vision clearly indicated that the distinction between clean and unclean meats was abolished. That was what he inferred and understood from it; and that was the interpetation announced by a voice from heaven. So, of those symbols which were exhibited to Ezekiel, Daniel, and John, which needed then to be interpreted, the interpretation as given and recorded in the literal phrase of ordinary language, corresponded exactly to the truths indicated by the natures, conditions, characteristics, agencies, acts, effects, etc., of the animate or inanimate constituents of the symbols. This would seem to imply that primarily the revelations were conveyed in the symbols, instead of being conveyed, as in ordinary cases, in words; and

that would seem to imply that the symbols themselves were 'created,' not by the prophet's imagination, but by the Omniscient Revealer. And some who never heard of, or, at least, who never properly understood the 'dynamical' theory of inspiration, and its auxiliary distinction between revelation and inspiration, and the combination of the Divine and human agencies in the Holy Scriptures—yield to this view of the matter, and fortify themselves by the consideration that the objects which are employed as symbols, are in all cases of different natures, conditions, characteristics, relations, etc., from those which they symbolically represent, while they as invariably present certain points of analogy or resemblance, which, under the circumstances and in the historical connections in which they were exhibited, indicated the truths intended to be foreshown. Those who take this *quasi*-'mechanical' view, and thereby 'ignore the human element,' will be very likely to insist that the prophets, had they in paroxysms of ecstasy, created the symbols, would have selected objects of the same natures, conditions, etc., with those intended to be symbolically represented. But this objection is overruled and obviated by that latent provision of the 'dynamical' theory which teaches that the symbols were not intended to facilitate the understanding of the revelations—they were intended only to assist the spiritual intuitions of the prophets. This will be rendered still more evident by a consideration of what our author ascribes to the human element or the manner in which the revelations were received and appropriated by the prophets in their state of ecstasy.

1. Their prophetic visions resulted from, originated

in, were the product of, their ecstatic state of mind when their imaginations alone were unsuppressed and in a state to act.

2. Certain 'ideas' having been divinely infused, into their souls, in such a way that they could not be apprehended by their understandings, and which would have remained unclothed and inexpressible, had not their agency been exerted at that stage of the process. They created certain *symbolic* forms, not to represent the 'ideas,' but only to clothe, embody, and give them shape, so as to make them objects of thought.

3. They presented these *symbolic* forms to their spiritual intuitional vision to be gazed at as objects of thought.

4. 'By this process they imparted that human coloring, by means of which the prophets were enabled to render intelligible to their fellow-men the mysteries of the kingdom of God, so far, at least, as God has been pleased to reveal them.'

5. 'In symbolic *actions* the prophet's own personality was so mingled with the objects which were presented to his spiritual gaze, that he took an active part in the drama, representing one or other of the parties engaged in *all such intuitions*—Jehovah or the people.'

6. 'In symbolic *visions* the prophet was no longer the actor in the scenes which he describes; he now regards them simply as a spectator.'

7. In moulding symbols when the infused 'ideas' related to things which surpass the bounds of human experience, the prophet's imagination was *productive;* when those 'ideas' related to the world of sense, it was *reproductive.*

8. It seems that in prophetic visions, 'ideas or conceptions' may be conveyed into the mind of the prophet without any vehicle, or vesture, whatever, by which they may be consciously received, apprehended, remembered, and expressed. But this was only preliminary. The infusions being but the agency of one of the parties to inspiration uncombined with the agency of the other party, is to no purpose until the Prophet has, in imagination, created certain forms—answerable, as near as might be, to the unperceived ideas—by gazing at which his sense of spiritual intuition was called into action. We wish the author had stated distinctly, at what stage of their visions it was, that the prophets selected *words* whereby to express the revelations which they intuitively perceived, while gazing at the symbolic forms which they had created. It could not have been at that stage when the 'ideas and conceptions were infused into their souls'; for in that case the 'ideas' would have been apprehended by their understandings, which would imply that their understandings were then active; and would, also, imply, that the creation of symbolic forms to embody the ideas, and making those forms objects of spiritual intuition, was superfluous. We are, therefore, left to conclude, that it must have been at the stage of spiritual intuition, while they were gazing at those symbolic forms. And this may account for the fact that each prophet selected such ordinary words, phrases, and idioms as were natural and familiar to him; since the particular *forms* selected and grouped in the symbols of the respective prophets, were those of well-known animals and natural phenomena, most likely to strike the

imagination in a state of ecstasy. For it is reasonable to conclude, that if the imagination, acting according to its natural laws, selected for symbols, phenomena with which the prophets were familiar, it would for the same reason select such words and phrases as they understood and were in the habit of using.

But let it suffice us to know that the 'dynamical' theory—which involves in its very essence the whole doctrine of mechanical forces, and, as applied to inspiration, whatever intellectual, moral, and spiritual forces may be required—is competent to what it undertakes, and will bear any amount of criticism without loss or damage.

The ground fallacy of the author's theory, lies in his assumption that, because the words which the sacred penmen used to express the inspired thoughts, were the same which they, characterized and circumstanced as they severally were, would have used, had the thoughts been their own and uninspired, *therefore* they must have selected the words. This involves the assumption, that if words had been inspired into their minds whereby to express the same thoughts in writing, they would have been different words from those which they used, and that there would have been no such diversity of styles and idioms as actually exists. But this would have defeated the object of inspiration, which was to convey infallible truths in words that were understood by the recipient, so that he might correctly conceive, be conscious of, and remember those truths in those words, and record the words for the instruction of others.

That the words actually employed were perfectly adapted to convey the inspired truths, is indubitable;

for the truths which they actually convey are infallible. But those infallible truths could not have been infallibly or perfectly conveyed to the several penmen, in any other than words, styles, phrases, idioms, with which they were familiar, and which by their education, employments, position, associations, temperament, genius, taste, physical and mental habits and circumstances, they readily and correctly understood. To accomplish the purpose of infinite wisdom, therefore, the Omniscient Revealer inspired those words into the minds of the sacred writers, as the vehicle of the infallible truths which He intended to convey. And, even if it had not been impossible, consistently with the constitution and laws of the human mind, to inspire thoughts into it, without the words as their vehicle which perfectly expressed them, it would be absolutely certain, if the thoughts which are contained in the Holy Scriptures were inspired of God, that the words of Scripture, as originally written, were inspired with the truths: for in no other words, styles, and idioms could the truths conveyed to the respective writers have been understood by them or by their cotemporaries.

And we can not but regard the author's endeavors to explain, how human agency became combined with the Divine agency in inspiration, and in revelation by symbols; how revelations in visions differ from revelations made directly; how the phenomena of ordinary revelations differ from those of prophetic revelations, as contributing nothing towards a right understanding of the nature of that inspiration of the Holy Scriptures which is the ground of their infallibility, gives them

authority as the word of God, and constitutes them the only rule of human faith and life.

V. His reasons for rejecting the so-called 'mechanical' theory of Inspiration.

We proceed to examine the author's reasons for rejecting the doctrine of verbal inspiration. That doctrine he characterizes as the *mechanical theory of inspiration*. We quote his own description of it: "It admits and can admit of no degrees. It puts forward one consistent and intelligible theory, without subdivisions or gradations. According to it, each particular doctrine or fact contained in Scripture, whether in all respects naturally and necessarily unknown to the writers, or which, although it might have been ascertained by them in the ordinary course of things, they were not, in point of fact, acquainted with; or in fine, every thing, whether actually known to them, or which might become so, by means of personal experience or otherwise—each and every such point has not only been committed to writing under the infallible assistance and guidance of God, but is to be ascribed to the special and immediate suggestion, embreathment, and dictation of the Holy Ghost. Nor does this hold true merely with respect to the sense of Scripture, and the facts and sentiments therein recorded, but each and every word, phrase, and expression, as well as the order and arrangement of such words, phrases, and expressions, has been separately supplied, breathed into (as it were) and dictated to the sacred writers, by the Spirit of God." (P. 19.)

Again: "According to this system, the Human ele-

ment is entirely lost sight of. On its principles the sacred writers, on receiving the Divine impulse, resigned both mind and body to God, who influenced and guided both at His sole pleasure; the human agent contributing, the while, no more than the pen of the scribe: in a word, he was the *pen*, not the *penman* of the Spirit." (P. 22.) As evidence that those who hold the 'mechanical' theory, teach this, he quotes, from Hooker, the following exposition of 1 Cor. 2: 13. Which things—the things which God had revealed to the Apostles by His Spirit, verse 10—also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth. "This is that which the prophets mean by those books written full within and without; which books were so often delivered them to eat, not because God fed them with ink and paper, but to teach us, that, so often as He employed them in this heavenly work, they neither spake nor wrote any word of their own, but uttered syllable by syllable as the Spirit put it into their mouths." This our author, of course, rejects, and doubtless would reject the more ample exposition of Doctor Hodge: "The words used by the apostle were neither such as the skill of the rhetorician would suggest, nor such as his own mind, uninfluenced by the Spirit of God, suggested. The affirmative statement is, that the words used were taught by the Holy Ghost. This is verbal Inspiration, or the doctrine that the writers of the Scriptures were controlled by the Spirit of God in the choice of the words which they employed in communicating divine truth. This has been stigmatized as the 'mechanical theory of Inspiration'; degrading the sacred penmen

into mere machines. It is objected to this doctrine, that it leaves the diversity of style which marks the different portions of the Bible, unaccounted for. But if God can control the thoughts of a man without making him a machine, why can not He control his language? And why may He not render each writer, whether poetical or prosaic, whether polished or rude, whether aphoristic or logical, infallible in the use of his characteristic style? If the language of the Bible be not inspired, then we have the truth communicated through the discoloring and distorting medium of human imperfection. Paul's direct assertion is that the words which he used, were taught by the Holy Ghost." (Com. on 1 Cor., p. 41.) And, let us add—If the Spirit can communicate truths, facts, doctrines, to the human mind, by inspiration, why can He not communicate them in words—the words which perfectly express them, and in which they are to be reüttered, vocally or in writing? Would the communication of them in words, any more than without words, make the recipients machines? Does the conveyance of thoughts from one man to another, in words, by vocal utterance, make the hearer a machine? Can one man convey his thoughts to another, without infringing his liberty or his consciousness, in a way that the Omniscient, Almighty Spirit, can not convey His thoughts? If the Spirit *spake* audibly on various occasions to prophets and apostles, conveying His thoughts in His words, can He not convey His thoughts in words by inspiration? The conveyance of thoughts in words by vocal utterance, is in the Scriptures themselves treated as the same thing, identical, equivalent, producing the

same effect, as the conveyance of the same or other thoughts by inspiration. All Scripture—that which is written, the words which constitute the Holy Scriptures—was given by inspiration. But a very large proportion of the whole is, word for word, what was vocally and audibly articulated. God at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets. But much of what the prophets officially delivered, they received by inspiration in visions, dreams, and otherwise, when there was no audible utterance. "The Lord God . . . spake by the mouth of His holy prophets which have been since the world began." (Luke 1.) This must include what was spoken audibly to the outward ear, and what was spoken, conveyed, realized to the consciousness, internally by inspiration; the words being included in both methods. The Spirit spake by David. His word was on his tongue. This can not refer to what the Spirit audibly articulated, to the exclusion of what He conveyed by inspiration. "The Holy Ghost spake by Isaiah the prophet unto our fathers, saying, Go unto this people, and say, Hearing," etc. (Acts 28.) Isaiah says: "I heard the *voice* of the Lord saying . . . Go and tell this people," etc. (Isaiah 6.) The Jews hardened their hearts, "lest they should hear the law and the *words* which the Lord of hosts hath sent in His Spirit by the former prophets," (Zech. 7:) which implies that the communications made to the prophets, whether by audible utterances, or by inspiration, were made in words.

The author's objections to the 'mechanical' theory of *Inspiration* are:

1. That it ascribes too little to the *Human* element of the Bible. He says that it "practically ignores the Human element of the Bible, and fixes its exclusive attention upon the Divine agency in *its composition*." (P. 18.) The confusion in his use of terms vitiates this assertion, and renders it inapplicable to the 'mechanical' theory, which does not relate to the *composition* of the Bible, but to the inspiration, inbreathing, transference, into the minds of the writers, of the thoughts and words of God, which they inscribed on paper. In literature, a composition is a writing. To compose a book is to write it. The thoughts and words are the same before as after they are written. They may be perfectly uttered vocally. They may remain unuttered, and yet be intellectually conceived as clearly and perfectly as after they have been spoken or written. Does the author mean then to say, that the 'mechanical' theory ascribes the act of writing to the Divine agency? Is that theory of inspiration a theory of writing? If so, how does it ignore the *Human element* upon which, in his phrase, it fixes its exclusive attention?

If, instead of thus confounding inspiration and composition, he had said in plain terms: The 'mechanical' theory of Inspiration ascribes the thoughts and words of Scripture exclusively to the Divine acts, and denies that human agency had any thing to do in the selection or inspiration either of the thoughts or words contained in the Bible; and, therefore, since it denies the Human element in such selection, and fixes its exclusive attention on the Divine agency, I object to it as not to be relied on in a defense of 'the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture,' he would have made him-

self understood consistently with his own theory. But then he should have explained himself, when, as expressions of his cherished *practical* sentiments and feelings, he penned such sentences as the following: "The narrative portion of the Bible, whether contained in the historical books of the Old Testament, or in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles, is to be looked upon as stamped with the same infallible truth as the account of Christ's discourses, or of what are, strictly speaking, revelations, or of doctrinal teaching in general;—this principle is fully borne out by many characteristics of the inspired record. *That even the form and language* in which its truths are expressed, [as the rejected 'mechanical' theory affirms,] bear the impress of its Divine origin, no less plainly than those truths themselves, may be inferred, with absolute certainty, from the nature of the reasoning employed by our Lord and His apostles, in which it is invariably assumed that *the words* of Scripture are no less Divine than the doctrines which they convey." (P. 366.) "Holy Scripture presents the prophets to our view as human *instruments* through whom the Spirit of God speaks, and by whose lips He announces the Divine oracles." (P. 199.)

2. He objects that the 'mechanical' theory can not stand the test of modern criticism. "So long, indeed," he observes, "as the 'mechanical' theory of inspiration was generally maintained, there was no want of distinctness or consistency in the views put forward. So long as it was believed that each word and phrase to be found in the Bible—nay, even the order and grammatical connection of such words and phrases—had been infused by the Holy Ghost into the minds of the

sacred writers, or dictated to them by His immediate suggestion, so long must the opinion held respecting Inspiration have been clear, intelligible, and accurately defined. But such a theory could not stand the test of close examination. The strongest evidence against it has been supplied by the Bible itself, and each additional discovery in the criticism of the Greek or Hebrew text confirms anew the conclusion that the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture can no longer rely upon such a principle for its defense." (Pref. p. 3.)

It is clear that he understood the 'mechanical' theory as teaching that the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture rests, absolutely and exclusively, on the fact, that all the words and phrases of the original texts, in the order and grammatical connection in which they were written, were infused into the minds of the sacred writers, or immediately dictated to them, by the Holy Spirit; and he admits that those who held that theory were consistent, and that their views of inspiration were clear, intelligible, and accurately defined. But, though he professes to believe that the texts after they were actually written—the words and phrases in the order and grammatical connection in which they were written—are the infallible word of God, he rejects the doctrine as above stated, because a certain class of critics deny it. But who are those critics? Are they believers in the infallibility of Scripture in any sense or on any theory? Are they believers in any supernatural and infallible inspiration whatever? Not one of them. They criticise the text—the words. the phrases—of Scripture, not as having been given by supernatural inspiration of God, not as being the words

of God in any sense, but as being the fallible, inadequate, uncertain words of man, employed to express his imperfect conceptions, just as they regard and criticise the writings of Herodotus and Homer.

Unfortunately, the author conceded what these critics denied, and feeling called on to show how words fallible as selected and used by man, can, when he selects and uses them as an element of Holy Scripture, become the infallible words of God—how the sacred writings can consist of two distinct elements, a Divine and a Human element, and yet consist only of the infallible words of God, he adopts the theory that the Divine and human agency were combined in the selection and collocation of the words, and assumes that the combined act made that which was human infallible and Divine, though by his theory it continues still to be a distinct human element of the Bible! He denies that the words of Scripture are the words of God, because they were selected exclusively by the Spirit, and inspired into the minds of the sacred writers, and believes that they were selected by man, and actually constitute a human element of the text; yet he believes that being written, they are the words of God. Because the words and phrases, and their order and grammatical connection, are, as written by the sacred penmen, precisely what he imagines they would have been had there been no inspiration in the case, he concludes that the penmen selected them, and therefore that they constitute a distinct human element of the Bible. Each one of the penmen selected just such peculiar, literal, figurative, polished, rude, common, or extraordinary words, phrases, idioms, collocations, as any man of his charac-

ter, temperament, habits, social position, etc., would naturally have selected, and therefore—such is the assumption—they could not have been inspired into his mind with the same peculiarities, by the Holy Spirit; and yet to render them, diversified as they are, infallible, as perfectly expressing infallible truth, it was necessary that the Spirit should guide them in the selection, and infallibly guide them, to choose those very words with all their individualizing peculiarities, and to reject all others. This is the point to which the author's theory and his reasonings come. Infallible truths were to be expressed. No other than certain words, in a certain order, and in certain grammatical connections, would perfectly express those truths. How were those precise words in the necessary order and connection supplied? Not, says the author, by being infused, inbreathed, *inspired*, into the minds of the writers with the truths, by the Holy Spirit, nor by being *dictated* to them audibly or otherwise, as the words necessary to be written to express the truths; but by the fallible human agents being infallibly guided to select just the words and collocations which were necessary.

We feel safe in saying, that the author has not exhibited in his volume a particle of evidence that any such guidance of the sacred writers, any such "actuating energy," on their faculties, took place in any instance or degree. It is but an inference from his theory, an assumption rendered necessary by his theory of Inspiration; or rather it is the essence of his theory of inspiration, as expressed in his formal definition. And if "the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy

Scripture," depends upon this as the alternative of the 'mechanical' theory, it is involved, to say the least, in far more embarrassment and difficulty, than has been imagined heretofore.

If the supposed guidance rendered the selection, and the words selected, infallible, then it was the same thing as a selection and inspiration of them by the Spirit, and they were His words; if it did not render them infallible, and they were still man's words, a human element "incorporated as an integral part of the Bible," then the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture, rests on man's responsibility in the selection and use of words. Nothing short of infallible guidance can arrest this conclusion. But *infallible* guidance implies either a mechanical direction of man's faculties, or such a restraining and controlling influence on them, as to suspend his free agency, or else it implies simply a conveyance by inspiration to the minds of the writers, of the words, as God's words, with the truths which He required to be expressed in writing.

If the truths which are recorded in Scripture were selected, prescribed, and determined by the Omniscient Being, then they were, in distinction from, and to the exclusion of, other matter, conveyed to the minds, realized to the intelligent consciousness of the holy men who were officially employed to record them, in such a way that they could intellectually conceive them. They could not possibly know any thing of them unless they were so conveyed and received, that they had a clear intellectual conception of them. But no man has any intellectual conception of truths except in words. If, then, the sacred writers, in receiving the truths

which they were to record, had the natural and ordinary use of their faculties — as our author, and all others who hold the Bible to be the word of God, maintain—they must as soon as they were conscious of receiving those truths, have been conscious of conceiving them in words. The same Divine act which conveyed the truths to their minds must have conveyed the words, for they could not receive, so as to know or be conscious of, the truths without the words. There is, therefore, just as much ground for a theory which should assume that the sacred writers selected the truths to be recorded, as there is for the theory which assumes that they selected the words, and the great doctrine of the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures, as much with respect to the doctrines and facts recorded as to the words in which they are written, rests on man's responsibility in the selection.

Such further theory, in fact, the author substantially advances, in stating "the arguments by which the 'dynamical' theory of inspiration may be supported. Inspiration, I must again repeat, must be understood as denoting that Divine influence under which *all* the parts of the Bible have been committed to writing—whether they contain an account of ordinary historical facts, or the narrative of supernatural revelations. In the reception and utterance of such revelations, it is admitted by all who allow that any communication has taken place between earth and heaven, that the human agent can be regarded in no other light than as an instrument in the hands of God, by whose intervention His counsels have been made known to man," [which, in fact, is just what the 'mechanical' theory teaches.]

"If in any case, here assuredly, the strict 'mechanical' theory of inspiration (if true) must hold good—a theory according to which each phrase and expression in the Bible has been set down by the sacred penmen at the dictation of the Holy Ghost. But if the facts which we are about to consider warrant our asserting, that even in the *reception* of what are, in the most literal sense, *revelations*, human agency has had its full scope; and that *each prophetic announcement*, as recorded in the pages of Scripture, bears the undoubted stamp of the genius, and mental culture, and circumstances of the prophet who has given it utterance; we are surely justified in concluding that, when matters of history, or drawing inferences from previous revelations, the same scope, at least, was allowed to the individual characteristics of the inspired writers. The general method according to which the Divine scheme has been developed, might, indeed, of itself, justify this conclusion. We are expressly taught by the whole tenor of Scripture, that the course which God has pursued in conveying *His revelations* to man, has been always singularly marked by the employment of *natural means*." (P. 148.) If in this extract, any thing intelligible is signified, it is that the agency of the sacred writers, in the act of receiving original revelations, such as prophecies audibly announced by the voice of God, had full scope in selecting the words in which the announcements were made, or otherwise imparting to them their own individual characteristics. What signifies his formal statement, (p. 27,) that he understands by Revelation a *direct* communication from God to man, of what was not known to the recipient before, when his

theory demands the intervention of human agency to determine the words which the Omniscient Revealer may employ! What, but that he holds a speculative theory, which is totally opposed to his practical belief?

If Jehovah, in announcing predictions previously known only to Him, used His own words to express His own thoughts, then there was no human element either in His thoughts or His expressions, and the 'dynamical' theory is false. If there was a human element in such revelations, in the thoughts expressed, or in the words selected and employed, then it must have been imparted by human agency prior to the announcement by the audible voice of God; the prophets must have selected the words prior to their being uttered, and must have selected their own words to express thoughts, predictions, then wholly unknown to them, and must therefore have selected the thoughts, facts, events, to be expressed, announced, revealed, in their words; and must themselves have been the prime authors and revealers of the prophecies. Instead of being the instruments in the hands of God, through which He conveyed His thoughts in His words to the world, they were in reality the principals.

That the author, under the spell of this 'dynamical' theory, intended to affirm in relation to original revelations, all that he meant by 'the Human element' as an integral part of Holy Scripture—'the combination of Divine and Human agency,' 'inspiration,' the reason of the diversified styles, idioms, etc., is manifest from what follows. For the most part, however, he uses terms in such inconsistent senses, as his speculative, or his practical, theory predominates, that it is difficult,

within reasonable limits, to exhibit distinctly, either class of his opinions. At page 167, he says: "We must ever keep in mind, that the internal suggestion which prompts his utterance, neither proceeds from, nor is produced by, the prophet's natural powers, or personal condition; it is a *new* principle which is infused into his soul, with an energy transcending all that is human. This fact is completely established by the uniformity with which the prophets themselves point out one characteristic of *every species* of Divine Revelation. They *invariably* represent their knowledge as proceeding from an *immediate intuition*. Such is the obvious sense of the constant expressions, 'seer,' 'vision.' *All revelations* were 'seen,' or 'gazed upon,' and were therefore apprehended by the inward intelligence instantaneously, and in a manner analogous to the reception of impressions by the outward senses." This is a fair specimen of his philosophical and critical accuracy in the use of language. *All revelations* were seen, apprehended, by the inward intelligence, by immediate instantaneous *intuition*, and the prophets were prompted to utter them by a *new principle* which was *infused* into their souls. No revelations then were originally made to the patriarchs, Moses, the children of Israel, or the prophets, in words. The articulate audible voice of God, speaking to them, added nothing to the knowledge which they previously had by immediate intuition. Had all that they knew of the things revealed been expressed and conveyed in the audible words of God, then the task of selecting the words, and introducing the 'Human element,' by combining their agency with His, would have been uncalled for, and

the diversities of style in the infallible text could not abide the test of rationalistic criticism. What that *new* suggestive principle was, that was *infused* into their souls, and prompted them to utter, orally or in writing, the knowledge which they had by immediate intuition, we know not, unless it was what Mr. Morell defines as "that act of Divine power by which God presents the realities of the spiritual world immediately to the human mind." (*Philosophy of Religion*, p. 150.) If that was it, then, having plenary knowledge, the prophets would know by immediate intuition, what was, from time to time, to be revealed by audible utterance in words, and could supply the human element by selecting the words beforehand. Why they should on this supposition have prescribed such different styles and idioms, must remain a mystery.

It is a gross misrepresentation to say that the sense of the terms 'seer' and 'vision,' as used in Scripture is the same as 'immediate intuition.' There are but two Hebrew words, which as verbs are rendered in our version, by our verb *to see*. That verb in its different forms is used to express all kinds of sensations and intellectual perceptions. Often it imports the same as the verbs to hear, to know, to understand. Thus the children of Israel "*saw* the thunderings . . . and the noise of the trumpet." (Exod. 20.) The prophets *saw* visions: that is, they heard words, or had intellectual conceptions and consciousness of thoughts inspired into their minds in words, which they immediately proceeded to write. Thus: "The vision of Isaiah which he *saw*—Hear, O heavens!" etc. "The *vision* of Obadiah—Thus saith the Lord." "The *burden*

which Habakuk the prophet did *see*." "The words of Amos which he *saw* concerning Israel." They *saw* nothing of the nature of revelations by immediate intuition. The knowledge conveyed to their minds in visions, dreams, trances, was conveyed in the words which they spoke and wrote.

One of the Hebrew words referred to is, as a noun, and the other as a participle, translated 'seer,' an epithet generally employed as synonymous with 'prophet'—one who *saw* visions, or received revelations in visions—as Samuel, Nathan, David's 'seer,' and others. It first occurs in 1 Samuel 9 : 9, where it is said: "He that is now called a prophet was beforetime called a 'seer.'" There is no application of it that indicates a power of perceiving or knowing prophetic or other revelations by immediate intuition.

It would be useless to pursue this class of objections any further. The critics who originate them, assume that if the Scriptures had been inspired of God and contained His thoughts in His words, they would not have consisted of the ordinary words and peculiar styles, phrases, idioms, etc., which constitute and are actually written in our Bible. But if they had been inspired and written in any other than the language of common life, and the peculiar styles and idioms of the respective writers, then neither the sacred penmen themselves, nor their contemporaries, nor the common people of later generations, and of different nations, could have understood them; they would not have been adapted to their object in any respect. And then the critics who believe in no supernatural revelations or inspirations of any kind, would have objected

that they were above the intelligence of mankind, obscure, unintelligible, not adapted to their professed object, and therefore could not have been communicated from an infinitely wise and good Being.

Moreover, if any of those who believe in the Divine authority of the Bible, or that it contains revelations from God, regard the styles and idioms in which it is written, as an objection to the doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration, they must, to be consistent, regard those characteristics as objections of no less weight to the theory of an infallible Divine guidance of the writers in the choice and arrangement of their own words. A theory of the mode of such supposed guidance by a combination of Divine and human agencies, will not deter the criticism of any school of antagonist philosophers. The fact that those styles characterize the writings, remains and is undeniable; and if, nevertheless, the Bible is the infallible word of God, that fact is at least as consistent with the doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration, as with any theory of infallible Divine guidance.

3d. To that particular expression of the 'mechanical' theory which asserts 'that the Holy Spirit merely accommodated Himself to the different peculiarities of the sacred writers—that He inspired His amanuenses with those expressions which they would have employed had they been left to themselves,' (p. 23,) he objects no less decidedly than to the theory itself as exhibited in his own statement of it. Of this explanatory view, which signifies that He inspired the writers with those words which they would naturally have employed to express precisely the same thoughts

in the same connections, had they previously possessed the thoughts, he says: "It is, perhaps, unnecessary to remark, that this wholly hypothetical statement assumes an exercise of the Divine agency for which *no motive can be assigned, or end pointed out.*" (P. 23.) But why should there not be the same motive and end for this exercise of the Divine agency, as for the exercise of that agency in the infallible guidance of the writers in their selection of the very same words? His whole difficulty, the *problem* which he is so anxious, and which it is the aim of his copious volume to solve, is, how to account for the fact that the Holy Scriptures are written in the peculiar styles and idioms of the writers. 'The maintainers of the "mechanical" theory, he says, either offer no explanation of this, or are reduced to the necessity of putting forward the explanation given above,' which he brands as hypothetically assuming an exercise of Divine agency without motive or end, and as closely resembling a doctrine of the Docetæ of old. This is no answer; and we must regard it as his foregone conclusion, necessitated by his theory, that the words in which the Divine thoughts are expressed were selected by the human agents; that there could be no sense in supposing them to be inspired into the minds of the writers after they had selected them, and therefore no motive to such an exercise of the Divine agency, nor any end to be answered by it; but being man's words, selected by man, and therefore fallible and uncertain, there needed a combination of the Divine agency with his, to make them the words of God and infallible! This, when his theory was uppermost in his view, appeared to him to solve the problem.

Whereas, if the words, instead of being selected by the amanuenses, were inspired into their minds as the adjunct and necessary vehicle of the previously unknown truths to be expressed in writing, then, contrary to his assumptions, there was no problem in the case, no two distinct elements, no combination of Divine and human agency, no lack of infallibility to be supplied, and no occasion for a volume on the 'Dynamical' theory.

VI. His distinction between Revelation and Inspiration.

The author deems the distinction which he makes between revelation and inspiration to be essential to his view of the dynamical theory, inasmuch as, pursuant to that distinction, he ascribes all revelations to the Logos—the official Mediatorial Person; and inspiration to the Holy Spirit. "Revelation and inspiration," he says, "are to be distinguished by the sources from which they proceed—revelation being the peculiar function of the Eternal Word; inspiration the result of the agency of the Holy Spirit. Their difference, in short, is specific, and not merely one of degree: a point which is amply confirmed by the consideration, that either of these Divine influences may be exerted, although the other be not called into action." (P. 29.) Again: "While inspiration (as the signification of the term denotes) is the peculiar function of the Holy Ghost —so, in like manner, to reveal is the office appropriated to the Eternal Word." (P. 115.) In connection with these passages he further expressly refers all direct revelations from God to man, whether conveyed in words or in acts, to the Logos, or Mediatorial Person,

to whom he also ascribes the works of creation and providence. This naturally leads him to refer to the manifestations and agency of that Person in the progress of the ancient dispensations under the appellation, which in our Bible is rendered *Angel*—the *angel* of Jehovah. That term, however, when employed to designate that Person, is not employed as a proper name, but only as a name of office, and would, in every instance, be most properly rendered *Messenger*—the Divine Person delegated, sent, by the Father; as in Malachi 3 : 1—"The Messenger of the Covenant." It is accordingly, in numerous instances, employed interchangeably with Jehovah, and other Divine names and designations, as in the portion of Malachi just referred to—"The Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the *messenger* of the covenant, whom ye delight in." To that Divine Person in his delegated character, "who appeared to Moses in the bush," and "was with him in the church in the wilderness, and spake to him in the Mount Sinai, and with our fathers, who received the lively oracles to give unto us," (Acts 7 : 35, 37,) and who in the New Testament is called the Logos—the Word—and the Apostle, that is, the Messenger, and High Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus, our author ascribes all Divine revelations and all miraculous operations, both under the old and new dispensations. But not finding all the express revelations in either Testament directly referred to his Personal agency, he supposes that those which are not so referred, or rather that all made after a certain period, were made by him through an intermediate agency, indissolubly connected with "the Eternal

Word," by which "the Heavens were supplied, and the constellations were commissioned." (P. 127.) "The agency was introduced," he adds, "in language, personally, as the Spirit of God;"—and he proposes to be so understood by such phrases as—"The Spirit of God came upon Balaam and God put a word in Balaam's mouth;"—"The Spirit of the Lord fell upon Ezekiel;"—"The Spirit lifted him up and brought him into the east gate of the Lord's house;"—"The hand of the Lord was on Elijah—the hand of the Lord fell upon Ezekiel—the hand of the Lord was with John the Baptist—the word of the Lord came expressly unto Jonah—the word of the Lord came to such or such a prophet." (See also Gesenius' *Lexicon to the Book of Isaiah*, sec. xxi. p. 378.) He supposes that these, and the like phrases, point "to some Divine agency which always accompanies, or proceeds from the Eternal Word;—an operation which is peculiar, but not the Divine Logos Himself. It is only in the language of St. John that the idea of the Personality of the Word is presented. In the Old Testament, while the conception already named, [Wisdom] appears to set relief through the medium of the operative power, then after the manner of a Person; and then in the passage, [Thought, Will are understood] that the worlds were framed by the word of God, and the Personal word, [Logos,] but this Divine operative energy (Divine Power) is represented as the immediate source of all created things. In conformity with this view, St. Peter tells us that it was the Spirit of Christ, which spoke in the prophets." (P. 128.)

He forcibly contends that all this is quite better

than confusion, and that a theory of Inspiration which requires such solecisms, such inconsistencies, and such looseness of explanation and reference, can afford little satisfaction to any class of readers. He ascribes to the Personal Word the original *act* of creation, and "all exhibitions of supernatural power, whether by *word* or by *act:* whether they be in short, revelations, properly so called, or miracles." (P. 118.) He labors to show on the one hand, that this official Person, is Personally and exclusively The Revealer, as He is Personally, and exclusively of the agency of the other Divine Persons—the Creator; and on the other, that *inspiration* peculiarly and exclusively belongs to the office and agency of the Holy Spirit. And yet to account for the fact that in part the Revelations are in the Scripture itself, ascribed directly to the Spirit, he conceives that to be but a subordinate instrumental agency, an "*operative power*"—"a Divine *operative energy.*" To give some color of plausibility to this "condition" of his theory, he assumes that He who in His official mediatorial capacity created the world, appeared visibly to and conversed with the Patriarchs and Moses, and was by his office the immediate author of Divine Revelations, withdrew as to his personal presence and direct agency, and ceased to act immediately as Revealer, and substituted in place of His own personal presence and agency, certain instrumentalities, described, *generically,* as *the Spirit of God.* Thus he writes, (P. 125,) "Let us look to the circumstances under which the immediate intervention of the uncreated angel, [that is, Jehovah, officially designated as the messenger] was withdrawn. As, in after times, the

Jewish people, 'denied the Holy One and the Just,' so in the days of Moses they rebelled against their Divine Guide, [namely, Jehovah, the Messenger:] they despised the stern warning of Jehovah, [the Messenger,] and worshipped the calf in Horeb. On that occasion the solemn promise, that the uncreated angel, [Jehovah as the messenger] should continue to precede the armies of Israel, was as solemnly revoked, and a created angel assigned as their leader. 'I will send *an angel* before thee,' said the Lord, [that is, Jehovah in His official capacity as the Messenger, said,] 'for I will not go up in the midst of thee, for thou art a stiff-necked people, lest I consume thee in the way,' " [that is, I, Jehovah, who in my delegated official capacity as The Messenger, appeared visibly to Abraham, to Jacob, to Moses, to the seventy elders on Mount Sinai, who conducted the children of Israel out of Egypt, and, enveloped in the pillar of cloud and fire, am the leader of Israel, will not henceforth go up in the midst of thee, lest I consume thee in the way.] "Here, then, as in the age of the Incarnation, the Personal Presence of the Eternal Son is withdrawn, [that is, He threatens personally to withdraw;]—and here, too, although in a veiled and mysterious manner, that Presence was supplied." [It was supplied by his continuing in fact to be personally present.] "God promises the people that they should not be forsaken. My presence [that is, my visible presence, I myself, personally] shall go with thee, and I will give thee rest. Henceforward, as in the Gospel times, God's dispensation was no longer administered by the Personal Presence of the Eternal Son; but in both cases certain

glimpses of His appearance were, from time to time, vouchsafed." After observing as illustrations of this, that Daniel saw "one like the Son of Man"—that Stephen saw "the Son of Man," and that John saw Him who is called "The Word of God," he proceeds: "*At all events, we know that subsequently to the age of Moses, the immediate communications of Jehovah, as a general rule, ceased, and that certain means were made use of for conveying His Revelations.*" (P. 125–127.)

It would, perhaps, be difficult to find in any of the myths of German speculation, any thing more inconsistent and absurd than these passages. It would be tedious and useless to dwell upon them to any considerable extent. What could be more preposterous than to attempt to uphold a theory in this manner? The author, in express terms, ascribes all Revelations to the immediate agency of God the Son in that delegated character and office in which he is called by the Divine Names, and by the official designations above referred to—the angel, the Logos, the Christ—and in which he created the world, appeared in Person and spoke to patriarchs and prophets, administered the primeval and theocratic dispensations, and at length took man's nature into union with His Person. On the other hand he expressly excludes Revelations from the office and agency of the Holy Spirit, and ascribes to Him only that influence or that exercise of His power by which He inspired the sacred writers so as to enable them to record what was revealed. But to sustain his hypothesis, it was necessary to account for those Revelations which were not made by the *immediate* agency of the Son, owing, as he conceives, to His

Personal absence both under the Old, and, after His ascension, under the New Testament; and to account for them, he conceives that they were made by Him when Personally absent, through "an intermediate agency indissolubly connected with the Eternal Word;" "some Divine Agency which always accompanies or proceeds from Him"—"His mediating Angel"—an agency which "is described, generically, as the Spirit of God"—an agency which excluded the idea of the *Personality* of the Son—an operative power, through which under the Old Testament, Christ acted, but not after the manner of a Person, and by which finally the Spirit of Christ spake in the prophets.

The reader must imagine for himself what that impersonal, intermediate agency and operative power, was, to which the revelation of the oracles of God is thus ascribed. But did the Uncreated Angel—Jehovah, the Messenger, the God of Israel, personally withdraw from His station as leader of the armies of Israel, on the occasion specified by our author, and thenceforward cease to act immediately towards them as Revealer or otherwise? This the Scriptures, not the theory and language of our author, must determine. And that He did not then withdraw, as to his Personal Presence, manifestations, agencies, revelations, immediate acts as Ruler and Leader, and in all His Personal and official relations, is demonstrated by the terms employed in the narrative, the argument of Moses, and the record of what subsequently took place. Our author overlooks the fact that it was the Uncreated Angel Himself, the Divine Person, designated indifferently, conjointly and interchangeably by Divine names and official appellations, and speaking, often,

throughout the Scriptures as well before as when incarnate, in His capacity simply as Divine, to and of Himself in His capacity as a delegated and official Person; the Divine Person who conducted the children of Israel out of Egypt, gave the Law at Sinai, and wrote it on tablets of stone, who, on the occasion referred to, indicated, for a reason which He assigned, namely, the obstinacy of the people, His purpose to withdraw from the station which He had hitherto occupied as their Leader, and to send a created Angel to guide them. It was directly to that Person that Moses addressed his prayer and his argument, that His Personal presence, in distinction from that of any created leader, might be continued with them; and who complied with his entreaties, forgave, on their repentance, and passed by the rebellion, and entered into a new covenant with the people, and assured them of a continuance of His own Personal Presence. The occasion was such as would have justified an abandonment, and even an instant destruction of the whole congregation. But Moses interceded—the people humbled themselves, the threatened punishment was averted. "The Lord said unto Moses, Depart and go up hence—I will send an angel before thee—I will not go up in the midst of thee; for thou art a stiff-necked people: lest I consume thee in the way. And when the people heard these evil tidings they mourned"—they sought the Lord—went to the Tabernacle—the cloudy pillar descended [from the top of Horeb] and stood at the door of the Tabernacle—Moses had confessed the great sin of the people and implored the forgiveness of it—he renews his prayer, deprecates the threatened substitution of a created leader—and he is answered: "My Presence,"

my own personal presence, as heretofore, I, myself, "shall go with thee, and I will give thee rest." The Divine Speaker was then personally present. He had theretofore been constantly present, and gone with and before them. It was the continuance of this personal presence that Moses desired; He deemed that essential—without it he desired not to go forward—and he earnestly argues to this point. "For wherein shall it be known here that I and thy people have found grace in thy sight? Is it not in that *Thou goest with us?* So shall we be separated, I and Thy people, from all the people that are upon the face of the earth? *And the Lord said unto Moses, I will do this thing also that thou hast spoken.*" (Exod. 33. Also, Deut. 9 : 25–29.) As much as to say, How shall we know and be assured, that thou hast pardoned the late rebellion, that we have found grace in thy sight, and that thou wilt continue us a separate people pursuant to the former covenants and promises, if thou, the author of those covenants and promises, confirmed by oaths, miracles, and wonderful providences, withdrawest from us, and sendest a fallible and powerless creature to be our leader and guide? Accordingly, Moses, for further assurance that the point was gained, and the former relations, intercourse, and guidance were to be continued, besought the Divine Leader to show him His glory. This was complied with by a visible manifestation of His glorious Person. "The Lord said unto Moses, Hew thee two tables of stone like unto the first; and I will write upon these tables the words that were in the first tables which thou brakest. And be ready in the morning, and come up in the morning unto Mount

Sinai, and present thyself there to me in the top of the Mount. . . . And he hewed two tables of stone . . . and went up unto Mount Sinai. . . . And the Lord descended in the cloud and *stood with him there*, and proclaimed the name of the Lord, and the Lord passed by before him . . . and Moses made haste, and bowed his head toward the earth, and worshipped. And," reässured as he now was, "he said, If now I have found grace in thy sight, O Lord, let my Lord I pray thee go among us (for it is a stiff-necked people) and pardon our iniquity and our sin, and take us for thine inheritance. And he said, Behold I make a covenant." (Exod. 34.) Then follow the stipulations of the covenant. "And the Lord said unto Moses, *Write thou these words;* for after the tenor of these words I have made a covenant with thee and with Israel. And he was there with the Lord, forty days and forty nights." After he had descended, the children of Israel came nigh; "and he gave them in commandment all that the Lord had spoken with him in Mount Sinai. And till Moses had done speaking with them, he put a veil on his face. But when Moses went in *before the Lord to speak with Him*, he took off the vail." (Exod. 34.)

An altered state of feeling, a reformation, in the minds of the people seems to have followed these events. The next chapters contain the commandments received by Moses from the Lord at the late personal interviews, concerning the materials, and a narrative of the construction and setting up of the Tabernacle: which being accomplished, "A cloud covered the tent of the congregation, and the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle . . . and when the cloud was taken

up from over the tabernacle, the children of Israel went onward in all their journeys. But if the cloud were not taken up, then they journeyed not till the day that it was taken up. For the cloud of the Lord was upon the tabernacle by day, and fire by night, in the sight of all the house of Israel throughout all their journeys." (Exod. 40.) Thus the same tokens and demonstrations of His Personal Presence and intercourse, which had been given previously to the alleged withdrawment, were continued and fully realized subsequently. The Books of Leviticus and Numbers, consist almost wholly of words spoken by Him to Moses, after that date. "At the commandment of the Lord they rested in the tents, and at the commandment of the Lord they journeyed: they kept the charge of the Lord at the commandment of the Lord, by the hand of Moses." (Numb. 9.)

The 14th chapter of Numbers narrates another rebellion occasioned by the evil report of those sent to inspect the promised land; and another prevalent argument and prayer of Moses for their pardon. "And the Lord said, I have pardoned according to thy word: but as truly as I live, all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord. Because all these men which have seen my glory, and my miracles which I did in Egypt and in the wilderness, have tempted me now these ten times, and have not hearkened to my voice, surely they shall not see the land which I sware unto their fathers." This shows conclusively that He who now spoke, was the same Person who spoke and wrought miracles in Egypt and at Sinai; and the New Testament expressly informs us that it was the Mediatorial Person, the

Christ, whom the Israelites "tempted" in the wilderness, (1 Cor. 10, and Heb. 3.) where "the Apostle [Messenger] and High Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus, who was faithful to Him that appointed Him," is shown to be superior to Moses; "wherefore," it is argued, "as the Holy Ghost saith, To-day if ye will hear His voice, harden not your hearts as in the provocation in the day of temptation in the wilderness; when your fathers tempted Me, and proved Me, and saw My works forty years. Wherefore I was grieved with that generation . . . so I sware in My wrath, They shall not enter into My rest."

The entire narrative to the close of the life of Moses, is one consistent testimony to the continued Personal Presence and immediate agency of that Divine Person. By a constant miracle He supplied their physical wants. By His power He destroyed their enemies. By His voice He instructed them, prescribed their worship, and directed their journeys. He appeared visibly to Balaam, and was seen by him with a drawn sword in His hand. He spoke to the disobedient prophet, who heard His voice and answered. While visible, He is designated as the messenger—when not visible, as Jehovah and as God. Under these several designations, Balaam recognized the same Person, and spoke to, and was answered by, Him as such. The Messenger Jehovah said to him: "Go with the men, but only the word that I shall speak unto thee, that thou shalt speak. . . . And God met Balaam. . . . And the Lord put a word in Balaam's mouth, and said, Return unto Balak, and thus shalt thou speak. . . . He heard the words of God, and said, I shall see Him, [the Messiah incarnate,] . . .

there shall come a star out of Jacob. . . . Out of Jacob shall come He that shalt have dominion." (Numb. 24.) Shortly preceding the death of Moses, and the passage of the Israelites over Jordan, He said to them: "The Lord thy God, He will go over before thee . . . and Joshua, he shall go over before thee, as the Lord hath said." . . . And to Joshua He said: "The Lord, He it is that doth go before thee; He will be with thee. . . . And the Lord said unto Moses, Behold thy days approach that thou must die; call Joshua and present yourselves in the tabernacle of the congregation, that I may give him a charge. . . . And the Lord *appeared* in the Tabernacle in a pillar of a cloud: and the pillar of the cloud stood over the door of the Tabernacle." (Deut. 31.) He was therefore Personally present in the same manner as at Sinai; and on this occasion He spoke to Moses, the songs, blessings, threatenings, and predictions which he afterwards recorded.

Thus far then, from the date of the rebellion at Sinai, "God's dispensation" was, and continued to be, "administered by the Personal Presence of the Eternal Son." "But," says Professor Lee, "at all events we know that subsequently to the age of Moses, the immediate communications of Jehovah, as a general rule, ceased, and that certain means were made use of for conveying his revelations." We propose, therefore, to show that the dispensation was further administered by the same Personal Presence, down to the destruction of the first temple; and that the communications of Jehovah—His revelations, His vocal utterances, His reponses in the tabernacle and temple, His occasional visible appearances, and His miraculous acts, were as

immediate and direct as those which preceded, or those which are recorded in the New Testament.

1. There was no cessation of His Personal Presence, His miraculous agency, and His verbal directions and revelations during the ministry of Joshua. "After the death of Moses the Lord *spake unto Joshua*," commanding him to go over Jordan with the people, and giving him various directions and promises of success. (Josh. 1.) When about to cross the Jordan, "Joshua said unto the children of Israel, Come hither and hear the words of the Lord your God. . . Hereby ye shall know that the living God *is among you.* . . Behold the ark of the covenant of the Lord of all the earth passeth over before you into Jordan." (Chap. 3.) In the next and ensuing chapters, the acts and proceedings of Joshua are performed in obedience to the express verbal directions of Jehovah. A commemorative monument of His immediate agency in opening a passage across the bed of the river, was erected to signify to the children of that generation that "the Lord your God dried up—cut off the waters of Jordan from before you, until ye were passed over, as the Lord your God [the messenger in the cloudy pillar] did to the Red Sea, which he dried up from before us, until we were gone over." After the passage, and prior to the conquest of Jericho, He *appeared to Joshua*, as on several occasions to others, as a man with a drawn sword in his hand. "And the Lord," he who thus appeared, "said to Joshua, See, I have given into thine hand Jericho." (Chap. 6.) Then follow particular directions for compassing the city with the ark of the Lord. When repulsed at Ai, Joshua fell on his face before the ark of the Lord, and wor-

shipped Him as personally present there, saying: "Alas! O Lord God!" Achan was discovered by His direct interposition. (Chap. 7.) When the five kings of the Amorites combined against Israel, "The Lord said unto Joshua: Fear them not, for I have delivered them into thine hand; the Lord discomfited them before Israel, and cast down great stones from heaven upon them; they were more which died of the hail-stones, than they whom the children of Israel slew with the sword. Then spake Joshua to the Lord, in the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel, and he said in the sight of all Israel, Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou moon in the valley of Ajalon. So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day, and there was no day like that before it or after it." (Chap. 10.) This was one of the most signal, direct, and immediate interpositions of Jehovah's power which is recorded in the Bible. The occasion was adequate. The question at issue was, whether or not the God of Israel was superior, absolutely and infinitely, to Baal, the god of the Amorites, whose tabernacle the sun was held to be, while the moon was that of Ashtaroth, the pagan queen of heaven.

At the close of his career, Joshua assembled the tribes and rehearsed to them as vocally expressed to him by "the Lord God of Israel," an outline of His dealings with them, from the call of Abraham to that time, showing that pursuant to His covenants and promises He had guided them, defended them, and given them possession of the promised land. And Joshua made a covenant with the people, and the people said:

"The Lord our God will we serve, and His voice will we obey." (Chap. 24.)

2. That He continued to administer the dispensation by His Personal Presence, and agency, and his verbal directions and revelations, during the period of the Judges and Samuel, three hundred and thirty years, is no less evident. On occasions of emergency the people asked and received from Him express verbal directions. Visible appearances of the Messenger Jehovah, and many extraordinary interpositions of His power, were also vouchsafed to them. . . Thus, immediately after the death of Joshua, "the children of Israel asked the Lord, saying, Who shall go up for us against the Canaanites, first to fight against them? And *the Lord said*, Judah shall go up: behold, I have delivered the land into his hand. . . And Judah went up, and the Lord delivered the Canaanites and the Perizzites into their hand. . . And the Lord was with Judah. . . And the house of Joseph went up against Bethel: and the Lord was with them." (Judges 1.)

From the conquest of Jericho to the close of Joshua's life, his camp was at Gilgal, where the tabernacle and the ark of the Lord were stationed, and continued during a much longer period. It was at that place that Jehovah the Messenger appeared to Joshua in the likeness of a man; and from His dwelling-place in the tabernacle there, He appeared visibly at other places from time to time. Accordingly we read, (Judges 2:) "And the Messenger Jehovah came up from Gilgal to Bochim, and said: *I made you to go up out of Egypt*, and have brought you unto the land which *I sware unto your fathers;* and *I said*, I will never break my cove-

nant with you. And ye shall make no league with the inhabitants of this land; ye shall throw down their altars: but ye have not obeyed my voice; why have ye done this? Wherefore, *I also said*, I will not drive them out from before you." The terms of this announcement identify the Messenger, who made it directly in person, with Jehovah the God of Israel and administrator of the dispensation. The narrative immediately ensuing, refers to the apostasies and rebellions of the people. "They forsook the Lord God of their fathers, which brought them out of the land of Egypt, . . and served Baal and Ashtaroth, and the Lord delivered them into the hands of spoilers, that spoiled them, and sold them into the hands of their enemies round about, so that they could not any longer stand before their enemies. Whithersoever they went out, the hand of the Lord was against them for evil, as the Lord had said, and as the Lord had sworn unto them; and they were greatly distressed. Nevertheless, the Lord raised up Judges, which delivered them out of the hand of those that spoiled them. And yet they would not hearken unto their Judges. . . . and when the Lord raised them up Judges, then the Lord was with the Judge, and delivered them."

In the war against Sisera, the Lord God of Israel commanded what should be done, and promised to deliver him into the hand of Barak. (Chap. 4 : 6, 7.) "And Deborah said unto Barak, Up, for this is the day in which the Lord hath delivered Sisera into thine hand: is not the Lord gone out before thee? And the Lord discomfited Sisera." (V. 14, 15.) That He was personally present, is shown by a passage in Deborah's

song. The inhabitants of Meroz had refused to coöperate with Barak. The Messenger Jehovah said: "Curse ye Meroz, curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof because they came not to the help of Jehovah." (Chap. 5.)

When the children of Israel were oppressed and reduced to extremities by the Midianites, the Messenger Jehovah appeared personally and visibly to Gideon, and said: "Jehovah is with thee. . . Surely I will be with thee." To assure and confirm his dubious mind, He accepted an offering from him, directed the manner of placing it on a rock, put forth the staff that was in His hand, and there rose up fire out of the rock, and consumed the flesh and the unleavened cakes. Gideon saw Him face to face. He performed other miracles—directed Gideon to dispense with all but three hundred of his men, and instructed him how to proceed. "And the three hundred blew the trumpets, and the Lord set every man's sword against his fellow, even throughout all the host" of the Midianites. (Chap. 6, 7.)

The Messenger Jehovah appeared visibly in the likeness of man, to Manoah and his wife, to forewarn them of the birth of Samson, and to give the directions requisite to his being a Nazarite for the special services to be performed by him. Manoah offered a sacrifice upon a rock to the Lord . . . . and the Messenger ascended in the flame of the altar . . . and Manoah said, we shall surely die for we have seen God." (Chap. 13.)

On the occasion of their war upon the tribe of Benjamin, the children of Israel repeatedly asked and obtained immediate and specific directions from Jehovah. This no doubt was by oracular response to the High

Priest from the dwelling-place of the official Person, Jehovah the Messenger, within the vail in the tabernacle; as was common in emergencies, from the institution of the Levitical Priesthood, to the destruction of the first Temple. After twice repairing to the station of the Ark, receiving directions, and being defeated, "Then all the children of Israel, and all the people went up, and came unto the house of God, and wept, and sat there before the Lord, and fasted that day until even, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings before the Lord. And the children of Israel inquired of the Lord, (for the ark of the covenant of God was there in those days, and Phineas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron, stood before it in those days,) saying: Shall I yet go out to battle against the children of Benjamin my brother, or shall I cease? And the Lord said: Go up; for to-morrow I will deliver them into thine hand." (Chap. 20.)

Thus far the personal presence, visible appearances, and immediate agency of the Mediatorial Person, in administering the dispensation, are shown to have been the same as prior to the death of Moses. No *new* agency, *operative power*, or other instrumentality was introduced. Nor was the ministry of Samuel and the later prophets a new or modifying feature of the system. It was no novelty, no new agency or mode of revelation. Moses was preëminent as a prophet. Joshua uttered inspired predictions. Balaam had done the same. Deborah was a prophetess. When subject to the Midianites, "the Lord sent a prophet unto the children of Israel, which said unto them, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I brought you up from Egypt,"

etc. (Judges 6.) This mode of direct verbal revelation to the prophets, and to the people by their repeating and writing the same words, was common to every period of the dispensation. And the evidence of the local personal presence of the Revealer, was the same at every period. His agency was exerted as directly and immediately, as in the miracles of the New Testament. His voice was heard; His Person was seen.

From the history of Samuel, it is apparent, that as a ruler, and as a prophet, he stood in the same relation to Jehovah as Moses had done. He was called in the tabernacle by the audible voice of Him who dwelt between the cherubim, and who then announced, revealed, to him, what was to happen to the house of Eli. (1 Sam. 3.) His narrative of the taking of the ark by the Philistines, demonstrates that both they and the Israelites believed that the Lord of Hosts was present and dwelt with it. The people brought "the ark of the covenant of the Lord of Hosts into the camp from Shiloh, that it might save them out of the hand of their enemies. The Philistines said, God is come into the camp, who smote the Egyptians with all the plagues in the wilderness. Wo unto us!" They placed it in the temple of Dagon. The idol fell down broken and headless before it. They carried it from place to place; but wherever it came miraculous inflictions of disease and death fell upon the people. At length it was miraculously conducted back into the territory of Israel. The men of Beth-Shemesh, the place to which it was conveyed, with irreverent and impious curiosity "looked into the ark of the Lord, and He therefore, even He, smote of the people fifty

thousand and three score and ten men . . . . and the men of Beth-Shemesh said, Who is able to stand before this Holy Lord God?" (Chap. 5, 6.) These events were followed by a great reformation of the Israelites. The Philistines renewed the war. Samuel interceded; and "the Lord thundered with a great thunder upon the Philistines, and discomfited them, and they were smitten." (Chap. 7.)

The subsequent history of Samuel is connected with that of Saul and David, and is fraught with records of immediate revelations from Jehovah, and immediate interpositions of His agency. The people desired a king. "The Lord said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voice of the people. And Samuel told the words of the Lord unto the people. The Lord told Samuel in his ear a day before Saul came—and when Samuel saw Saul, the Lord said unto him, Behold the man whom I spake to thee of. Samuel called the people together unto the Lord at Mizpeh, [where the ark then was,] and said unto the children of Israel, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I brought up Israel out of Egypt," etc. When Saul was publicly selected from his tribe and family by Divine indication, he had concealed himself. "Therefore they inquired of the Lord further, if the man should yet come thither. And the Lord answered."—Answered no doubt by a voice from the oracle. On that occasion Samuel briefly refers to the righteous acts of Jehovah as their Ruler, from the coming of Jacob into Egypt; and to their now, "when the Lord their God was their King," having demanded a human king—that, like other nations, they might have a judge and leader always visible. But he as-

sures them of the continued favor of Jehovah if they feared and served Him, and obeyed His voice, and that His hand should be against them if they rebelled. They had wickedly desired a king, as if thereby to escape His immediate supervision; and to impress them with an overwhelming sense of His continued agency and sovereignty over them, He sent thunder and rain, it being the time of harvest, when such a phenomenon was a miracle. The people were terrified, confessed their wickedness in desiring a king, and begged Samuel to pray for them, that they might not die. "And Samuel said unto the people, Fear not; ye have done all this wickedness, yet turn not aside from following the Lord, but serve the Lord with all your heart; and turn ye not aside, for then should ye go after vain things [idols] which can not profit nor deliver; for they are vain. For the Lord will not forsake His people *for His great name's sake*, because it hath pleased the Lord to make you His people. . . . Only fear the Lord and serve Him in truth with all your heart; for consider how great things He hath done for you. But if ye shall still do wickedly, ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king." (Chap. 7–12.)

3. It thus appears that there was no withdrawment on the part of Jehovah, nor discontinuance of His immediate interpositions and revelations. His theocratic, mediatorial, covenant relations remained unsuspended and intact; and in like manner they continued during the next five hundred years, down to the destruction of the temple and the expulsion of the last king of David's line who sat upon his throne.

In the progress of the history, some two years after Saul's induction into the kingly office, the armies of the Philistines, with thirty thousand chariots, made war upon him and invaded his kingdom. He was unprepared. "The people followed him, trembling." He called for Samuel to offer a burnt offering; but he came not at the time appointed. He sacrilegiously invaded the priest's office, officiated at the offering himself, violated the commandment of Jehovah, and was forewarned by Samuel that his reign should not be established and continued, but that another had been selected to take his place. Nevertheless Jehovah interposed by His own immediate agency, causing an earthquake for the destruction of the Philistines and the deliverance of His people. "There was a trembling in the host, in the field, and among all the people; the garrison and spoilers, they also trembled, and the earth quaked: so it was a very great trembling—the multitudes melted away, and they went on beating down one another—so the Lord saved Israel that day." (Chap. 14.)

Jehovah expressly designated David from among the sons of Jesse to be king. "The Lord said to Samuel, Arise, anoint him, for this is he." When he encountered Goliath, the contest being virtually between Jehovah as Head and leader of His people, and Baal, in whom the Philistines trusted, he said to the champion of idolatry: "Thou comest to me with a sword, and with a spear, and with a shield; but I come to thee in the name of the Lord of Hosts, the God of the armies of Israel, whom thou hast defied. This day shall the Lord deliver thee into mine hand; and I will smite

thee, and take thine head from thee; and I will give the carcasses of the host of the Philistines this day unto the fowls of the air, and to the wild beasts of the earth: *that all the earth may know that there is a God in Israel.* And all this assembly shall know that the Lord saveth not with sword and spear: for *the battle is the Lord's,* and He will give you into our hands." (Chap. 17.)

After the apostasy of Saul, he received no more direct revelations from Jehovah. "The Lord answered him not, neither by dreams, nor by visions, nor by prophets." (Chap. 18.) But David, while in exile, received express verbal directions from time to time. When the Philistines assailed Keilah, "David inquired of the Lord, saying, Shall I go and smite these Philistines? And the Lord said unto David: Go, and smite the Philistines, and save Keilah." His men being afraid, he inquired again. "And the Lord answered him, and said: Go down to Keilah; for I will deliver the Philistines into their hand." The inquiries on these and similar occasions, appear to have been made by David personally, without the intervention of a priest; and the record plainly imports that the answers were verbally and audibly made to him. After he had slain the Philistines and retaken Keilah, the residence of his family, he was informed that Saul was coming to destroy that city and capture him. He directed Abiathar the priest, who had just taken refuge with him, to bring the ephod. "Then said David, O Lord God of Israel, . . . will the men of Keilah deliver me up into Saul's hand? Will Saul come down, as Thy servant hath heard? O Lord God of Israel, I beseech Thee, tell Thy servant. And

the Lord said, He will come down. Then said David, Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the Lord said, They will deliver thee up." (Chap. 23.)

Again, when the Amalekites captured his family, and destroyed Ziklag, "David said to Abiathar the priest, I pray thee bring me hither the ephod. And Abiathar brought thither the ephod to David. And David inquired at the Lord, saying, Shall I pursue after this troop? shall I overtake them? And He answered him, Pursue: for thou shalt surely overtake them, and without fail recover all." (Chap. 30.) After the death of Saul, "David inquired of the Lord, saying, Shall I go up into any of the cities of Judah? And the Lord said unto him, Go up. And David said, Whither shall I go up? And He said, Unto Hebron." (2 Sam. 2.) After he was proclaimed King by all the tribes, "David went on and grew great, and the Lord God of Hosts was with him." The Philistines, hearing of his accession to the throne, prepared to attack him. "And David inquired of the Lord, saying, Shall I go up to the Philistines? Wilt thou deliver them into mine hand? And the Lord said unto David, Go up." At a later period the same enemy marched against him. "And when David inquired of the Lord, He said"—as if to signalize the immediate interposition of His power—"Thou shalt not go up: but fetch a compass behind them, and come upon them over against the mulberry trees. And let it be, when thou hearest the sound of a going in the tops of the mulberry trees, that then thou shalt bestir thyself: *for then shall the*

Lord go out before thee, to smite the hosts of the Philistines." (Chap. 5.)

Subsequently—after David had brought "the ark of God, whose name is called by the name of the Lord of Hosts that dwelleth between the cherubim," to Jerusalem, "and set it in its place, in the midst of the tabernacle that he had pitched for it"—the verbal directions and revelations from Jehovah were sometimes given directly to him and to those who succeeded to his throne, but more commonly to the prophets. Thus having brought the ark to Jerusalem, and being at peace with the surrounding nations, he desired to build an house for the ark as the dwelling-place of Jehovah. And "the word of the Lord came unto Nathan, saying, Go and tell my servant David, Thus saith the Lord, Shalt thou build me an house for me to dwell in? Whereas I have not *dwelt in any house* since the time that I brought up the children of Israel out of Egypt even to this day, but *have walked in a tent and in a tabernacle.* In all the places wherein I have walked with all the children of Israel spake I a word with any of the tribes of Israel, whom I commanded to feed my people Israel, saying, Why build ye not me an house of cedar . . . according to all these words . . . so did Nathan speak unto David. Then went King David in, [to the tabernacle,] and sat before the Lord." In the prayer and thanksgiving which follow, David says: "Thou hast confirmed to Thyself Thy people Israel, to be a people unto Thee forever." And "Thou, O Lord of Hosts, God of Israel, hast revealed to Thy servant, saying, I will build thee an house." (Chap. 7.)

With those who allegorize or spiritualize such pas-

sages of Scripture as this or any of those before quoted, and make the ordinary words of human language, as spoken by Jehovah Himself, mean one thing when they describe His actions, and another when they describe the actions of men, we decline having any controversy. We believe that He employed the words which He spoke, as a perfect vehicle and expression of His thoughts, and in the same sense that men employed them; and caused them to be written that men might infallibly know what they should believe concerning Him, and what duties He requires of them. And we accordingly believe that in His delegated character and mediatorial Person, He created the worlds, was personally and locally present in Eden; conversed with Adam, Noah, the Patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets; visibly appeared on earth in that character and Person at different times and places; dwelt in the pillar of cloud—in the tabernacle of witness, and in the Temple; and by His immediate Personal agency administered the primeval and Levitical dispensations. We believe this for the same reason that we believe that in the same character and Person he became incarnate, and walked and conversed with men; namely, because the facts are as plainly expressed in His words and by His inspiration in the one case, as in the other.

The obscurity in the English, and in the other versions of the Old Testament, from that of the Seventy to the present time, in respect to the names and official designations, and the continuous Personal agency and administration of the delegated One—the Messenger of the eternal covenant—is owing, for the most part, probably first to the example of the Jewish translators of the

Septuagint; who, inheriting their theology from the Jews posterior to the captivity, entertaining the sentiments concerning the Messiah which prevailed at the period of His advent, and desiring not to offend, but to please the Egyptians, Greeks, and other heathens, would naturally exclude, or as far as possible obscure, the titulary and personal references to His character and agency. Secondly, to the hereditary Jewish sentiments and prejudices of Jerome, the founder of the Vulgate, whose translation from the Hebrew closely followed the Rabbinical interpretations of his time. Thirdly. To the undue influence of the Rabbinical and Masoretic constructions and comments, on the minds of more recent translators. Hence, to cite no other instance, the Hebrew term which is translated angel, as the proper name of a created being, instead of its being rendered *Messenger*, as a name of office, when it is coupled and employed interchangeably with the name Jehovah, may be traced through the modern and the earlier versions up to that of the Seventy. It is, we think, largely owing to the obscurity thus occasioned, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament are, with respect to this subject, regarded and represented as so inexplicit, enigmatical, mystical, as to be intelligible only by means of the clearer revelations of the Gospel; their types and shadows concealing the dim rays of light which are supposed to have guided the unparalleled faith of Patriarchs and Prophets; as though the veil which was on the uncircumcised Jewish heart, had been extended over the speculative Gentile mind, with the added films of Rabbinical stolidity and rationalistic criticism; preventing a discernment of the

characteristics, prerogatives, names and designations of the Messiah, the great theme of Moses and the Prophets; and concealing the broad line of His Personal agency throughout the successive dispensations.

During His ministry after His incarnation, He constantly referred His hearers who did not infer His claims, either from His titles or His works, to the Hebrew Scriptures, as testifying at large of Him; to what Moses and the Prophets wrote, as being written of Him; to the announcements and predictions uttered by His own voice—when signified by designations that bespoke Him simply as Divine—concerning His official Person, agency, and relations. In His character simply as Divine, and as such invisible, He spoke to and of Himself as the delegated, anointed, official Person—the Messenger, the Son, who appeared visibly to patriarchs and prophets, the seed of the woman, the son of David, the King, the Saviour, the Redeemer, the Holy One of Israel, the Branch, the Shepherd, Immanuel, who was to become incarnate; as when He had taken the human nature into union with His Person, whatever is affirmed of Him that is predicable only of one of His two distinct natures, is affirmed of Him as a Person. It was that official, delegated Person, "who took on Him the seed of Abraham," and became "perfect as the Captain of Salvation through sufferings." In that delegated character, before Abraham was, He was. In that official, Personal character, He was Prophet, Priest and King, Revealer, Mediator and Ruler, as truly before as after His incarnation. As such, to Him the prayers of the Patriarchs and prophets were, perhaps exclusively, addressed, as, at the opening of the new

dispensation, were those of the disciples, Stephen, Paul, and others. To Him the patriarchal and Levitical altars were erected, and the sacrifices offered. He was the immediate object of faith, homage, and obedience. In respect to all Personal and providential manifestations, interpositions, and operations, He was the actor. This is the only legitimate conclusion to be derived from the language of the Old and New Testaments, in their connection with each other; from the covenant of which He was the Mediator from the foundation of the world; from His offices as Prophet, Priest, and King; from His names and official designations; from His relations to His chosen people, the Church, which He, as if slain from the foundation of the world, redeemed and saved—and to the successive covenants, promises, and predictions which He fulfilled and is still fulfilling; and from the nature, scope, and design of His entire undertaking in His delegated character. If in that character He appeared and acted at all, then He was the actor throughout the ancient dispensations. If in that character He expiated, "by himself purged," our sins, then in that character He made the world, and is heir of all things; and to Him of old the Father said, "Thou art my Son;" and "Thy throne, O God! is forever and ever . . . and thou Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands;" as at a later period He said: "This is my beloved Son, hear ye Him." "For by Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible . . . all things were created by Him and for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist.

. . . For it pleased the Father that in Him should all fullness dwell." But in all His delegated agency He spoke the words and did the things prescribed and appointed by the Father. doing as a delegate, His will in all things. At the same time the Holy Spirit had from the Father an official mission and agency in carrying out the work of Mediation and Redemption. He is represented as being sent, and having an office work—renewing, enlightening, sanctifying men — applying the benefits of the redemption purchased by Christ—speaking in the prophets and apostles—inspiring into their minds what was to be written—bringing to their remembrance what had been spoken to them. His Personally official agency in the great scheme of infinite wisdom, goodness, and grace towards men, is no less distinctively exhibited in the Scriptures, than that of the Redeemer. And in order to an intelligent view of the Divine economy as revealed in the Scriptures and realized in the works of providence and grace, it is important to consider, that with respect to that economy and those works, the relations and acts of the respective Persons of the Godhead are official—founded in reciprocal covenant engagements. As Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are coëqual and coëternal. They are revealed to us in connection with those works, and in the relations which they sustain to them, and to each other in connection with them; and conformably to the covenant and economy in which those relations and works are founded, the designations by which they are respectively made known, are official designations, employed with a Personal and official reference. The Father sends, delegates, commis-

sions the Son, to accomplish certain works. The Son reveals the Father and executes His will. The Holy Spirit exerts His agency in conformity with the will of the Father and the Son. It is in these relations that the respective Persons are worshipped, and not jointly, or as a unity. These relations must be conceived of as coëval in their origin with the objects of them. In their nature the Three Persons are equal. The subordination of the second and third must have been voluntarily assumed for special purposes and agencies which required it. When creatures were to be brought into existence, relations not previously existing were required; and as relations to creatures required various agencies of the respective Persons, new relations between them were requisite, which, being founded in compact, are properly termed official. Accordingly all Divine acts towards creatures are Personal acts of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit. Hence all the acts of the Son in the works of creation, providence, and redemption, are ascribed to Him in His delegated character, by whatever designations He may be referred to in connection with those works; and it was accordingly in that official character that He appeared Personally and visibly in the ancient dispensations, assumed the human form, and performed various acts proper only to one in that form. The nature of His delegated undertaking, and the objects of those dispensations, required such local and visible Personal manifestations and agencies, and also that He should speak to and of Himself in the aspects and relations in which He appeared, and in which He exercised His Prophetic office in respect to His future coming, and His sacer-

dotal work. (See "The Messiah in Moses and the Prophets.") In like manner the acts of the Holy Spirit—that of inspiring into the minds of the sacred writers what they were to commit to writing, as well as others—are ascribed to Him as official acts.

Let it also be considered, as preliminary to a further citation of evidences of the continued Personal Presence, and immediate agency of the Messenger Jehovah, during the continuance of the Davidic line of kings—that the Divine Persons are designated not only by their official titles, but are respectively addressed and spoken of by each of the denominatives which are employed as proper names; and as they are one in essence and in will, though Personally three, the acts of each, being alike Divine, are in Scripture exhibited as the acts of God. When severally addressed by the Names which are alike denominatives of each, the context indicates which official Person is referred to.

These considerations are the more necessary as we approach the culminating period of the Theocratic rule, and the Levitical institutions, which was characterized by more frequent and signal revelations, inspirations, interpositions, and judgments, with the progress of apostasy and corruption. Within the memorable period of about five hundred years yet to be surveyed, most of the Psalms and of the prophecies were written; the Temple was erected, and was long the acknowledged scene of the Divine Presence, and of acceptable homage and praise from the people, and then alternately of reverence and sacrilege; ten of the tribes apostatized and were cast off; the two followed their example of wickedness, and were driven from the land of their inheritance;

the temple was destroyed with the ark and its furniture; Jehovah then withdrew and discontinued His theocratic relations. The evidences of His continued Personal Presence and immediate agency, up to that time, are altogether too multiplied to be cited in detail. The briefest reference to a portion of them that is compatible with the object of referring to them, must suffice, and the selection must be made without special regard to their chronological order.

Passing other instances of direct and prophetic revelation to David during the progress of his reign, we refer to his numbering the people and the immediate personal interposition of the Messenger Jehovah, by which seventy thousand men were destroyed; the victims being selected from all parts of the kingdom. "When the Messenger stretched out His hand upon Jerusalem to destroy it, the Lord repented Him of the evil, and said to the Messenger that destroyed the people, It is enough: stay now thine hand. And the Messenger Jehovah was by the threshing floor of Arannah the Jebusite. And David spake unto the Lord when he saw the Messenger that smote the people, and said, Lo! I have sinned and I have done wickedly." (2 Sam. 24.) In the parallel account (1 Chron. 21,) it is said that "God sent the Messenger [after the pestilence had done its work throughout the land] unto Jerusalem to destroy it. . . . And David lifted up his eyes, and saw the Messenger Jehovah stand between the earth and the heaven, having a drawn sword in his hand stretched out over Jerusalem. Then David and the Elders, clothed in sackcloth, fell upon their faces. And David said unto

God . . . even I it is that have sinned and done evil . . . Then the *Messenger Jehovah commanded Gad* to say to David, that David should go up, and set up an altar unto the Lord in the threshing floor of Ornan [Araunah] the Jebusite. And David went up at the saying of Gad which he spake *in* the name of the Lord [that is of the Lord, the Messenger] and Ornan saw the Messenger, . . . and David built there [the site of the future temple] an altar unto the Lord, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings, and called upon the Lord, and *He answered him by fire upon the altar of burnt offering.* And the Lord commanded the Messenger; and He put up His sword again into the sheath thereof. . . . When David saw that the Lord had answered him on the threshing floor of Ornan the Jebusite, then [thenceforth] he sacrificed there. For the tabernacle of the Lord, which Moses made in the wilderness, and the altar of the burnt offering, were at that season in the high place at Gibeon. But David could not go before it to inquire of God: for he was afraid because of the sword of the Messenger Jehovah."

This we take to be a clear case in which the Second Person of the Adorable Trinity in His delegated character, spoke, as invisible, under the name Jehovah, to and of Himself as the Messenger visible in the likeness of that form in which He was to become incarnate; when the two natures being united in His one Person, the human would be visible and the Divine remain invisible. Of this the propriety is as apparent as the necessity. That official Person conducted the administration by His immediate agency, ordinarily as invisibly present in the Tabernacle or at other stations, but on

special occasions of revelation and of public and visible interpositions, as visibly present, in the likeness of man—one sent—the Messenger—the visible executor of threatened judgments. The official Person, in His Divine nature invisible, audibly directed the visible Messenger who thus appeared to the view of those concerned, in the form of man. The same official Person in the visible form of man, directed God the prophet. Regarded in these two aspects, the one Person is designated by names and titles in conformity with His official acts; and on the occasions of His visible appearance, as to Jacob, Manoah, Gideon, and others, He is addressed both by the Divine Names and by His official titles.

The Psalms of David abound in evidences that it was Jehovah in His delegated character to whom David's prayers and praises were addressed; and that his apprehensions of that Divine Person respected Him as having the same attributes as when visibly incarnate. The allusions in these inspired compositions, to His Person, to His local presence and visibility, to His human sympathies, self-denials and sufferings, in most intimate connection with His omniscience, His almighty power, His covenant engagements and relations, His prophetic and sacerdotal work, His regal majesty, His triumph as Redeemer, His glorious perfections, His faithfulness, righteousness, and truth—all attest the reality of His continued local presence in Zion, and His immediate agency in the administration of His government and providence over His people. In these sacred lyrics every species of style and composition is employed; and as illustrative of His delegated

covenant relations and agencies, the Psalmist in his regal office and in the vicissitudes and extremes of his personal experience, is made to represent Him, in connection with retrospective allusions and prophetic references and announcements; or rather as if personated by the Psalmist, He, often, not to say always or generally, is Himself the Speaker. (See Psalms, 22, 35, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 56, 57, 86, 88: and with reference more especially to His exaltation, 2, 24, 45, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 110.

These and many others contemplate Him in His official character and relations, as if the human nature were actually united with his Person, as the immediate object of homage and praise, or as a suppliant in His incarnate and suffering state; and as having His local habitation in the tabernacle or temple as Prophet, Priest, and King. A few citations from Psalms which expressly connect His past, present, and future agency in the same delegated capacity, will sustain our view of His continued Personal Presence.

Thus (Psalm 68) on the occasion of David's removing the ark to Mount Zion: "Let God arise, let His enemies be scattered. . . . . Sing unto God, sing praises to his name: extol Him that rideth upon the heavens by His name JAH, and rejoice before Him. A Father of the fatherless, and a Judge of the widows, is God *in His holy habitation.* . . . O God, when *thou wentest forth before Thy people, when Thou didst march through the wilderness: the earth shook, the heavens also dropped at the presence of God; Sinai itself was moved at the presence of God, the God of Israel.* . . . The hill of God is as the hill of Bashan. . . . This is the hill

[Mount Zion] which God desireth to dwell in; yea, Jehovah will dwell in it forever. The chariots of God are twenty thousand, even thousands of angels: the Lord [the Adonai, a title of the Messiah] is among them as in Sinai, in the holy place. Thou hast ascended on high. Thou hast led captivity captive. Thou hast received gifts for men; yea, for the rebellious also, that the Lord God might dwell among them. [The speaker is Christ, see Ephesians, 4 : 7, 10.] Blessed be *the Adonai*, who daily loadeth us with benefits, *even the God of our salvation.* He that is our God, is the God of salvation; and unto God, the Adonai, belong the issues from death. . . . The Adonai said, I will bring my people again from the depths of the sea. . . . *They have seen thy goings, O God; even the goings of my God, my king in the sanctuary.* The singers went before, the players on instruments followed. . . . Bless ye God in the congregations, even the Adonai, from the fountain of Israel. . . . Sing unto God, ye kingdoms of the earth; O sing praises unto the Adonai."

Again, (Psalm 132,) on the same occasion: "Arise, O Lord, into thy rest, Thou and the ark of Thy strength. Let Thy priests be clothed with righteousness; and let Thy saints shout for joy. For Thy servant David's sake, turn not away the face of Thine anointed, [the Messiah.] The Lord hath sworn in truth unto David; He will not turn from it; of the fruit of Thy body will I set on Thy throne. . . . . For the Lord hath chosen Zion; He hath desired it for *His* habitation. This is my rest forever; here will I dwell; for *I* have desired it."

Among the last acts of David, on the occasion of

presenting his offerings and those of the people towards the building of the Temple, he said: "Thine, O Lord, is the greatness, and the power, and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty; for all that is in the heavens and in the earth is thine: Thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and Thou art exalted as Head over all. Both riches and honor come of Thee, and Thou reignest over all; and in Thine hand is powe rand might; and in Thine hand it is to make great and to give strength unto all. . . . Then Solomon *sat on the throne of the Lord as King*, instead of David his father." (1 Chron. 29.) Solomon having presented burnt offerings on the "altar before the Lord. . . . God appeared to him and said, Ask what I shall give thee. And Solomon said unto God, Thou hast shewn great mercy unto David my father, and hast made me to reign in his stead. Now, O Lord God! let thy promise unto David my father be established . . . give me now wisdom and knowledge. . . . And God said to Solomon . . . wisdom and knowledge is granted unto thee." (2 Chron. 1.) When he had completed the Temple, and brought into it the ark of the covenant of the Lord, "Then the house was filled with a cloud, even the house of the Lord . . . for the glory of the Lord had filled the house of God. Then said Solomon, The Lord hath said He would dwell in the thick darkness. But I have built an house of habitation for Thee, and a place for Thy dwelling forever. . . . Blessed be the Lord God of Israel, who hath with His hands fulfilled that which He spake with His mouth to my father David, saying, Since the day that I brought forth My people out of the land of Egypt, I chose no city among all the tribes of Israel to

build an house in. . . . But I have chosen Jerusalem. . . Now then, O Lord God of Israel, let Thy word be verified which Thou hast spoken unto Thy servant David. *But will God in very deed dwell with men on the earth?*" —a question equivalent to the strongest affirmation. "*Behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens can not contain Thee:* how much less this house which I have built. . . . Now, my God, let, I beseech thee, Thine eyes be open, and let Thine ears be attent unto the prayer that is made in this place. Now therefore arise, O Lord God, into Thy resting place, Thou, and the ark of Thy strength." (Chap. 5, 6.)

These prayers are addressed to Him who in His official character conducted the children of Israel out of Egypt, and dwelt in the thick darkness of the pillar of cloud. That His universal presence as Divine was known and often referred to by the patriarchs, prophets, and others, from the beginning, is as evident as that they had any conception of His omniscience or other attributes; and that they distinguished between that Omnipresence, and his local presence when He appeared visibly, is no less manifest. Though the word *heaven* is often employed with immediate reference to the most holy place in the Tabernacle, it is not necessary so to restrict it here. As Divine, He is ever in the heaven of heavens. His presence fills immensity. He is God. Yet, as in His delegated character He was personally and locally present on earth when literally incarnate, so He was locally present when executing the same official work in the previous dispensations. If there was mystery in this, it could have been no greater than when He tabernacled in flesh, and in-

structed His disciples—"that He proceeded forth and came from God—that He came down from heaven—that He came forth from the Father and came into the world, and should leave the world and go to the Father—that He should depart out of this world unto the Father—that He should go His way to Him that sent Him—that no man had ascended up to heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven—that [in respect to His Deity] he that had seen Him had seen the Father—that He and the Father were one—that officially the Father was superior to Him—that they should see the Son of man, the delegated Person, ascend up where He was before." These and the like passages, especially the entire 17th Chapter of John, clearly exhibit the two aspects in which in His official character and agency He was ever regarded by all who were taught of God to know Him, and in which, both when visible and when invisible, He of necessity spoke to and of Himself.

"And the Lord appeared to Solomon by night, and said unto him, I have heard thy prayer, and have chosen this place to Myself for a house of sacrifice. If I shut up heaven that there be no rain, or if I command the locusts to devour the land, or if I send pestilence among My people; if My people which are called by My name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek My face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land. Now Mine eyes shall be open, and Mine ears attent unto the prayer that is made in this place. For now have I chosen and sanctified this house, that My NAME may be there forever; and

Mine eyes and my heart shall be there perpetually." (2 Chron. 7.) His *Name* signifies His manifested nature or attributes—His Personal Presence.

Between the death of Solomon and the destruction of the Temple, a period of about three hundred and ninety years, there were in the line of David twenty Kings of Judah: and between the revolt of the ten tribes under Jeroboam and the overthrow of Israel, about two hundred and fifty years, there were eighteen Kings of Israel. The events to be noticed during these periods have relation more or less to both kingdoms. On the accession of Rehoboam, the ten tribes openly apostatized to idolatry. He raised an army and purposed to attack and regain them. "But the word of God came to Shemaiah, the man of God, saying, Speak unto Rehoboam, the son of Solomon, King of Judah, and unto all the house of Judah and Benjamin and to the remnant of the people, saying, Thus saith the Lord, Ye shall not go up, nor fight against your brethren the children of Israel; return every man to his house; *for this thing is from Me.* They hearkened, therefore, to the word of the Lord, and returned to depart according to the word of the Lord." Here, as in most instances of direct verbal revelations from Jehovah, whether with or without the intervention of a prophet, the words spoken by Him were, beyond a doubt, the same identical words which are written; and in style and idiom, they often exhibit what our author terms the 'human element' as strikingly as the recorded language of mere human speakers. On a subsequent occasion, when Rehoboam had forsaken the Law, and was attacked by Shishak, King of Egypt, the same

prophet was sent to say: "Thus saith the Lord, Ye have forsaken me, and therefore have I also left you in the hand of Shishak. . . . And when the Lord saw that they humbled themselves, the word of the Lord came to Shemaiah, saying, They have humbled themselves; therefore I will not destroy them." (1 Kings 14.)

After the death of Rehoboam, his son and successor, Abijah, with an army of 400,000 men, made war on Jeroboam, whose army numbered 800,000. Prior to battle Abijah addressed the ten tribes and their king, charging them with their apostasy, vindicating himself and his people, and concluding in these significant terms: "*Behold God himself is with us for our Captain*, and His priests with sounding trumpets to cry alarm against you. O children of Israel! fight ye not against the Lord God of your fathers; for ye shall not prosper." The result was, "that God smote Jeroboam and all Israel before Abijah, and Judah . . . so there fell down slain of Israel 500,000 chosen men. . . The children of Judah prevailed because they relied upon the Lord God of their fathers." (2 Chron. 13.)

During the reign of Jehoshaphat, a confederacy of adjacent nations came against him. "And Judah gathered themselves together to ask help of the Lord. . . . Then upon Jahaziel . . . came the Spirit of the Lord in the midst of the congregation; and he said, Hearken all ye. . . . Thus saith the Lord God unto you, Be not afraid nor dismayed by reason of this great multitude; for the battle is not yours but God's. . . Ye shall not need to fight in this battle. . . . Stand ye still, and see the salvation of the Lord. . . . to-morrow go out against them, for the Lord will be with you." (2

Chron. 20.) Accordingly when Judah approached, "and looked unto the opposing multitude, behold they were dead bodies fallen to the earth, and none escaped." (*Ibid.*) No more immediate revelation or direct interposition than this is any where recorded.

Our author endeavors to sustain his hypothesis, "that subsequently to the age of Moses the *immediate* communications of Jehovah, as a general rule, ceased; and that certain *means* were made use of for conveying His revelations . . . while the personal presence of the Logos was withdrawn"—and refers to certain Scripture phrases, expressive of an agency of the Holy Spirit towards the prophets, as "an intermediate agency" . . . by which "the presence of the Eternal Word was supplied, and His revelations were communicated." This intermediate agency, he says, is described, generically, as "the Spirit of God." His object is to make it appear that in the absence of the Logos, this intermediate agency was the means, or medium, of *revelations,* in distinction from that Personal, official agency of the Holy Spirit by which, as the Scriptures represent, He *inspired* into the minds of the prophets what they were to speak and write. But the phrases which he quotes, neither imply any such thing as he cites them to prove, nor are they peculiar to the ages subsequent to that of Moses. The very first of them indeed relates to Balaam: "The Spirit of God comes equally upon Balaam and Saul, as upon the prophets Azariah and Ezekiel. . . . The Spirit of the Lord fell upon me—Ezekiel—and said unto me. . . . The Spirit lifted me up and brought me unto the east gate of the Lord's house . . . a trance fell upon

Peter . . . this and that one were clothed, or endued with the Spirit." He adds other phrases in which the words "Hand of the Lord," and "Word of the Lord," occur as if they denoted a Divine influence by which *revelations* were made—"The Hand of the Lord was on Elijah: The Hand of the Lord God fell upon Ezekiel. . . . The Lord spoke to Isaiah by a strong Hand. . . . The Hand of the Lord was strong upon Ezekiel. . . . The Hand of the Lord was with John the Baptist. . . . The Word of the Lord came expressly to Ezekiel . . . and the Hand of the Lord was there upon him. . . . The Word of the Lord came to such or such a prophet; Moses thus denotes *revelations* in the time of Abraham; it is used by David as well as by those who were officially prophets."

The confusion and jumble of these citations, relating as they do to wholly different exertions of the Divine agency, is such as might, to intelligent readers, render comment superfluous. Those of them which state that *the Word of* THE LORD *came* to Ezekiel and the several prophets, and to David, Moses, Abraham, and others, denote in the simplest terms, *immediate revelations* from Jehovah — revelations without intermediate agency. Very numerous and extended portions of the Scriptures are introduced by this formulary. The voice or word of the Lord came to the prophets and others. They heard Jehovah speaking to them—heard His voice, His words. Whether awake, or in dreams, or in visions, His thoughts and the words which conveyed them were realized to their intelligent consciousness, so that they could remember and, as moved, infallibly speak and write them.

The other classes of expression denote an agency which had nothing to do with revelation, mediate or immediate, but which produced effects on the physical condition, or on the courage or energy of men; or else denote immediate revelation and inspiration. Thus: "The Spirit of the Lord came upon Othniel, and he judged Israel and went out to war." (Judges 3.) "The Spirit of the Lord came upon Gideon, and upon Jephtha." "The Spirit of the Lord began to move Samson at times in the camp of Dan, (Chap 13;) a young lion roared against him: and the Spirit of the Lord came mightily upon him, and he rent him as he would have rent a kid. (14.) So when he broke the cords with which he was bound, and slew a thousand men, (15,) Obadiah said to Elijah, 'the Spirit shall carry thee whither I know not.'" (1 Sam. 18.) When the sons of the prophets proposed to search for the body of Elijah, they said: "Lest the Spirit of the Lord hath taken him up, and cast him upon some mountain or into some valley." (2 Kings 2.) "The Spirit entered into me when He spake unto me, and set me upon my feet." (Ezek. 2, 3.) "The Spirit took me up . . . the Spirit lifted me up and took me away." (3.) "The hand of the Adonai Jehovah fell there upon me . . . and He put forth the form of a hand, and took me by a lock of mine head; and the Spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the visions of God to Jerusalem." (Chap. 8.) "The Spirit lifted me up, and brought me unto the east gate of the Lord's house." (11.) "The hand of the Lord was upon me, and carried me out in the Spirit of the Lord and set me down in the midst of the

valley." (37.) "The Spirit took me up and brought me into the inner court." (43.) "I am full of power by the Spirit of the Lord, and of judgment, and of might, to declare unto Jacob his transgressions." (Micah 3.) "The hand of the Lord is upon thy cattle." (Exod. 9.) "The hand of the Lord was against them to destroy them." (Deut. 2.) "The hand of the Lord was against the Philistines." (1 Sam. 7.) "The hand of the Lord came upon Elisha." (2 Kings 3.) These expressions, and many others like them, denote some extraordinary or miraculous exercise of Divine power wholly different from that by which revelations are made.

A different class of phrases, on the contrary, which our author quotes as of like import with these, namely, as denoting means or instrumentalities of revelation, plainly signify immediate revelations or inspirations. Thus: "The Spirit of God came upon Balaam . . . and he said . . . he, which heard *the words of God*, [the Messenger,] which saw the vision of the Almighty, [the Messenger,] falling flat on his face, (not in a trance,) but having his eyes open. How goodly are thy tents, O Jacob! and thy tabernacles, O Israel!" (Numb. 24.) Balaam exercised the office of a prophet. The Spirit of God came upon him—he heard the words of God—the thoughts and words which he, in virtue of his office, was to speak, were, without any intervening instrumentality, and while he was in the full exercise of his intelligent consciousness, conveyed into his mind by the Spirit of God.

Samuel said to Saul: "The Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee, and thou shall prophesy . . . a com-

pany of prophets met him; and the Spirit of God came upon him, and he prophesied among them." (1 Sam. 10.) What he said or prophesied is not recorded. But whatever it was, the Spirit of God doubtless inspired it into his mind while he acted the part of a prophet. So "the Spirit of God came upon Azariah . . . and he said to Asa, Hear ye me, Asa, and all Judah and Benjamin. The Lord is with you, while ye be with Him; and if ye seek Him, He will be found of you; but if ye forsake Him, He will forsake you." (2 Chron. 15.) Which plainly imports that the Spirit came upon him expressly to impart to him these words, and that he, therefore, spoke them as of Divine authority. In like manner Ezekiel says: "The Spirit of the Lord *fell upon me, and said unto me*, Speak; thus saith the Lord . . . Thus saith the Adonai Jehovah . . . I will bring a sword upon you, saith the Adonai Jehovah." (Ezek. 11.) What more immediate revelation could possibly be made than this, expressed in the words of the delegated One, Adonai, the Logos, as they are written? Did Moses record, as from Jehovah, any *revelation* more direct and exclusive of any intervening agency, instrumentality, or means? Or is it possible in this case, or in any case of its class, to distinguish between the *revelation* and the *inspiration?* On another occasion Ezekiel says: "The Spirit *entered into me, when He spake unto me* . . . I heard Him that spake unto me. And He said unto me, Son of man, I send thee unto the children of Israel, to a rebellious nation . . . and thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God . . . and thou shall speak My words unto them." (Ezek. 2.)

"The Spirit of God came upon Zechariah . . . and he said . . . Thus saith God, Why transgress ye the commandments of the Lord, that ye can not prosper? because ye have forsaken the Lord, He hath also forsaken you." (2 Chron. 24.) So, on the day of Pentecost, the disciples "were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak . . . as the Spirit gave them utterance." (Acts 2.)

It is, we trust, rendered manifest by these citations that the revelations subsequent to the age of Moses were as immediate as those before—that a revelation in words spoken to a king or prophet, was as immediate as such a revelation made to Moses—that words spoken by the Holy Spirit conveyed a revelation as really and effectually as words spoken by Jehovah—and, in fine, that no new or intermediate agency whatever was introduced. Such an intermediate agency is, indeed, inconceivable. A revelation from God, is intelligence communicated from Him to man; and in the nature of the case, must be immediate to those to whom it is primarily communicated. To say that if it is inspired by the Spirit into the mind of a prophet, the Spirit is in that act an impersonal instrument, is to deny that He is God. To say that if communicated primarily and immediately to a prophet, to be by him announced to others, the prophet is in that instance an intermediate agent, is to trifle with the subject; for the question relates solely to his immediate reception, not to his subsequent repetition of it. Moreover, the later prophets did not differ in this respect from Moses. Both Jehovah and the Holy Spirit, sent by Him, spoke to them personally, directly, immediately.

Passing the revelations conveyed audibly or by inspiration to the minds of Elijah and Elisha, and the numerous miracles wrought through their instrumentality, though some of them clearly demonstrate the continual local presence and agency of Jehovah the Messenger, especially that of the public trial and condemnation of the prophets of Baal, and that of the sustentation of Elijah in the wilderness, where the Messenger Jehovah came to him, we next refer to the extraordinary deliverance of Ahab and the Israelites from the hosts of the King of Syria and thirty-two confederate Kings. The express question to be decided was, as in many other cases, whether Jehovah, the God of Israel, or Baal, the god of the heathen confederates, was the Creator and Ruler of the world. "There came a prophet unto Ahab, King of Israel, saying, Thus saith the Lord, Hast thou seen all this great multitude? Behold I will deliver it into thy hand this day: *and thou shalt know* that I am Jehovah." The result was decisive against Baal. The next year, however, they renewed the war, "and there came a man of God and spake unto the King of Israel, and said, Thus saith the Lord, Because the Syrians have said, Jehovah is God of the hills, but He is not God of the valleys, therefore will I deliver all this great multitude into thy hand, *and ye shall know that I am Jehovah* . . . and the children of Israel slew of the Syrians an hundred thousand footmen in one day. But the rest fled to Aphek, into the city, and there a wall fell upon twenty-seven thousand of the men that were left." (1 Kings 20.)

Nothing in the history of the Levitical dispensation is more characteristic of the continued Theocratic rule

than those immediate, resistless, and overwhelming Personal interpositions of Jehovah, by which the devotees of Baal were confounded and destroyed. The pending question, from the apostasy onward, was that originally announced in general terms, between the Seed of the Woman, and the seed of the Serpent; between Jehovah in His mediatorial capacity, as Head and Leader of His chosen and redeemed people, and Satan as head of the apostate faction. It was especially to demonstrate and signalize the supremacy, rights, and prerogatives of Jehovah, in opposition to the rival system of the great adversary, who, under the designation of Baal, arrogated lordship and claims to homage and obedience, that the Theocratic institution was introduced. This question was publicly arbitrated in the view of human and invisible spectators, in the controversy with Pharaoh and his vassals in Egypt and at the Red Sea, with the worshippers of Baal in the wilderness, and at the conquest of Canaan; with the Pagan nations surrounding Judea, and with the revolting tribes on various occasions. The oft-recurring trials of this question, involved the continued Personal Presence and immediate agency of the Divine Leader. And hence, when the ten tribes were challenged as being nominally of His party, He directly interposed to vindicate His name, and annihilate His enemies.

Ahazia, the son and successor of Ahab, being sick, sent messengers to "inquire of Baal-Zebub, the god of Ekron, whether he should recover of his disease. But the Messenger Jehovah said to Elijah, Arise, go up to meet the messengers of the King of Samaria, and say unto them, Is it not because there is not a God in Israel

that ye go to inquire of Baal-Zebub, the God of Ekron? Now therefore thus saith the Lord, Thou shalt not come down from that bed on which thou art gone up, but shalt surely die." When the messengers returned with this announcement, the King sent a captain with fifty men to command Elijah to come to him. "And Elijah said to the captain, If I be a man of God, then let fire come down from heaven and consume thee and thy fifty. And there came down fire from heaven and consumed him and his fifty." The King tried the experiment again, "and the fire of God came down from heaven and consumed the second captain and his fifty." This produced alarm and conviction. The King sent a third similar company. The third captain came and fell on his knees before Elijah, and besought him, recounted what had befallen the preceding captains, and begged for his life, "and the Messenger Jehovah said unto Elijah, Go down with him." (2 Kings 1.)

The history exhibits numerous instances of such immediate interpositions of Jehovah's power, both against individuals, rulers, armies, and people, inflicting on them instant destruction for particular acts of disobedience and wickedness, or for public apostasy to the service of Baal; which judicial retaliations and inflictions were provided for in the Theocratic constitution and among its essential features. For Jehovah as Head of the Institution was at the same time, and in all the acts of His administration, the civil Lawgiver, Judge, and Chief Magistrate, and the Omniscient Moral Governor of His covenant people. As such He vindicated His own rights and authority when violated by those under the bond of the covenant; and executed vengeance

both upon them and upon the surrounding pagans who opposed them and set Him at defiance. Such visitations are often expressly foretold and threatened, and their literal fulfillment is recorded in connection with the crimes to which they have reference.

The genius of the system, as locally combining a moral and religious with a social and civil administration, and its high purpose of antagonism to the powers of evil, and of manifestation of the rights, prerogatives, authority, and supremacy of Jehovah, required that the dispensation should be one of outward and visible acts, discriminations between the righteous and the wicked, rewards of obedience to the one, and visitations of judgment upon the other, temporal blessings and punishments, vindications of His ways and demonstrations of His righteousness. But in order to these exhibitions—to the consistency of His acts with His words, and of events with appearances, and to the convictions to be wrought on the minds of men, and on those of all created intelligences, good and bad, His local Personal Presence was indispensable. The relations, founded in compacts and covenants, which He sustained to the separated people, as their temporal Lawgiver, their King, the Captain of their hosts, the prescriber of their conduct, taking cognizance of their motives, detecting the perpetrators of secret wickedness, audibly announcing His commands, and dispensing good and evil according to the moral deserts of individuals, implied His Personal Presence and immediate agency. Accordingly He says He was present. He spoke and acted as being present. He dwelt in the most Holy place, of which His sanctuary in heaven was the pat-

tern, and which prefigured the Body in which He became Incarnate. To demonstrate the reality of His local presence, He appeared visibly, spoke audibly, wrought miracles by His word, delivered His people, and destroyed the armies of the aliens, by the immediate exercise of His almighty power. He gave every evidence of His Personal Presence in His delegated character, that was necessary to the faith of His obedient servants, and that the nature of the case allowed.

All the language of Scripture accords with this view of His local Presence and agency throughout the primeval and Theocratic dispensations. Every where the narratives, the prophecies, and the Psalms assert or assume it, and none the less because in the New as well as in the Old Testament. His Divine nature is often referred to as ever in heaven. Moreover, the surrounding nations, worshippers of Baal, the Egyptians, the Canaanites, the Assyrians, and others, believed Him to be the local God of Israel, that He dwelt in the tabernacle, as by their counterfeit system, they imagined that their antagonist god dwelt, as a personal agent, in the visible idol, and that Jehovah was propitiated and prayed to, as the priests of Baal offered sacrifices and prayers to him. The analogy every where aimed at between the antagonist, rival, counterfeit system of Baal, and the original Theocratic system of Jehovah, proceeds upon the assumption that each was locally present. The followers of Baal counterfeited the movable tabernacle of Jehovah, by their tabernacle of Moloch; His oracle, by their simulated responses; the Levitical priesthood and sacrifices, by their own hierarchal and sacrificial system; His visible glory by ap-

propriating the sun to Baal; His miracles by the jugglery of magicians.

This antagonism, from beginning to end, is without significance, except upon the supposition that the followers of Baal, in their civil and religious polity, and in their wars upon Israel, believed that they were contending, not against the Supreme Invisible Deity, but against a local, personal god, between whom and Baal a trial of strength was in their view by no means desperate and hopeless; not a contest between human weakness and infinite power, but as a trial between earthly monarchs—a trial between local deities of limited power. This controversy, from its first commencement, involved the moral and religious, as well as the social and civil responsibilities of the parties to it. In conducting it by a public and visible administration, He who is first announced in His delegated character as the Seed of the woman, separated to Himself a particular people, assumed the local relations and functions of their civil and religious Lawgiver and chieftain, Prophet, Priest, and King, and as such dwelt among them.

After the accession of Uzziah to the throne of Judah, the progress of degeneracy and corruption in both kingdoms was increasingly rapid; and for the vindication of Jehovah's administration over them, the instruction and guidance of His true worshippers, and the revelation of His future incarnation and kingdom, a succession of prophets was raised up, who recorded and published the words which they received from Him. These records are fraught with the most decisive evidences of the continued Theocratic relation, Personal

presence, and immediate agency of Jehovah. For our purpose of illustration, reference is made to them collectively, while some further instances of His immediate agency are selected from the historical narrative.

In the reign of Hezekiah, Sennacherib, king of Assyria, invaded Judah, and openly reproached and defied the God of Israel. "And Hezekiah prayed before the Lord, and said, O Lord God of Israel, which dwellest between the cherubim . . . I beseech thee, save Thou us out of his hand, *that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that Thou art the Lord God, even Thou only*. . . And the Lord said, *I will defend this city, to save it, for Mine own sake, and for My servant David's sake.* And it came to pass that night, that the Messenger Jehovah went out, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred four score and five thousand . . . in the morning they were all dead corpses." (2 Kings 19.)

"In the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim, the son of Josiah, king of Judah, came this word from the Lord, saying, Thus saith the Lord; stand in the court of the Lord's house, and speak unto all the cities of Judah, which come to worship in the Lord's house, all the words that I command thee to speak unto them; diminish not a word. . . . And thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord, If ye will not hearken to me, to walk in my law, which I have set before you, to hearken to the words of my servants the prophets whom I sent unto you, then will I make this house as Shiloh, and will make this city a curse to all the nations of the earth." (Jeremiah 26.) When the city was beseiged, Jehoiakim taken captive, and the temple partially plundered, it is written: "Surely at the com-

mandment of the Lord came this upon Judah, to remove them out of His sight." (2 Kings 24.)

Prior to the total destruction of the Temple and the city, and the extinction of the kingdom, Jehovah formally withdrew from the Temple, as related by Ezekiel, (chap. 8,) and terminated the Theocracy. He appeared to the prophet in the form of man, and in vision transported him to Jerusalem. Having exhibited to him the abominations which were practised there in the temple, the tokens by which the remnant of true worshippers was to be distinguished and preserved, and the reasons of His righteous judgments, He passed from the interior of the Temple to the threshold, and assumed the glorious form in which He had appeared at the river Chebar; then "He departed from off the threshold of the house and mounted up from the earth, and went up from the midst of the city, and stood upon the mountain, which is on the east side of the city"—Mount Olivet. This departure was final, till His incarnation. The ark, the cherubic figures, and all the furniture of the Temple, were burned or otherwise destroyed. A new building was erected after seventy years, but no visible glory, oracular responses, sacred fire, or other tokens of His Presence, were exhibited in it.

Thus we have shown, and shown, we presume, conclusively, that Jehovah in His delegated character, did not withdraw from the Tabernacle, nor discontinue His immediate agency towards the children of Israel, on the occasion specified by our author, nor at any time thereafter till the exile of all the tribes from the promised land, the destruction of the temple, the cessa-

tion of the Davidic line of kings, and the total abolition of the Theocratic economy; and that the evidences of His continued local, Personal presence, and immediate agency as administrator of the Theocratic system, are as unequivocal and conclusive, as those exhibited prior to the death of Moses. Our author's hypothesis concerning revelation and inspiration is therefore mistaken, imaginary, and baseless. And since in his opinion as well as in our own, the dynamical theory of inspiration can be sustained only by assuming the truth of that hypothesis, his theory as a whole must be regarded as unfounded and unwarrantable.

The main thing to be aimed at in a theory of Inspiration, and that alone, indeed, which renders any inquiry into the subject necessary or desirable, is, to reconcile the fact, that the words of Scripture are the words of God, with the fact, that in style and idiom they are the words of man. The delicate nerves of skeptics are sensitive on this point. Rationalistic and philosophic critics deem it a problem for scientific solution, on the hypothesis that the Scriptures contain a revelation. The alleged, or supposed, irreconcilableness of those two facts, is the foundation of the principal objections to the Divine Inspiration and authority of the Scriptures; and the principal writers in defense of their Divine origin, have accordingly endeavored to reconcile or account for those facts. But the methods which they have adopted—including that of the dynamical theory — in so far as they teach that man's agency was in any degree concerned in the selection of the words, have failed of their object: 1. Because it is fully as inconsistent with the infinite intelligence, infal-

libility, and other perfections of God, to suppose that He would cause His thoughts to be expressed vocally and in writing, in the words, styles, and idioms of the respective writers, as to suppose that He would Himself directly express them in the same words, styles, and idioms. 2. Because, if man's agency was at all concerned in the selection of the words, to that extent they are his words and not the words of God, and as expressions of His thoughts are not infallible. 3. Because a very large proportion of the contents of Scripture are expressly declared to be the words spoken by Jehovah Himself; and yet those portions of its contents are, as characteristically as the other portions expressed in the ordinary words, styles and idioms of the respective writers who recorded them.

It is plain that if a very large proportion of all the words of Scripture are written precisely as they were spoken by Jehovah Himself, then, to that extent, there is nothing to be reconciled. The agency of the writers of those words could not affect the question of their being literally and exclusively the words of God. And to that extent it is clear that the thoughts of God in His own selected words could be communicated and were communicated to man without any interference of their agency. Their agency was called for only to repeat vocally, or to write, the words which were uttered in their hearing, or otherwise conveyed into their minds. But if Jehovah could thus convey His thoughts and His words to the intelligent consciousness of those who were to write them, then we may infer with perfect confidence, that He could convey to the intelligent consciousness of their minds His thoughts

in His words, by inspiring them into their minds when awake, or in dreams, in visions and symbolical exhibitions; so that man's agency in the selection of words was no more called for or admissible in the one case than in the other.

The notion which so engrosses and misleads our author, that because the diction, style and idioms of Scripture are like those of the writers, there must, in the selection and collocation of the words, have been a combination of Divine and human agency, is a groundless fallacy; impossible in respect to all the words which were uttered audibly by Jehovah Himself, and wholly unnecessary, useless, and incredible in respect to all the other words of Scripture. Such a combination, indeed, of Divine and human acts, producing a result exclusively Divine, is inconceivable. A Divine act in selecting certain words, and a coïncident human act in the selection of the same words, can not be conceived of as resulting in a selection by which the words shall be those of one, to the exclusion of the other party. That the Divine and human agency are concurrently exercised in certain cases, is beyond a question. Thus in the sanctification of believers, God works in them to will and to do. But the willing and doing are their own acts, and are uniformly and properly ascribed to them. In all cases of joint or coïncident agency, that which is done by one agent is ascribed to Him, and that which is done by the other agent is ascribed to Him. The two agencies are never confounded. Nothing which is effected by one is ascribed to the other. And therefore if these two agencies are jointly concerned in the selection of the words

of Scripture, the words must be a joint product—partly the words of God, and partly the words of man. There is, we allege with confidence, no such distinction as he affirms between revelation and inspiration; nor any other distinction, except it be between a Divine act which conveys thoughts in audible words, and a Divine act which conveys thoughts in words by inspiration—speaking audibly the words which express particular thoughts, or inbreathing, inspiring, the same or other thoughts into the mind.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

BEFORE taking leave of these discourses, we can not forbear to refer to the considerations which induced the author to compose and publish them. "Independently," he says, "of the intrinsic importance of every question connected with the elucidation of Holy Scripture—*the vagueness which too often characterizes the language* employed by writers who, in modern times, have treated of its inspiration, seems to render *a fundamental examination into the nature* of this Divine influence daily more desirable. So long, indeed, as the 'mechanical' theory of Inspiration was generally maintained, there was no want of distinctness or consistency in the views put forward. So long as it was believed that each word and phrase to be found in the Bible—nay, even the order and grammatical connection of such words and phrases—had been infused by the Holy Ghost into the minds of the sacred writers, or dictated to them by His immediate suggestion, so long must the opinion held respecting Inspiration have been clear, intelligible, and accurately defined. But such a theory could not stand the test of close examination. The strongest evidence against it has been supplied by

the Bible itself; and each additional discovery in the Greek and Hebrew text confirms anew the conclusion that the great doctrine of the infallibility of Holy Scripture can no longer rely upon such a principle for its defense." He goes on to observe that, the 'mechanical' theory having been tacitly abandoned by all who are capable of appreciating the results of criticism, and no satisfactory system having been proposed in its stead, "there has gradually sprung up *a want of definiteness and an absence of consistency* in the language used when speaking of Inspiration, owing to which those who are most sincere in maintaining the Divine character of the Bible have, not unfrequently, been betrayed into concessions fatal to its supreme authority. And not only is there *a vagueness in the language*, . . . there is also *a want of completeness in the method* usually adopted when discussing it. . . . With reference to the *nature* of Inspiration itself, and to the possibility of reconciling the unquestionable stamp of humanity impressed upon every page of the Bible with that undoubting belief in its perfection and infallibility which is the Christian's most precious inheritance—it may safely be maintained that in English theology almost nothing has been done; and that *no effort has hitherto been made to grapple directly with the difficulties of the subject.*" (Preface.) He adds, that with the exception of some brief remarks by Mr. Westcott, and *the treatise of Mr. Morell*, he is not acquainted with any works in the English tongue, which even profess to entertain the question.

This, we doubt not, is a just representation of the state of the subject in Great Britain. And, with

such convictions as the author had respecting it, and with his religious affections and faith, and his knowledge of the Scriptures and of the 'mechanical' theory of Inspiration, we can not but marvel that he should have been staggered by such criticisms and objections as those of Schleiermacher, Strauss, Morell, Coleridge, and other idealists, pantheists, and rationalists. The object of these so-called critics was, not to establish a belief, on any ground whatever, of the perfection and infallibility of the Holy Scriptures, but to deny and exclude from them those attributes. No critic, it seems, Christian or infidel, German or English, had arisen, whose object it was to establish, on some other than the 'mechanical' theory, an 'undoubting belief in the perfection and infallibility of the Scriptures.' On that theory, 'there was no want of distinctness or consistency—the opinions of those who held it were clear, intelligible, and accurately defined.' But the unbelieving critics rejected that theory; professed believers openly or tacitly acquiesced in their rejection of it; and our author yielded to their example. We heartily wish that, instead of yielding, he had steadfastly adhered to the so-called 'mechanical' theory, and that in his discourses he had effectually 'grappled with the real difficulties of the subject.' A little consideration of the nature of the question, apart from the assumptions and speculations of every other school of writers, might have convinced him that 'even the order and grammatical connection of the words and phrases' of Scripture, was as absolutely necessary as the words and phrases themselves, to express and convey, perfectly and infallibly, the thoughts which the

Scriptures were intended to express and convey. No other than precisely that order and arrangement, could possibly have expressed precisely the same thoughts and shades or modifications of thought; and therefore if the words of the original texts in the order in which they were arranged, truly express the thoughts which were intended to be expressed, then that order was no less essential than the thoughts themselves, and their relations, connections, and order of succession. And if the *inspiration* is the ground of the *infallibility* of Scripture, then the order and grammatical connection of the words must have been determined by inspiration.

A little thinking of this sort, might have led the anxious, conscientious, earnest, and amiable author to the following conclusions:

1. That no theory of Divine Inspiration can be well founded which does not clearly and consistently establish and account for the fact, that the Scripture—every word and phrase as given in the original text, in their order and connection—is the express and authoritative word of God.

2. That if the words and phrases in their original order and connection were not so given by Inspiration of God, as to preclude human responsibility and discretion in their selection and collocation, it can not be shown that they infallibly express what was intended to be conveyed, or that they can with propriety be called the word of God, or that, as expressing His thoughts and will, they are binding on the conscience, and an infallible rule of faith and life.

3. That since the Scripture was actually written in

the words and phrases and collocations referred to, and yet is the authoritative and infallible word of God, no possible criticism of the sacred text can demonstrate that those words and phrases were not given by inspiration in a mode equivalent to an immediate dictation of them by the Spirit.

4. The criticism, accordingly, of which the mechanical theory could not stand the test, was that of neologists, who introduced indefinite and inconsistent language, and thereby to speculative minds confused the whole subject; that of German philosophers, idealists, skeptics, pantheists, and atheists, who having no faith either in the doctrines or words of Scripture, naturally hated and opposed a theory according to which the Bible was generally believed to be the veritable word of God.

The main object of this modern criticism is in general to show that inasmuch as the Scriptures were written by men, and men ignorant of science, and of little culture in any respect, and written in their ordinary language and idiom, it can not be regarded as expressing intelligibly and accurately any supernatural doctrines, or even any historical or other matters of ordinary occurrence. These critics write as not believing in any Divine inspiration of the sacred writers or of what they wrote, or in any special or Divine authority of their writings; and to evade and confuse the subject, they institute various extreme and fanciful suppositions, pretended contradictions or inconsistencies, hypothetical distinctions and disparaging comparisons; and introduce false issues and false reasonings, tending to such conclusions as, that, if the Scripture

was written by man in his own words and style, it can have no higher than mere human authority; if on the other hand it be ascribed to Divine dictation, it is in style and diction unworthy of that source, and disproves itself. In a word, that the language and style prove that it could not have been inspired and of Divine authority; and that its being written by man, in his vulgar language and style, prove it to be fallible and without authority.

Hence in our author's view, the great problem to be solved was, how to reconcile the Divine and human elements in the composition; which in his opinion the 'mechanical' theory failed to do. . . That theory, under the potent influence of the so-called criticism, "had been tacitly abandoned"—and no satisfactory system had been proposed 'in its stead.' Indefiniteness and inconsistency of language in relation to the subject of inspiration had sprung up. There is, says the author, 'a vagueness in the language which most writers employ when approaching this topic, and a want of completeness in the method usually adopted when discussing it.' To meet the exigency of the case as thus indicated, and with his view of those defects of the 'mechanical' theory owing to which it had been tacitly abandoned, the author projected his lectures on the basis of the 'dynamical' theory.

The distinction which the author makes between Revelation and Inspiration, is obviously altogether irrelevant to a discussion of the nature and mode of Inspiration; since, according to his own view, every portion of the Scripture was inspired, and he holds to one kind only, and rejects all pretenses of different kinds

and degrees of inspiration. "According to that distinction," he writes, (p. 115,) "while Scripture is, throughout all its parts, *inspired*, it can not be said that all its contents are *revelations*." But if all its contents are *inspired*, and by one kind and degree of inspiring agency or influence, how can the fact that one portion of its contents consists of prophetic announcements, and other portions, of facts and doctrines which man was incompetent to discover, and of which the writers had no previous knowledge, serve to explain or in any manner to illustrate the nature or mode of Inspiration? Surely that fact has no conceivable relation whatever to the question in hand. All the contents equally behooved to be inspired and to be written; and all accordingly were inspired, and in one particular way, that is, what is written, whether previously known or not, was conveyed into the minds of the writers by inspiration. If there were diverse modes of *Revelation*, there was, according to our author, and according to the Scriptures also, but one mode of *Inspiration*. "The gift of Inspiration," he observes, (p. 146,) "was equally required by those among the authors [writers?] of Scripture who had received revelations, as by those to whom Divine knowledge was never thus imparted." Again, (p. 148,) "Inspiration, I must again repeat, is to be understood as denoting that Divine influence, under which *all* the parts of the Bible have been committed to writing, whether they contain an account of of ordinary historical facts, or the narrative of supernatural revelations."

The author rejects the 'mechanical' theory of Inspiration, wholly or chiefly because it ascribes too little

to the agency of man — the human element — and, though it teaches that the Spirit "accommodated Himself to the different peculiarities of the sacred writers, and inspired them with those expressions which they would have employed had they been left to themselves," it does not account, to his satisfaction, for the variety of diction and the peculiarities of style in the original text, and therefore he thinks it can not be reconciled "with the highest aim of religion—the elevation and enlightenment of the faculties of man." (P. 23.) He thinks, also, that the expressions above cited are wholly hypothetical, and "assume an exercise of the Divine agency for which no motive can be assigned, or end pointed out." How he would reconcile with the highest aim of religion the fact that such variety of style and diction was actually employed in the Bible, every part and parcel of which he holds to be the inspired word of God, he has omitted to inform us. It would at least be very natural to conclude, that since the style and diction referred to is, in fact, employed, so that the Scriptures as written are in the most profound sense the word of God, they must be perfectly consistent with their object—the highest aim of religion; and that the attainment of that object was an assignable and sufficient motive, and an end easily to be pointed out. To say that the Divine agency, exerted to produce a specific result, would be without motive or end, unless exerted in the *mode* of a particular theory, is preposterous and absurd. And since the Scriptures throughout were given by inspiration of God, and are written in human language and in the ordinary style of the writers, it is certain that they are with that

characteristic perfectly consistent with the Divine Wisdom and with the highest aim of religion.

It is too apparent to be overlooked or disguised, that if the author, instead of devising a theory for himself, adopted that of another, it was that of Mr. Morell which he adopted, with certain verbal modifications in regard to the nature of Inspiration, and the distinction which he affirms between inspiration and revelation. For that philosopher insists on an equally broad distinction. He holds that revelations were immediate intuitions of Divine realities, and inspiration was that excitement or stimulus which enabled the mind to perceive them. He accordingly employs the same phrases as our author: such as "spiritual intuition," "the power of spiritual vision," "dynamical" in opposition to "mechanical," and the like.

That view of Inspiration, which the Scripture itself expressly teaches, and according to which the Omniscient Being conveyed those thoughts which were to be communicated to mankind in the sacred writings, to the minds of those who were to write them, and conveyed them by vocal articulation audibly, or otherwise, in their accustomed language or style, so that they could comprehend, be conscious of, remember, and readily and correctly speak and write them, is consistent with man's constitution and agency in the case, and with the fact that the Scripture as written, is the word of God, and is adequate to all the exigencies and all the phenomena of the case. It is all that the case required; all that behooved to be effected by inspiration. Nor is there any incompatibility or incongruity between this view, and the fact that revelations were made by audi-

ble utterances of the very words which are recorded, by an equivalent effect in the prophet's mind, causing him to be conscious of the thoughts and words in visions and dreams, and by significant acts, types, and symbols. For whatever thoughts were conveyed in these latter modes, were conveyed by means equivalent in their effect on the understanding and consciousness of the recipients, to audible utterances—spoken words. On this view, the Scripture as written, is clearly seen and felt to be the word of God, as clearly as the vocal or written words of one man by which he conveys his thoughts to another, are seen and felt to be his words.

The subject is thus cleared of a vast incubus of artificial and heathenish mystery. It is a plain matter of conveying thoughts in intelligible language, from the Infinite Intelligence to intelligent creatures; involving, so far as the agency of man is concerned, nothing different from our ordinary experience, and nothing peculiar in any respect, except that it is God who conveys to man what is to be written, instead of its being conveyed by one man to another, in his ordinary language, or by intelligible and equivalent signs. This Divine Inspiration of thoughts in words into the minds of the sacred writers, is therefore no more to be illustrated by the hocus-pocus of the heathen oracles, than an act of creation or a real miracle is to be illustrated by the acts of the magicians of Egypt, or by the feigned miracles of heathenish or Romish device. The prophets, while receiving revelations and inspirations in words which they were to write, retained their intelligent consciousness so as correctly to understand and write them. Whatever may have been the effect of the ephod or

the minstrel on the mental or the physical affections of the prophets, they were used but occasionally, and could have had nothing to do with the inspiring agency, or with the thoughts and words which were conveyed by inspiration. And whatever may have been the purpose and effect of the influence of the Spirit exerted, not uniformly and generally, but in particular instances, on the bodies and physical organs of the prophets, that influence, as might be inferred from its infrequency, had no natural or necessary connection with the inspiring influence.

We conclude that there is no foundation in Scripture nor any possibility in the nature of the case, for the author's assumption of a combination of the agency of the Holy Spirit with man's agency, in any thing relating to the inspiration of the Scriptures. The Scriptures never confound the two agencies, nor represent them as combined. They expressly ascribe the regeneration of man to an immediate act of the Spirit, as distinct from any act of man as is an act of creation. In what succeeds that immediate act in the process of sanctification, they assert a coöperating, indwelling, enlightening, guiding influence of the Spirit in coïncidence with the voluntary acts and affections of men; but they distinctly ascribe that influence to the Spirit as personal to Him, and those acts and affections to men as theirs exclusively, and for which they alone are responsible. There is no combination of the two agencies producing a result of the joint act to be ascribed to both agents as if they were but one numerically and in nature, or to be affirmed of one to the exclusion of the other agent. Such a combination is

impossible, and the conceit of it is absurd. It denies or confounds all distinction between different persons, agencies, acts, and results. It makes the acts of two distinct persons the acts of one person, which is absurd. The nature, personality, and acts of the Holy Spirit are as absolutely distinct and different from the nature, personality, and acts of man, as the Creator is distinct and different from the creature; and they can no more be confounded in one species of phenomena than in personal identity. If this is not absolutely true and what the Scriptures absolutely teach, then Pantheism has a point to start from, a fulcrum to support its mythic lever. But the Scriptures expressly teach that inspiration was a personal and official act of the Holy Spirit, conveying His thoughts in His words to men; that what the sacred writers recorded was conveyed to them by His inspiration; that He spake to them in words and phrases similar to theirs; that, on the other hand, they in the voluntary exercise of their personal agency, reüttered His words verbally and recorded them in writing; that they spake to Him in words and phrases similar to His, making specific inquiries and requests, to which they received specific answers, and making specific replies to interrogations from Him. They treat of His agency in these things as strictly personal to Him and perfectly distinct from theirs, and no more imply a combination of His agency with theirs in these acts, than in the act of creation. To say that a prophet, as the *recipient* of a Divine communication of thought, is active in the conveyance of the thought to himself because his reception of it is a necessary condition of its being conveyed to him, is as

preposterous as to say, that in the Divine act of creating Adam, Adam was active, because his reception of life was a necessary condition of the Divine act being exerted.

Those who hold the distinguishing evangelical doctrines of the Bible, and who of course hold the Scriptures themselves to be the infallible word of God, may be represented as defining Inspiration, either, first, as a Divine act which conveyed to the sacred writers both the thoughts and the words which they committed to writing; or, second, as a Divine influence exerted on the faculties of the writers, by which they were *so guided* as to render them infallible in thought and in language. The latter definition, considered as it properly should be, to relate equally to all the contents of Scripture, must preclude the supposition of different kinds and degrees of inspiration, and it must also preclude the supposition of revelations being made by inspiration. Accordingly, those who hold this view, feel obliged to assert a radical and essential distinction between revelation and inspiration. On this view, the sacred penmen, so far as they recorded revelations previously made, behooved to be infallibly guided only in respect to the words which they employed. But in respect to matters naturally within their personal knowledge and experience, the guidance must have extended both to thoughts and words; and, obviously, it must have left them in the free exercise of their natural faculties, in their selection of thoughts and choice of words, or else it must have left them no discretion whatever. On the latter supposition they must have been mere machines, the process must have been purely mechanical; the

influence exerted on them must have suspended and superseded the natural exercise of their faculties. In this case, infallibility, in respect to what they wrote, must, as in any merely mechanical process, be a result of the nature of guidance. But on the other supposition, namely, that the guidance did not in any manner interfere with the free natural exercise of their faculties, but only infallibly preserved them from error in their selection of thoughts and words, it is difficult, and as we think, impossible, to see why both the thoughts and the words, as selected and written by them, were not as truly and exclusively theirs, as they would have been had there been no such guidance as is supposed. And in that case, granting that what they wrote was truth only, without any mixture of error, it is difficult to see how that entitles it to be called the word of God—uttered in His name and on His authority. If Inspiration was a divine act which conveyed to the sacred penmen all the words which they wrote, then there is no difficulty in understanding how and why they are the words of God. But if Inspiration conveyed neither thoughts nor words, but only guided the sacred writers, the subject is beset by very grave difficulties. Suppose a writer—as Horne in his Introduction—should, understanding inspiration in this latter sense, namely, as a guidance, an influence *on* the the faculties of man, endeavor to prove that the sacred writers were divinely inspired, and therefore that what they wrote was of Divine authority, and should adduce miracles and prophecy as proofs. Does not every one perceive the incongruity, nay, absurdity, of supposing an interposition of divine power supernatural and con-

tranatural, to prove or attest that a prophet's words were uttered under an infallible *guidance*, or to prove or attest any thing less than that what he uttered was the authoritative, infallible words of God, and that the utterer was but the mouth-piece of Him whose words they were, and by whose power the miracle was wrought?

Does the fulfillment of the very words of a prophecy prove that they were the words of a prophet uttered by him when subject to a Divine influence on his faculties, which guided him in the selection, and preserved him from error; or does the literal fulfillment prove that the words of the prediction were the very words of the Omniscient Being, by whose providence over all creatures rational and physical, the specified result was brought about? Was it in attestation of the words of Scripture as the very words of God, or as the words of man infallibly guided and preserved from error, that the confessors and martyrs, under the ancient and present dispensation, suffered torments and sacrificed their lives?

The absolute necessity of a standard in the sacred text that is in itself infallible; the meaning and authority of which does not depend in any degree upon fallible human wisdom or upon the intellectual or moral qualifications of the sacred penmen, is evident from a variety of considerations. If there be not such a standard, then there can be no infallible standard, no standard of immutable authority over the consciences of men.

In the nature of the case, the rule which prescribes what we must believe concerning God and what duties

He requires of us—that which determines the nature and results of sin and holiness—that by which man is at last to be judged and his destiny eternally fixed, must be infallible. Neither its contents nor its authority can in any degree be ascribed to man. Nor can the meaning of the rule depend upon the construction which men may put on it, but must be inherent in the rule itself as delivered by the Lawgiver. As well might one contend that the laws of the physical universe are not in themselves immutable and independent of the theories and constructions of men, as to contend that the Scripture doctrines of faith and rules of duty were not unchangeably fixed and certain in the sacred record independently of the agency of the writers.

The true reason why different readers, students, expositors, do not understand the Scriptures alike, is not any intrinsic or necessary imperfection, ambiguity, or inadequacy of language, but is founded in the corrupted nature, the darkened understanding, the perverted wills, the disordered affections of the fallen race. Language was originally as perfect a vehicle and representative of thought as the eye is a perfect instrument of sight, and the ear of sound. The words employed to express a particular thought, expressed that thought unmistakably and perfectly. And when the mind is perfectly rectified, when in another state or dispensation, men are enlightened, taught of God, so as to see eye to eye, they will understand the sacred text alike. There will be no sects, no diversity of sentiment in heaven. The Scripture standard, the inspired thoughts, as perfectly expressed in the inspired words of the sacred text, will endure forever. It will be the rule of final judgment,

the test by which the thoughts, words, affections, and actions of men will be tried.

Hence the irrefragable Protestant doctrine, as expressed in the Westminster Confession, that all the books of "Holy Scripture, or *the word of God written, are given by inspiration of God to be the rule of faith and life.* The authority of the Holy Scripture for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, *dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or Church, but wholly upon God, the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received because it is the word of God.* The Supreme Judge, by whom all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but *the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures.*"

It is accordingly clear beyond a question, that no church or ecclesiastical body, no individual or number of individuals, has any right whatever to prescribe to others any doctrine of faith or rule of life as in any degree depending on their authority, or to arrogate any right or authority to enjoin their interpretations of Scripture on the consciences of other men. There is in this relation no authority but that of the word of God.

It is manifest that neither any individual, nor any association or hierarchy of men, can have any right or authority to enjoin their interpretations, doctrines, or faith upon other men, for in the nature of the case the authority which prescribes and enjoins, must be infallible—incapable of erring—exempt from all liability to err. But no individual man, nor any association of

men can pretend to possess this attribute or profess even to have been guiltless of error both in faith and practice. As human beings and members of the fallen race, whether polished or vulgar, learned or ignorant, they are in this respect on a level. Every man has in respect to his moral relations to his fellow-men, just as good a right to entertain his false opinions as they have to entertain their true opinions on the same subject. No one has naturally any right in any degree to prescribe and enforce his faith upon others. Nor has any such right ever been delegated to any mortal or collection of mortals, nor can possibly be so delegated unless it be possible first to confer omniscience, plenary and infallible knowledge on the person or persons so authorized.

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